Dynamics of Planning Process in the Lower Mekong Basin : A Management Analysis for the Se San Sub-Basin by Thim, Ly
 
 
 
  
Dynamics of Planning Process in the Lower Mekong Basin: 
A Management Analysis for the Se San Sub-Basin 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inaugural-Dissertation 
zur Erlangung der Doktorwürde 
der 
Philosophischen Fakultät 
der 
Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität 
zu Bonn 
 
 
 
 
 
vorgelegt von 
 
 
LY THIM 
 
 
  
aus 
 
 
Prey Veng, Cambodia 
 
     
 
 
 
Bonn, 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gedruckt mit der Genehmigung der Philosophischen Fakultät 
der Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zusammensetzung der Prüfungskommission: 
 
Prof. Dr. Hans-Dieter Evers 
(Vorsitzende/Vorsitzender) 
 
Prof. Dr. Solvay Gerke 
(Betreuerin/Betreuer und Gutachterin/Gutachter) 
  
PD. Dr. Peter P. Mollinga 
(Gutachterin/Gutachter) 
 
Prof. Dr. Christoph Antweiler 
(weiteres prüfungsberechtigtes Mitglied) 
 
 
 
 
 
Tag der mündlichen Prüfung : 10 June 2010 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
 
This thesis would not have been possible without the help and support of many people. Above all 
I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Solvay Gerke for accepting me to be her supervisee from the 
outset. Without her acceptance I could not enroll in the PhD program of Bonn Interdisciplinary 
Graduate School of Development Research (BiGS – DR –) at the Center for Development 
Research (ZEF) of Bonn University. 
I owe a deep debt of gratitude to my second supervisor, PD. Dr. Peter P. Mollinga, for his 
invaluable guidance and suggestion through out the preparation of this thesis. Without his 
constant advice this thesis would not have been completed. 
I am grateful to my advisor, Prof. Dr. Hans Dieter Evers, for visiting me in the field and giving 
me the benefit of his advice and guidance in data collection and analysis. Without his field 
mission, my data collection would have been insufficient for the analysis. 
I take this opportunity to thank the librarian and all staff of the “BiGS – DR –” program of ZEF. 
My thankfulness in particular goes to Ms. Zabel Rosemarie for her kind assistance in all matters 
related to academic as well as social aspect. 
I am also greatly indebted to the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) for providing 
financial support for this study. Without this financial assistance my study would not be possible. 
I have special pleasure in expressing my appreciation to friends and colleagues who helped me to 
accomplish this thesis. My deepest appreciation goes to Julia-Roswitha Kloos, Tatjana Bauer, 
Nadine Reis, and Anna Hennecke at ZEF, and Veronika Kham who helped translating the 
required summary of this thesis into German version. Thanks also go to Dr. Daphne Gondhalekar 
for her proof read of the German summary. Without their assistance I could not submit this thesis 
to the Faculty of Philosophy. 
Last but not least I would like to thank my wife Arounna Vongsakhamphouy for her personal 
support in the process of this thesis writing. To my son, Arounyadet Thim, he enriches my life 
substantially. To my parent, parent in-law, sisters and brothers for their continuous support and 
encouragement. 
Ly Thim 
June 2010 
 i
 ii
ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study was to explore how various actors have responded to hydropower dam 
impacts in the Se San river basin as away to unpack how river basin management works in 
practice. The Se San river basin is shared by upstream Vietnam and downstream Cambodia. In 
1993, Electricity of Vietnam began constructing 720 MW Yali-Falls dam in upstream Vietnam 
and the dam began to cause downstream impacts in Cambodia in early 2000. Since then conflict 
between the affected downstream communities and upstream dam builder has been emerging 
To study the responses, the concept of social interface of actor-oriented approach was used to 
analyze the arena of conflicts at three levels including local, national and international arenas. 
At local arena, two interesting responses were found. First, the responses emerged from local 
communities in term of coping strategies to the dam impacts which were identified as very 
limited. Some of their coping strategies caused destruction of natural resources such as 
deforestation for new settlement and farming. Second, the responses were organized by NGO 
network in Cambodia and abroad to establish a grass-root NGO for advocacy against the dam 
building called Se San Protection Network. This network was built with a strong cooperation 
with other NGOs across national and international levels but a weak collaboration with 
government has been found. Although Vietnam and Cambodia governments recognized that the 
dam has an impact on local livelihoods, compensation for past, present and future losses was 
ignored and mitigation of impacts remains questions. As there is no tangible result from the NGO 
Network, some affected communities have lost their confidence in supporting advocacy network. 
If this continues to occur the strength of advocacy network tends to be weak in the future. 
At national arena, responses were initially done through the Mekong River Commission for 
which Cambodia and Vietnam are the members. Through the intervention of the Mekong River 
Commission, a Joint Committee for Se San Management between Cambodia and Vietnam was 
established to discuss and negotiate a number of actions such as mitigation measures, monitoring 
water quality and impacts assessment study. No compensation issue has been discussed because 
Cambodia government did not make a demand. The analysis of this study revealed that mitigation 
measure was not fully implemented by the Joint Committee as water level fluctuation and water 
quality still remains an issue. In addition, notification system on dam water release was not either 
smoothly delivered to local communities because of poor communication facility. An important 
finding in this arena was that the Cambodia government did not give much attention to solve the 
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Se San issue. One of the examples is that the Cambodia joint committee whose task is to 
negotiate with Vietnam had no budget to organize the meeting since 2004. 
At international and global arenas the study found that the Electricity of Vietnam has used 
various strategies to avoid cost such as shifting the debate of the Yali-Falls dam impact from 
international and global levels to a bilateral one which was more favorable and easy to deal with. 
In this case, problem was scaled down from a larger to a smaller context. At international arena, 
the author also discovered that the role of the Mekong River Commission Secretariat in conflict 
resolution is weak as the Secretariat has no mandate to preside over conflict resolution but rather 
as a facilitation role to the parties. In this case negotiation between Cambodia and Vietnam was 
done bilaterally which is favorable for Vietnam to control the game. 
The last finding of this study was that Cambodia government has an interest in dam building and 
has registered Electricity of Vietnam to build dams particularly for the section bordered to 
Vietnam to boast political and economic ties between the two countries. 
Overall, the author concluded that the planning process in the Se San River basin highly served 
the interest of dam builders as well as national interest and failed to take into account the interest 
of local communities whose livelihoods depend on river system for a living. To meet their 
interests and goals, powerful actors zigzagged their strategies to avoid claims made by affected 
communities and NGOs. Future study should deal with how Mekong River Commission’s role 
shall be promoted to voice the power of local communities in dam development process. 
 
Key words: river basin management, hydropower dam impact, social actors and responses, social 
interface, and arena of conflict 
 
 iv
 v
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Acknowledgement i
Abstract iii
Table of Contents v
List of Figures  ix
List of Tables  x
List of Boxes  x
Acronyms  xi
Zusammenfassung xiii
Chapter 1 Introduction ……………………………………………………….………… 1
1.1 Introduction ………………………………………………………...……............... 1
1.2 Background to the study ………………………………………………………….. 1
1.3 An overview of the Se San River……………………………………………..…... 5
1.3.1 Physical geography …………………………………………………....……. 5
1.3.2 Elevation ……………………………………………………..…………..…. 7
1.3.3 Climate and rainfall ………………………………………………...………. 7
1.3.4 Population, ethnicity and economic characteristics ……..……………..…… 7
1.4 Research approach and methodology …………………………………………….. 9
1.4.1 Methodological design – three arenas ………………………..…………..… 9
1.4.2 Methods of data collection ………………………………………………….. 10
1.5 An overview of dam affected area in Ratanakiri province ……………..……….... 13
1.5.1 Overall area and population affected by dam ………………..……..………. 13
1.5.2 Overview of socio-economic characteristics ………………..…..………….. 15
1.6 Structure of thesis ……………………………………………………....………… 18
 
Chapter 2 Theoretical Review and Analytical Framework …………………..…..…... 20
2.1 Introduction ………………………………………………………………...…….. 20
2.2 Issues of river basin development …………………………………………....…… 20
2.3 Terms and concepts of river, river basin and management ……………..…….….. 22
2.3.1 River ……………………………………………………….……………..… 23
2.3.2 River basin ……………………………………………………..….……….. 23
2.3.3 River basin management ……………………………………………...……. 24
2.3.4 Organizational models of river basin management …………..…………..… 25
2.3.5 The complexity of river basin management ……………………..……….… 27
2.4 Concepts of development and its meaning in relation to hydropower development   28
2.4.1 Concepts of development ……………………………………..………….… 28
2.4.2 The meaning of development in relation to hydropower development …….. 30
2.5 Concepts of planning …………………………………………………………....... 35
2.5.1 General views of planning ……………..………………………..………..… 35
2.5.2 Characteristics and intrinsic nature of planning ……………………………. 36
2.5.3 The process view of planning: management from the planning perspective 
………………………………………………………………………….…… 
 
37
2.5.6 Planning as a political process ……………………………………… 40
2.6 Analytical framework – an actor-oriented approach to social interface in planning 
………………………………………………………………………………….…. 
 
42
2.6.1 General concept of actor-oriented approach ……………………..……….… 43
2.6.2 Agency, knowledge and power ……………………..………………………. 45
2.6.3 Social interface …………………………………...………………..……….. 47
2.6.4 Arenas ……………………………………………...………..……………… 50
2.7 Summary and conclusion …………………………………….............…………… 51
  
Chapter 3 Water Resources Development Planning in the Lower Mekong Basin: an 
Empirical Experience for Hydropower Development in the Se San Sub-basin ……... 
 
55
3.1 Introduction …………………………………………..………………………...…. 55
3.2 Historical review of water resources planning and management in the Mekong 
River Basin …………………………………………………………………..…… 
 
55
3.2.1 Geographical location of the Mekong basin …………..…………………..... 55
3.2.2 The birth of the Mekong project from 1947 to 1956 ………..……..……….. 58
3.2.3 The Mekong Committee (1957-1977): an era for promoting hydropower 
development on the Mekong’s tributaries ……………………………....….. 
 
59
3.2.4 Interim Mekong Committee (1978-1994): planning during an uncompleted 
member ……………………………………………………………….....….. 
 
61
3.2.5 Mekong River Commission (1995-Present): reactivation of full 
committee’s members ………………………………………..…………..…. 
 
62
3.2.6 Discussion and conclusion ………………………………..……………..….. 65
3.3 The process of hydropower development in the Se San sub-basin …………....…. 67
3.4 Hydropower development in the Se San River: from Vietnamese perspective …...   69
3.4.1 The role of Se San River in economic development trajectory in Vietnam ...   69
3.4.2 Status of hydropower development in the Se San River ………………....… 72
3.5 Conclusion …………………………………………………………………..…..... 74
    
 vi
Chapter 4 Local Arena: Struggle the Battle – Success versus Challenge ……………. 77
4.1 Introduction ………………………………………………………..………..…….. 77
4.2 Hydropower dam impacts: differences in viewpoints ………………………...….. 77
4.2.1 The perspective of river bank communities ………………………….....…... 78
4.2.2 Other viewpoints on local impacts …………..………………………….….. 80
4.2.3 Concluding remarks ……………………………………..………………..… 87
4.3 Local coping capacity, knowledge and problems encountered …………..…….… 88
4.3.1 Coping capacity toward flood events …………………………..……….….. 88
4.3.2 Organizing cultural practices as a means for recovery ………..………..…... 90
4.3.3 Abandoning and relocating home ………………..……………………..…... 91
4.3.4 Taking self-precaution measure ………………..………………………..….. 93
4.3.5 Seeking other alternatives of livelihoods …………..…………………….... 94
4.3.6 Coping with the decline of water quality …………..…………………..…… 96
4.3.7 Concluding remarks ………………………..……………………………..… 97
4.4 The emerging response in to dam impacts ……………………………...…..……. 98
4.5 The formation of Se San Protection Network and network building ………..….... 100
4.6 Strategies and choices of Se San Protection Network ………..………………..…. 105
4.6.1 Propagation of Se San issues for transboundary dialogue …………..…….... 106
4.6.2 Formation of rivers coalition network: linking local actions to national, 
international and global arenas and vice-versa ………..………………….… 
 
108
4.6.3 Capacity building of the network ………………………………..…….…… 110
4.6.4 Community network meeting and petition preparation …………………….. 111
4.6.5 Research and documentation ……………………………………..……..….. 114
4.6.5 Political support …………………………………………..……………..….. 116
4.6.7 Restoration of local livelihoods through partners …………..…………..…... 118
4.7 Outcomes and challenges …………………………………..………………….…. 120
4.7.1 Communities’ awareness and support in advocacy ……………..………...... 120
4.7.2 Acknowledgement on dam impacts ……………………………..………..… 121
4.7.3 Challenges facing local communities and Se San Protection Network …….. 122
4.8 Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………....... 123
 
Chapter 5 National Arena: Success or Failure of Intervention? ……………………... 127
5.1 Introduction ……………………………………………………………………….. 127
5.2 State’s structure: actors and politics related to water resources management ……. 127
5.2.1 National government: line ministries and inter-ministerial committee ……. 129
 vii
5.2.2 Sub-national government: province, district, commune and village ……….. 133
5.3 Cambodia interest in water resources development ……………………..……..… 135
5.4 Governmental response to February 2000 flood event caused by water release 
from Yali-Falls dam …………………………………………………….…..……. 
 
137
5.4.1 Immediate response of national agencies ……………………….………..… 137
5.4.1 Responses of border provincial authorities ………..……………………..…. 141
5.4.3 Establishing mechanism for negotiating mitigation measure ………..…..…. 142
5.5 Mitigation measures ………………………………………………..…………..…. 144
5.5.1 Failure of notification system …………………………………..………..…. 144
5.5.2 Monitoring and mitigating water level fluctuation ………..…………..……. 147
5.6 The issue of water quality ……………………………………………..……..…… 149
5.7 Negotiating for an impact assessment ……………………………………..…..…. 152
5.8 Compensation …………………………………………………………………….. 155
5.9 Conclusion ………………………………………………………………………... 159
 
Chapter 6: International and Global Arenas: More Protests More Dams ………….. 162
6.1 Introduction ………………………………………………………….……..…….. 162
6.2 Protesting and fighting against the Yali-Falls dam: the role of distant actors ……. 162
6.3 Funding and withdrawing of support by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) …. 171
6.4 The Mekong River Commission Secretariat as an intermediary: responses and the 
issue of power relation ………………………………………..………………...… 
 
173
6.5 Negotiating Se San dams in Cambodia’s stretch …………………………………. 178
6.6 Conclusion ………………………………………………………..……………..... 182
 
Chapter 7: Conclusion …………………………………………………….………….… 185
 
References …………………………………………………………….…………………. 189
I. Interviews …………………………………………………………………..………. 189
II. Focus Group Discussion by District ……………………………………………..... 195
III. Bibliography …………………………………………………………………….... 198
 
 
 
 viii
 ix
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
No. Title Page
1.1 Overview of the Se San River Basin 6
1.2 Map of Ratanakiri Province 13
2.1 Planning as a process of action 40
3.1 Physiographical and political divisions map of the Mekong Basin 57
3.2 Organizational structure of Mekong River Commission 63
3.3 Mekong River Commission Program Structure 65
3.4 Map of planned hydropower stations and the location of the proposed North-
to-South 500 kV high-tension power line in Vietnam (in the early 1990s) 
 
5  71
3.5 Cross section map of hydropower dam cascades on Se San River in Vietnam    73
4.1 Magnitude of daily water fluctuation at Andong Meas from January 2004 to 
May 2006 
 
84
4.2 Frequency of water level fluctuation within the day at Andong Meas from 
2002 to 2004 
 
85
4.3 Jarai women are sitting and waiting to get water from forest based water hole  96
4.4 Organizational structure of 3 S Rivers Protection Network (3SPN) 103
4.5 Structure of Se San Community Network (SCN) indicated in shade box 104
5.1 Governance Structure of the Public Sector in Cambodia, 1999 128
5.2 Hourly water levels at Andong Meas in Cambodia, Se San River from 2000-
2002 
 
149
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
No. Title Page
1.1 Administrative divisions and Area of Se San Basin 6
1.2 Average monthly rainfall (mm) in some stations in Se San basin (1985-2000) 7
1.3 Number of Se San’s riverbank population in Ratanakiri Province, 2006 15
1.4 Rice cultivation areas by district and commune adjacent to Se San River, 
2006 
17
3.1 Distribution of water resources in the Mekong River Basin 56
3.2 Name of hydropower projects listed by Mekong Committee in 1968 68
3.3 Dams on Se San River in Vietnam territory 74
4.1 Key impacts caused by the Yali-Falls dam as found by Oxfam America 2001 83
4.2 Population of the abandoned villages by district and commune 92
5.1 State’s actors involved in water resources management in Cambodia 132
5.2 Hydropower Development Plan 2010-2020 Generation Projects in Cambodia 137
6.1 Responses of MRC Secretariat after February 2000 flood event caused by 
water release from the Yali-Falls dam 
177
 
LIST OF BOXES 
No. Title Page
4.1 Example of petition prepared by Se San Community Network 113
4.2 Reports prepared by 3SPN’s partners 115
 
 x
 xi
ACRONYMS 
 
- 3SPN   3 S Rivers Protection Network 
- ADB   Asian Development Bank 
- AMRC  Australian Mekong Resource Center 
- BDP   Basin Development Plan (Mekong River Commission) 
- CEDAC Centre d’Etude et de Dévelopment Agricole Cambodgien (French acronym 
stand for Cambodian Centre for Study and Development in Agriculture in 
Cambodia) 
- CNMC  Cambodia National Mekong Committee 
- ECAFE  Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East 
- EIA   Environmental Impact Assessment 
- EP   Environment Program (Mekong River Commission) 
- EVN   Electricity of Vietnam 
- GAPE  Global Association for People and the Environment 
- IMC   Interim Mekong Committee 
- MAFF  Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (Cambodia) 
- MAFF  Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (Cambodia) 
- MBHIP  Management Board of the Yali Hydropower Project (Vietnam) 
- MC   Mekong Committee 
- MC Mekong Committee 
- MIME  Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy (Cambodia) 
- MoE   Ministry of Environment (Cambodia) 
- MOWRAM  Ministry of Water Resources and Meteorology (Cambodia) 
- MPWT Ministry of Public Works and Transport (Cambodia) 
- MRC   Mekong River Commission 
- MRD Ministry of Rural Development (Cambodia) 
- NGO Non-governmental Organization 
- NTFP Non-Timber Forest Products Non-Governmental Organization (Ratanakiri 
Province, Cambodia) 
- PECC 1  Power Engineering Consultant Company 1 (Vietnam) 
- RCC   River Coalition in Cambodia 
- RGC Royal Government of Cambodia 
- SIDA Swedish International Development Agency 
- SPN   Se San Protection Network 
- SWG   Se San Working Group 
- TERRA  Towards Ecological Recovery and Regional Alliance 
- TOR   Term of Reference 
- UNDP United Nations Development Program 
- VNMC  Vietnam National Mekong Committee 
- WCD World Commission on Dams 
- WUP   Water Utilization Program (Mekong River Commission) 
 xii
 xiii
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
1. Einführung 
Diese Studie konzentrierte sich auf die Nutzung und Bewirtschaftung der Wasserressourcen des 
Se San Flussbeckens. Das Becken wird flußaufwärts durch Vietnam und flußabwärts durch 
Kambodscha begrenzt. Der natürliche Reichtum dieses Flusses dient zwei gegensätzlichen 
Interessen der beteiligten Akteure. Auf der einen Seite sind die Wasserressourcen der Lebensnerv 
der Kommunen, die diesen Fluss seit Generationen für ihren Lebensunterhalt nutzen. Auf der 
anderen Seite wurde dieser Fluß für eine Reihe groß angelegter Wasserkraftbauprojekte 
ausgebeutet, wodurch die Existenzgrundlagen der örtlichen Gemeinschaften geschädigt wurden. 
In diesem Zusammenhang besteht die Herausforderung darin, eine gerechte Nutzung und 
Bewirtschaftung der Wasserressourcen zu Gunsten der beiden Parteien, den Gemeinden und der 
Damm-Entwickler, zu gewährleisten. 
Diese Studie befasste sich mit dem empirischen Prozess aus einer Perspektive, die Planung als 
einen kontinuierlichen Prozess der Aktion und Intervention bei der Durchführung von 
Entwicklungsprojekten versteht. Aus dieser Perspektive zielte diese Studie darauf ab, den 
Einfluss der verschiedenen gesellschaftlichen Akteure auf die Planung für das Management des 
San Se Flussbeckens als Reaktion auf die Yali-Falls Damm-Auswirkung zu erforschen. Der Yali-
Falls Staudamm, der von Electricity of Vietnam (EVN) im Jahr 1993 gebaut wurde, führte ab 
Mitte 1996 im stromabwärts gelegenen Kambodscha zu Auswirkungen. Die Reaktionen auf 
solche Auswirkungen von verschiedenen gesellschaftlichen Gruppen und Akteuren begann 
allerdings nach dem Hochwasserereignis während der Trockenzeit Ende Februar 2000, das durch 
das Ablassen von Wasser aus dem Yali-Falls Staudamm verursacht wurde. Es entstand ein 
Konflikt zwischen den stromab- und stromaufwärts gelegenen Gemeinden und den Bauherren des 
Staudamms. 
Die Ziele dieser Studie sind wie folgt: 
- Entwicklung eines Verständnisses des historischen Prozesses der Entwicklung der 
Wasserkraft im Se San Flussbecken; 
- Ermittlung der wichtigsten Akteure, ihrer Rollen, Interessen, ihrer Machtverhältnisse und 
Strategien zur Beeinflussung des Entscheidungsprozesses im Bereich Wasserkraft-
Entwicklung im Se San Flussbecken; 
- Bereitstellung einer abschließenden Bemerkung zu den Auswirkungen, die sich aus 
Antworten als Mittelwert für das Se San Flussbecken Management ergeben. 
2. Theoretische Überprüfung und analytischer Rahmen 
Basierend auf dem Problem und dem oben beschriebenen Zweck wurde eine Reihe von 
theoretischen Debatten überprüft um aufzudecken, wie ein Planungsprozeß für das Flußbecken in 
der Praxis funktioniert. In diesem Kapitel werden Themen wie die Flußbeckenentwicklung, 
Konzepte des Flußbeckenmanagements, Konzepte der Entwicklung in Bezug auf Wasserkraft 
und Konzepte der Planung erörtert. Mit dieser Analyse als Grundlage wurde der Ansatz des 
"actor-oriented approach to social interface" als analytischer Rahmen angewendet. Im 
Folgenden wird der Fluß von theoretischen Konzepten und analytischem Rahmen erklärt. 
Die Fragen zu der Entwicklung des Flußbeckens erstrecken sich vom Druck des Wassermangels 
zur Verschlechterung der Wasserqualität bei sinkendem Wasserstand aufgrund von einer 
überhöhten Entnahme und unsachgemäßer Nutzung der Wasserressourcen. Folglich führt dies 
tendenziell zu einer Verstärkung des Konfliktes zwischen den stromaufwärts und stromabwärts 
gelegenen Gemeinden. Eine für diese Studie relevante Frage hängt  mit der Entwicklung der 
Wasserkraft zusammen, wobei ein Staudamm konstruiert wurde, um den Fluss zu blockieren, um 
Wasser für die Stromerzeugung zurückzuhalten, mit dem dann die Turbinen angetrieben werden.  
Durch den Betrieb des Damms ist der natürliche Lauf des Flusses manipuliert und in Raum und 
Zeit verändert, was wiederum  zu einer Beeinträchtigung der Wasserqualität führt und damit 
Einfluss auf das Fluss-System nimmt. Da die Menschen Teil dieses Systems sind und in 
Abhängigkeit von ihm leben, sind sie auch betroffen. Die am stärksten durch den Damm 
betroffene Bevölkerungsgruppe, die in dieser Studie identifiziert wurde, sind die Gemeinden, die 
entlang des Flusses leben und deren Lebensunterhalt vom Fluss-System abhängt. Daher 
beinhalten die Auswirkungen nicht nur ökologische und soziale Aspekte, sondern auch 
wirtschaftliche und kulturelle. 
Die Faktoren für die Förderung der Wasserkraft-Entwicklung, die in dieser Studie identifiziert 
wurden, betrafen den Begriff der Entwicklung. In dieser Studie versteht man unter dem Begriff 
"Entwicklung" den Wandel, Prozess und Fortschritt, welcher Wirtschaftswachstum, 
Lebensunterhalt, Selbstachtung und Freiheit für eine bestimmte Gesellschaft oder ein Land 
herbeiführt. Diese Studie fand heraus, dass die Befürworter der Wasserkraft-Entwicklung als 
einen integrierten Ansatz angesehen werden müssen, der alle zusammenhängenden Aspekte 
innerhalb des Systems wie die Umwelt, wirtschaftliches, soziales, kulturelles und geistiges 
Wohlbefinden der Menschen in den Entwicklungsprozess mit einbezieht. 
 xiv
In dieser Studie wurde der Begriff "Planung" als ein zyklischer kontinuierlicher Prozess 
verstanden, der eine endlose Zeitspanne ueberdeckt. Die Komponenten dieses Planungsprozesses 
sind die Planung, Durchführung und Überwachung. Die drei Komponenten sind in einem Zyklus 
miteinander verbunden oder bekannt als eine Feedback-Schleife. In der Planung wird der Plan 
entworfen, und es folgt die Umsetzung der geplanten Aktivitäten und Überwachung. Da die 
Implementierung einen großen Pool von Ressourcen und Menschen mit einbezieht und betrifft, 
produziert die Planung oft eine Vielzahl von Konflikten zwischen den Nutzern während der 
Ausführung von Entwicklungsaktivitäten. In diesem Zusammenhang wurde der Planungsprozess 
als ein politischer Prozess identifiziert, an dem viele betroffene gesellschaftliche Akteure beteiligt 
sind. Dieser politische Prozess wurde als die Prozesse definiert, welche in  einem umstrittenen 
Interessenkonflikt zwischen den Nutzern vermitteln, seien es Dorfbewohner, Entwickler oder 
Entscheidungsträger. 
Um diesen politischen Planungsprozess zu entschlüsseln, wurde ein "actor-oriented approach" 
angewandt, um die interaktiven Relationen an der Schnittstelle zwischen Entwicklungsagenturen 
und den betroffenen Gemeinden zu analysieren, und um die Ergebnisse der Bemühungen der 
Planung aufzudecken. In dieser Studie wurden für die Analyse drei theoretische Konzepte 
verwendet, die sich vom "actor-oriented approach" ableiten lassen, nämlich das Konzept 
"agency, knowledge and power", das Konzept des  "social interface" und das Konzept der 
"arenas". Diese Studie hat die drei Konzepte als miteinander zusammenhängend identifiziert. 
Während das Konzept "agency, knowledge and power" auf die Notwendigkeit hinweist, soziale 
Akteure zu identifizieren, ihre soziale Beziehung und Struktur, Strategie, Interesse und 
Ressourcen und um Wissen und Macht zu enthüllen, wurde das Konzept des "social interface" 
identifiziert als die Bedeutung zu haben, Konfrontation und Konflikte zwischen den betroffenen 
gesellschaftlichen Akteuren mit verschiedenen Interessen, Ressourcen und Macht aufzudecken. 
Und schließlich wurde das Konzept der "arenas" als ein wichtiges Instrument identifiziert, um 
die "social interface" zu analysieren, weil es die Bedeutung der sozialen und räumlichen Lage der 
Konfrontation der verschiedenen gesellschaftlichen Akteure vermittelt.   
Schließlich konzipiert diese Arbeit das Gebiet der Wasserkraft-Entwicklung als eine "arena", in 
der eine Auseinandersetzung über Fragen, Ressourcen, Praktiken, Wissen und Werte stattfindet. 
Durch die Anerkennung von Entwicklungs-Interventionen als ein gesellschaftliches Ereignis, bei 
dem verschiedene gesellschaftliche Akteure mit verschiedenen Interessen im Planungsprozeß 
interagieren, analysierte diese Studie, wie sich dieser Wettbewerb bei drei verschiedenen 
"arenas" entfaltet, die in dieser Studie identifiziert wurden als die Einheit der Analyse, um die 
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Interessenkonflikte der verschiedenen beteiligten Akteure in der Wasserkraft-Entwicklungs-
Intervention des Se San Flussbeckens zu studieren. Diese drei Stufen der Analyse waren lokale, 
nationale und internationale/globale "arenas". Basierend auf dem Fall der Auswirkungen des 
Yali-Falls Staudamms war die wichtigste Forschungsfrage "Wie reagieren die verschiedenen 
sozialen Akteure auf die Auswirkungen des Staudamms auf lokaler, nationaler und 
internationaler/globaler Ebene?" Die drei "arenas" wurden in drei verschiedenen Kapiteln 
diskutiert. Kapitel 4 konzentrierte sich auf die lokale arena, Kapitel 5 auf die nationale arena und 
Kapitel 6 auf internationale und globale arenas. Obwohl jede "arena" in verschiedenen Kapiteln 
diskutiert wurde, bedeutet es nicht, dass es keinen Zusammenhang und Wechselbeziehungen 
zwischen den "arenas" gibt; sie sind miteinander verknüpft und dynamisch. 
3. Entwicklungsplanung für die Wasserressourcen im Unteren Mekongbecken: Eine 
empirische Untersuchung der Wasserkraftentwicklung im Se San Teileinzugsgebiet  
Das Ziel dieses Kapitels ist, eine historische Perspektive auf die Mekong Planung und 
Zusammenarbeit zu geben, von der aus der Planungsprozess für die Wasserkraftentwicklung des 
Se San Flusses hervorgeht. In diesem Kapitel wird gezeigt, dass bei der 
Wasserkraftentwicklungsplanung des Se San Flusses eine Vielzahl von nationalen und 
internationalen Akteuren beteiligt war, wobei zahlreiche Studien und Untersuchungen über einen 
langen Zeitraum hinweg entstanden sind.   
Von Anfang an wurde die Initiative der Wasserkraftentwicklung vom Mekong-Projekt, das 1947 
von der Wirtschaftskommission für Asien und den Fernen Osten (ECAFA) der Vereinten 
Nationen gegründet wurde, beeinflußt. Dieses Mekong-Projekt stellte auch den Ausgangspunkt 
für die Zusammenarbeit der vier Länder des Unteren Mekong-Beckenbereichs (Kambodscha, 
Vietnam, Thailand, Laos) im Wasserressourcenmanagement des Mekong dar und resultierte 
schließlich in der Gründung des Mekong Komitees im Jahr 1957. 
Das Mekong-Projekt und das Mekong-Komitee diente als Plattform sowohl für internationale 
Experten als auch für Experten aus den Anrainerstaaten, die sich trafen um zu diskutieren, 
Untersuchungen durchzuführen und Entwicklungschancen für das Untere Mekongbecken 
herauszustellen. Das Wasserkraftentwicklungsmodell wurde ursprünglich von internationalen 
Experten als die beste Option für eine Allzweckentwicklung angesehen, die auch dem 
Hochwasserschutz und der Bewässerung des Unteren Mekongbecken im Jahre 1951 dienen 
könnte. Die Befürwortung dieses Modells wurde  durch internationale Experten der ECAFE im 
Jahre 1953 als durchführbar bestätigt. Ende 1950 empfahlen internationale Berater ausdrücklich 
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zur Wasserkraftentwicklung der Zuflüsse, da diese schmaler waren und weniger Investitionen 
erforderten. Der Se San Fluss wurde als einer der 34 Hauptzuflüsse mit Wasserkraftpotential 
identifiziert. Weitergehende Studien über den Se San Fluss wurden von Anfang bis Mitte der 
60er Jahre durchgeführt und zeigten mehrere Wasserkraftmodelle im oberen Teil Vietnams auf, 
wobei der Yali-Falls Kleinstaudamm am vielversprechendsten war. Dieser Wasserkraftplan 
wurde im Jahre 1970 erneut untersucht und deckte den gesamten Verlauf des Se San Flusses ab. 
Es wurden zehn Projekte für Vietnam, vier Projekte für Kambodscha, sowie ein 
grenzenübergreifendes Projekt geplant. Jedoch mußten alle Wasserkraftprojekte aufgrund des 
Bürgerkrieges in Vietnam und Kambodscha in der ersten Hälfte der 70er Jahre gestoppt werden. 
Während Kambodscha, geführt von dem Völkermord-Regime der Roten Khmer, seine 
Mitgliedschaft im Mekong Komitee Mitte der 70er Jahre beendete, bildeten die verbleibenden 
drei Mitgliedsstaaten im Jahre 1978 das Interim Mekong Komitee (IMC) um ihre 
Zusammenarbeit und Planung fortzusetzen. Das IMC spielte weiterhin für das Vorantreiben der 
Wasserkraftentwicklung der Mekongzuflüsse eine große Rolle. Der Yali-Falls Staudamm am Se 
San Fluss war der größte Damm für den Vietnam von Geberländern durch das IMC finanzielle 
Unterstützung erhielt um detaillierte Studien durchzuführen, u.a. eine Durchführbarkeitsstudie 
sowie eine Umweltverträglichkeitsprüfung, die jeweils von den Regierungen Schwedens und der 
Schweiz im Jahre 1984 und 1991 finanziert wurden.   
Im Jahre 1991 ließ Kambodscha seine Mitgliedschaft wieder zu, jedoch wurde die Arbeit der 
Mekong Kooperation erst 1995 wiederaufgenommen. Diese neue Form der Zusammenarbeit 
bedeutete die Änderung des IMC zur Mekong River Commission (MRC) im April 1995. Mit der 
Neuerrichtung des MRC rückte die Unterstützung der Wasserkraftentwicklung immer mehr in 
den Hintergrund. Der Schwerpunkt der MRC wurde auf eine gemeinsame Entwicklung und den 
ökologischen Schutz gelegt. Nach zehn Jahren Tätigkeit des MRC wurde dieses aus den Reihen 
von Nichtregierungsorganisationen und Forschungsinstituten insofern kritisiert, als dass es 
ineffektiv in der Durchführung des 1995 verabschiedeten Mekong-Abkommens, vorallem im 
Bereich der grenzenüberschreitenden Konfliktlösung, wäre. Die Analyse zeigt, dass das MRC 
Sekretaritat, das sowohl den technischen als auch administrativen Teil des MRC einnimmt, 
machtlos ist um Druck auf Mitgliedsstaaten, die Projekte mit negativen Auswirklungen auf 
andere Staaten durchführen, auszuüben. Das MRC Sekretariat spielt bei Konfliktlösungen nur 
eine Moderatorenrolle, wobei die Entscheidung vollständig von den betroffenen 
Verhandlungsstaaten abhängt. Eine weiterführende Diskussion über die Rolle des MRC 
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Sekretariats in Bezug auf die Reaktion der Auswirkungen des Yali-Falls Staudamms wird in 
Kapitel 5 und 6 abgehandelt.       
Abgesehen von der Darstellung der Entwicklung auf Beckenebene, diskutiert dieses Kapitel 
darüberhinaus auch politische Strategien in Vietnam um zu verstehen, wie Vietnam den Se San 
Fluss in seine Wasserkraftentwicklungsagenda untergebracht hat. Das Ergebnis zeigt, dass 
aufgrund des wirtschaftlichen Wohlstandes, der in den späten 80er Jahren zu Energieengpäßen in 
Vietnam führte, die vietnamesische Regierung ihre Entscheidung bezüglich des geplanten Baus 
des Yali-Falls Staudamms von 48 MW im Jahre 1984 auf 700 MW im Jahre 1991 geändert hat. 
Zudem wurden fünf weitere Dämme mit einer Gesamtkapazität von mehr als 1000 MW geplant 
und deren Bau im Se San Becken in Vietnam vorangetrieben. 
4. Lokale Arena: den Kampf kämpfen, Erfolg vs. Herausforderung 
Dieses Kapitel analysiert eine Reihe von Situationen in denen Auseinandersetzungen über den 
Einfluss von Wasserkraftwerken stattfinden sowie Interventionsmaßnahmen und deren 
Auswirkungen auf der lokalen Ebene. Dabei werden wichtige Punke wie Auswirkungen des 
Staudamms auf verschiedene soziale Akteure, lokale Bewältigungsstrategien dieser 
Auswirkungen, Antworten auf lokaler Ebene, das nüpfen von sozialen Netzwerken sowie 
Strategien, Ergebnisse und Herausforderungen bei der Erstellung der Netzwerke diskutiert. 
Der erste Punkt diskutiert die Ansichten der betroffenen lokalen Akteure u.a. der River Bank 
Gemeinden, NGOs und der Regierungen Kambodschas sowie Vietnams.  Die Analyse zeigt, dass 
die betroffenen Gemeinden und die NGOs auf der einen Seite sowie die Regierung Kambodschas 
auf der anderen Seite weiterhin unterschiedliche Ansichten haben. Die Regierung Vietnams liegt 
dabei irgendwo dazwischen. Die betroffenen Gemeinden und NGOs betonen die beträchtlichen 
Auswirkungen des Yali-Falls Staudamms auf die dörfliche Existenzgrundlage, während die 
vietnamesische Regierung dies durch unangemessene Studienergebnisse zu widerlegen versucht. 
Der zweite Punkt untersucht inwieweit die betroffenen Gemeinden mit den sich wandelnden 
Bedingungen im Fluss-System umgehen können. Die Analyse ergibt, dass die betroffenen 
Gemeinden entsprechend ihrer Kultur, Mittel und Ressourcen unterschiedliche 
Bewältigungsstrategien aufweisen. Beispielsweise legen einige Gemeinden ihre Angeln nicht 
mehr nachts aus, da sie fürchten bisher unbekannte Strömungen könnten diese zerstören. Einige 
haben sich Arbeit außerhalb ihres Distriktes gesucht, um die Verluste im Fischfang ausgleichen 
zu können. Wieder andere sind gleich in höhere Lagen umgezogen aus Angst vor einem 
Dammbruch und Überflutung. Obwohl die genannten Strategien die Auswirkungen auf die 
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Lebensweise in den betroffenen Gemeinden verringern können, können sie auch neue 
Bedrohungen und Risiken hervorrufen, wie sie besonders in der Umsiedelung in Berglagen zu 
finden sind. Diese Umsiedlung führt zunächst zu Wasserknappheit in der Trockenzeit. Zweitens 
ist es aufgrund der fehlenden Infrastruktur schwieriger, Schulen und Krankenhäuser zu erreichen. 
Damit würden sich zwangsläufig höhere Analphabetenraten und ein erhöhtes Risiko bei 
Krankheiten ergeben. Um diese negativen Auswirkungen abzuwenden, wären hier Interventions-
Maßnahmen notwendig um eine Grundversorgung der betroffenen Gemeinden mit Häusern, 
Nahrungsmitteln, Wasser, Bildungsmöglichkeiten, Krankenhäusern und Straßen sicherzustellen.  
Der dritte Punkt erklärt Reaktionen auf der lokalen Ebene. Die Analyse deckt auf, dass einzelne 
Personen von lokalen und internationalen NGOs in der Ratankiri-Provinz eine wichtige Rolle bei 
der Untersuchung des durch den Yali-Falls Staudamm im Februar 2000 verursachten 
Hochwassers gespielt haben. Diese haben nämlich  bewusst staatliche Behörden aus der Provinz 
in die Untersuchung miteinbezogen. Im Rahmen des dabei entstandenen Untersuchungsberichts 
konnten die betroffenen Gemeinden nationale und internationale Entwicklungshilfe-
Organisationen erreichen, damit diese Druck auf diejenigen ausüben, die den Staudamm gebaut 
haben. Dadurch sollen Kompensationszahlungen für bereits entstandene Schäden sowie ein 
sofortiger Abbruch der weiteren Baumaßnahmen erreicht werden. Ein wichtiger Erfolg des 
Berichts war, dass sich einzelne Personen aus lokalen und internationalen NGOs 
zusammengeschlossen haben und das Se San Community Network gegründet haben. Ziel dieses 
Zusammenschlusses ist die Durchsetzung der Forderung nach einer Reform der bisherigen Politik 
um ein besseres Management von Flussgebieten zu erreichen, welches die Konsequenzen von 
grenzüberschreitenden Wasserkraftwerken einbezieht. Mit finanzieller Unterstützung von Oxfam 
Amerika konnte sich das „Se San Protection Network“ in der Ratankiri Provinz Ende 2001 
etablieren.  
Im vierten, fünften und sechsten Punkt dieses Kapitels werden Bildung, Strategien, Ergebnisse 
und Herausforderungen dieses lokalen Netzwerkes diskutiert. Die Analyse zeigt, dass sich das 
lokale Netzwerk gut etabliert und in seiner Bedeutung durch die Unterstützung des SPN 
Sekretariats zugenommen hat. Kenntnisse  betroffener Gemeinden über die Entwicklung von 
Wasserkraftwerken und deren Auswirkungen konnten durch die Informationsweitergabe des 
Netzwerks deutlich verbessert werden. Gegenwärtig sind über 500 Personen aus betroffenen 
Gemeinden Mitglied im Netzwerk und fordern von der Regierung Kambodschas in 
Verhandlungen mit der vietnamesischen Regierung zu treten und Forderungen nach 
Kompensation und Wiederherstellung der Existenzgrundlage durchzusetzen. Dies zeigt, dass die 
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betroffenen Gemeinden die Fürsprache durch das Netzwerk unterstützen. Um eine erfolgreiche 
Fürsprache zu ermöglichen, hilft das SPN Sekretariat Kontakte zu lokaler, nationaler wie auch 
internationaler Ebene zu ermöglichen. Der Aufgabenbereich des lokalen Netzwerks konzentriert 
sich auf die Verbreitung von Informationen über Damm-Baummaßnahmen und auf die 
Dokumentation der dadurch auftretenden Auswirkungen. Das SPN Sekretariat unterstützt dies 
indem Kapazitäten für Forschungsaktivitäten, Dokumentation und Verbreitung von Berichten 
bereitgestellt werden, damit die Berichte interessierte nationale und internationale 
(Entwicklungshilfe-) Agenturen erreichen können. Dies ist eine strategische Vorgehensweise, um 
Kompensation und Wiederherstellung der Existenzgrundlage in den betroffenen Gemeinden 
durch die vietnamesische Regierung zu erreichen. 
Durch die Aktivitäten des SPN Sekretariats wie beispielsweise die Unterstützung von Forschung, 
Diskussionen und Workshops in den Gemeinden, sind die betroffenen lokalen Gemeinden in der 
Lage über die Auswirkungen des Dammbaus auf ihre lokale Existenzgrundlage auf nationaler 
und internationaler Ebene zu sprechen und entsprechende Gegenmaßnahmen zu fordern. Zu 
diesem Zweck wurde eine Koalition aus verschiedenen lokalen und internationalen NGOs in 
Kambodscha sowie außerhalb gegründet, um die politischen Reformen so zu beeinflussen, dass 
soziale Gerechtigkeit für die betroffenen Gemeinden erreicht werden kann. Durch die 
Bemühungen des Netzwerks hat die Regierung Vietnams die negativen Auswirkungen des Yali-
Falls Staudamms stromabwärts in Kambodscha anerkannt und bereits einige Maßnahmen 
erlassen, um die Auswirkungen auf die lokalen Gemeinden zu verringern. Dazu wurde z.B. das 
„Se San 4A Reservoir“ in der Nähe der kambodschanischen Grenze gebaut, um den 
Wasserdurchfluss konstant zu halten sowie eine Einschätzung der Auswirkungen auf den 
kambodschanischen Teil des Se San Flusses durchgeführt um die sozialen Folgen verringern zu 
können.  
Trotz dieser Erfolge bleiben weitere Herausforderungen und Einschränkungen, da z.B. die 
Kompensation und Wiederherstellung der Existenzgrundlage der lokalen Gemeinden noch nicht 
stattgefunden hat. Obwohl die betroffenen Gemeinden im Bereich der Fürsprache von den NGOs 
stark unterstütz wurden, gibt es bei den meisten Gemeinden immer noch Probleme mit 
Wasserqualität und  Nahrungsmittelknappheit durch eingeschränkte Dienstleistungen der NGOs. 
Da diese Probleme bestehen, verringert sich die Teilnahme der betroffenen Gemeinden an den 
Fürspracheaktivitäten.  
Einige der betroffenen Gemeinden fühlen sich vom lokalen Netzwerk nicht gut vertreten, da sie 
immer noch keine spürbare Kompensation von Vietnam erhalten haben und sie weiterhin unter 
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den sich verschlechternden Bedingungen im Fluss-System leben müssen. Daher stellt sich hier 
die Aufgabe, die Lebensbedingungen und Existenzgrundlage der lokalen Gemeinden zu fördern 
und weiterhin die Fürspracheaktivitäten aufrecht zu erhalten, um den politischen Reformprozess 
beeinflussen zu können. 
5. National Arena: Erfolg oder Misserfolg der Intervention? 
Dieses Kapitel erklärt, wie nationale Regierungsbehörden auf die Auswirkunen des Damms 
reagiert haben, welche Strategien ihre Interessen geformt haben und was das Ergebnis ihrer 
Reaktionen war. In dieser Analyse hat sich herausgestellt, dass das „Royal Government of 
Cambodia“ bei der Wasserressourcenplanung eine Hauptrolle spielt. Die Regierung ist in die 
nationale Regierung und die sub-nationale Regierung unterteilt. Die nationale Regierung bildet 
die höchste Ebene, bestehend aus dem Ministerat, dem der Premierminister vorsteht und den 
Ministerien.  Die Sub-nationale Regierungsebene beinhaltet Provinzen, Distrikte, Kommunen und 
Dörfer. Der Fall des Se San Flusses ist eine internationale Angelegenheit; daher sind 
diesbezügliche Entscheidungen dem höchsten Regierungslevel vorbehalten.  
Auf nationaler Ebene wurden zwei wichtige Akteure identifiziert, welche die 
Hauptverantwortung in der Se San Angelegenheit tragen: Das Ministerium für Wasserressourcen 
und Meteorologie (MOWRAM) und das kambodschanische Nationale Mekong Kommittee 
(CNMC). MOWRAM und CNMC unterliegen beide direkt dem Ministerrat. Während die 
Aufgabe von MOWRAM das nationale Management von Wasserressourcen ist, spielt CNMC 
eine größere Rolle bei der internationalen Kooperation hinsichtlich Wasserressourcen im 
Mekongbecken. Die MRC, welche aus dem 1995 Mekong Abkommen hervorging, ist die 
Gerichtsbarkeit, bei der CNMC Beschwerden an Mitgliedsstaaten einbringen kann, wenn 
Entwicklungsaktivitäten von diesen Staaten Wassernutzung beeinträchtigt. 
Während der Überflutungen im Februar 2000, brachte das CNMC durch das MRC Sekretariat 
eine Beschwerde an das Vietnam Nationale Mekong Kommittee (VNMC), hinsichtlich einer 
Frage zu Wasserfreisetzung des Yali-Falls Staudamms. In diesem Fall war das MRC Sekretariat 
ein wichtiger Vermittler zwischen Kambodia und Vietnam. Die Untersuchungskommission des 
MRC Sekretariats in den betroffenen Gegenden in der Ratanakiri Provinz, die die Ursachen der 
Überflutungen im Februar 2000 untersuchte, brachte eine starke Unterstützung des CNMC. In der 
Folge wurde das kambodschanisch-vietnamesische Kommittee zum Management des Se San 
Flusses etabliert und fungierte als Forum für Diskussionen und Verhandlungen zwischen beiden 
Parteien. Durch dieses Forum war das kambodschanische Kommittee in der Lage mit seinem 
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Gegenpart über die Aufsetzung eines Informationssystems zu Wasserfreigabewarnungen, über 
die Durchführung von Studien zur Wasserqualität und Ausführung von Studien zur 
Folgenabschätzung zu verhandeln. Neben der Durchführung von Meetings, assistierte das MRC 
Sekretariat MOWRAM beim Aufstellen einer Station zum Wasserstands-Monitoring des Se San 
Flusses in Kambodscha im Jahr 2000, leistete technische Unterstützung bei der Kommentierung 
der Terms of Reference für die Studie zur Folgenabschätzung im Jahr 2001 und führte eine 
Bewertung der Wasserqualität im Jahr 2004 durch. 
Obwohl viel umgesetzt wurde, waren die Ergebnisse der Intervention nicht sehr erfolgreich. Die 
Analyse zeigte, dass die Informationssysteme zur Wasserfreisetzungswarnung nicht vollständig 
implementiert waren und keine geeigneten Kommunikationseinrichtungen auf Provinz und 
Lokalebene vorhanden waren. Die Bewertung der Wasserqualität durch das MRC Sekretariat war 
ebenfalls nicht erfolgreich, da die Genauigkeit der Beprobung eingeschränkt war durch nur 
einmalige Beprobung pro Monat während der Trockenzeit und einmalige Beprobung alle zwei 
Monate während der Regenzeit. Hinsichtlich der Kompensationen: Der Erfolg der 
Kompensationsforderungen von betroffenen Gemeinden ist unwahrscheinlich, da kein 
Aktionsplan für weitere Verhandlungen zwischen Kambodscha und dem vietnamesischen 
Kommittee zum Management des Se San Flusses aufgesetzt wurde. 
Das Fazit dieses Kapitels ist, dass der Se San Angelegenheit nicht viel Beachtung oder Priorität 
bei der zentralen Regierung eingeräumt wurde. Die Analyse zeigte, dass das Cambodia Standing 
Committee, welches damit beauftragt ist, mit dem vietnamesischen Kommittee zu verhandeln, 
durchgängig seit 2004 kein Budget zur Verfügung hatte, um Treffen mit dem vietnamesischen 
Kommitte zu organisieren. Das vierte Treffen zwischen den beiden Kommittees im Jahre 2008 
war vollständig von Vietnam organisiert. Darüberhinaus zeigte die Analyse auch einige Aspekte 
hinsischtlich des Einflusses von Vietnam über Kambodscha. In der Ratanakiri Provinz hat sich 
eine starke politische und ökonomische Verbindung zwischen den benachbarten Provinzen 
etabliert. Die Obrigkeiten der vietnamesischen Grenzprovinzen haben einen starken Einfluss auf 
Ratanakiri, da sie finanzielle Unterstützung beim Bau von Schulen, Straßen und Wohnraum 
geben. Was die politische Struktur von Kambodscha betrifft, sind diese politischen und 
ökonomischen Verbindungen zwischen den beiden Provinzen durch bilaterale Übereinkommen 
zwischen Kamboscha und Vietnam festgelegt. Dieses bilaterale Abkommen wurde auf höchster 
Ebene von den Innenministerien in Kambodscha und Vietnam festgelegt. Jede Entscheidung, die 
von der Provinzobrigkeit in Ratanakiri getroffen wird, muss vom Innenministerium abgesegnet 
werden. Dies ist insbesondere wichtig in Bezug auf Se San Angelegenheiten, da diese als 
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internationale Angelegenheiten durch die höchsten Regierungsebene entschieden werden. Dies 
gilt auch für das kambodschanische Innenministerium. Gemäß der politischen Struktur in 
Kambodscha ist das Innenministerium verantwortlich gegenüber dem Ministerrat, der dem 
Premierminister untersteht. Jede Entscheidung, die vom Minister getroffen wird, muss vom 
Premierminister abgestimmt werden. Wie beschrieben sind Angelegenheiten, die den Se San 
Fluss betreffen, internationale Angelegenheiten und Zustimmung zu Entscheidungen auf höchster 
Ebene entscheidend.  Die Aussage des Provinzgouverneurs von Ratanakiri, dass Kompensation 
durch die kambodschanische Regierung nicht notwendig ist, spiegelt die Entscheidung der 
zentralen Regierung wieder. Solche Entscheidungen waren ein Zugeständnis an die 
vietnamesische Regierung, möglicherweise kamen sie zustande durch die enge politische 
Verbindung zwischen Premierminister Hun Sen und der vietnamesischen Führung, welche bei 
der Befreiung Kambodschas vom Khmer Rouge Regime im Jahre 1979 half. 
6. Die Internationale und Globale Arena: Mehr Proteste, Mehr Dämme 
Dieses Kapitel behandelt vier unterschiedliche Fragen bezüglich der Resonanzen verschiedener 
Akteure auf globaler und internationaler Ebene. Das Kapitel untersuchte den Protest gegen den 
Bau von Dämmen, die Aktivitäten der Asian Development Bank (ADB), die Machtverhältnisse 
im Sekretariat der Mekong River Commisssion (MRC) im Umgang mit der Se San Thematik und 
die Verhandlungen über den Dammbau am Se San Fluss in Kambodscha. 
Das erste Unterkapitel befasst sich mit den Beziehungen zwischen zwei bekannten 
internationalen NGOs, Probe International sowie International Rivers, und der Weltbank. Die 
Analyse ergab, dass das mangelnde Engagement der Weltbank im Hinblick auf die 
Auswirkungen des Staudamms auf das Interesse der Bank an der Förderung von Energieprojekten 
in Vietnam zurückzuführen ist. Infolgedessen hielten beide Seiten an ihren Argumenten und 
Perspektiven fest. Beispielsweise waren Probe International und International Rivers der Ansicht, 
dass die Elektrizität, welche vom Se San Staudamm produziert wird, nicht ohne Weltbank-
finanzierte Fernleitungen transportiert werden kann. Im Gegensatz dazu verteidigte die Weltbank 
ihre Position, dass sie nicht am Bau des Staudamms beteiligt war. Die Diskussion zeigte, dass das 
Argument der Weltbank eher ‚Electricity of Vietnam‘ (EVN) begünstigte als die betroffenen 
kambodschanischen Gemeinden. Die Analyse ergab, dass die Weltbankpolitik im 
vietnamesischen Energiesektor stark im größeren Zusammenhang mit der Weltbankunterstützung 
für Vietnam seit Anfang der neunziger Jahre zu sehen ist.  
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Das zweite Unterkapitel behandelt die Reaktionen der ADB. Die Analyse ergab, dass Worley 
Ltd. – die Firma, die von der ADB unter Vertrag genommen wurde, um den Se San 3 Staudamm 
(dabei handelt es sich um den zweiten Staudamm, etwa 15 km hinter dem Yali-Falls Staudamm) 
zu evaluieren – das Anliegen der lokalen Bevölkerung bezüglich der Auswirkungen des Yali-
Falls Staudamms unterstützte. Der Befund des Unternehmens wurde jedoch durch bestimmte 
Strategien und Taktiken der EVN behindert, wie z.B. das Zurückweisen der 
Untersuchungsergebnisse und die Zurückhaltung der Veröffentlichung des Berichts. Darüber 
hinaus beantragte EVN keine weiteren ADB-Gelder und begann, nach anderen 
Finanzierungsquellen zu suchen. Im Fall des Se San 3 Staudammes wollte EVN die 
Angelegenheit des Yali-Falls Staudamms kleinhalten, um den Bau des Se San 3 Staudamms nicht 
zu verzögern; denn andernfalls wäre mit langwierigen Studien und Prüfungen zu rechnen 
gewesen, bevor die ADB weitere Gelder freigegeben hätte. Die Strategie von EVN bestand daher 
darin, nach anderen Finanzierungsquellen zu suchen und mit dem Bau fortzufahren. Während der 
Bau des Se San 3 Staudamms unproblematisch verlief, kümmerte sich EVN nicht um die 
Kompensationsmaßnahmen, die vom Worley-Bericht eingefordert wurden. Dies führte 
schließlich dazu, dass das Thema auf internationaler Ebene keine Beachtung mehr fand.  
Das dritte Unterkapitel untersuchte die Rolle des MRC Sekretariats und der Machtverhältnisse im 
Hinblick auf den Umgang mit Konflikten. Die Analyse zeigte, dass die Verhandlungen zwischen 
Vietnam und Kambodscha aufgrund der begrenzten Funktionalität des MRC Sekretariats im 
Bezug auf Konfliktlösungsmechanismen auf bilateraler Ebene verlief. Dies führte dazu, dass 
EVN einen gewissen Spielraum hatte, um die Agenda in ihrem Sinne zu beeinflussen und zu 
steuern; beispielsweise konnte eine Diskussion um Entschädigungen verhindert werden. 
Aufgrund der mangelnden Funktionalität des MRC Sekretariats konnte EVN die Debatte von der 
internationalen auf die für sie günstigere bilaterale Ebene verlagern. 
Das vierte Unterkapitel befasst sich mit den Verhandlungen über den Dammbau auf 
kambodschanischer Seite zwischen EVN und der kambodschanischen Regierung. Die Analyse 
ergab, dass EVN versuchte, Kambodscha bei der Lösung des Yali-Falls Problems 
entgegenzukommen, indem beispielsweise Meldungssysteme zur Abgabe von Wasser aus dem 
Damm installiert wurden, die Entwicklung hydrodynamischer Modelle sowie 
Umweltverträglichkeitsprüfungen finanziert wurden und ein Se San 4a Re-Regulierungsdamm 
gebaut wurde. Der Se San 4a Staudamm wurde an der Grenze zwischen Kambodscha und 
Vietnam errichtet um zur Stabilisierung des Wasserabflusses beizutragen.  Im Laufe der 
Sitzungen des ‚Joint Committee for Management of Se San River‘ führte EVN weiterhin 
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Verhandlungen mit ihrem kambodschanischen Counterpart, um ihren ambitionierten Plan 
voranzutreiben, weitere Wasserkraftwerke auf der kambodschanischen Seite des Se San Flusses 
zu bauen. Da die Entscheidungsgewalt über eine Weiterentwicklung von Wasserkraft auf 
höchster Ebene angesiedelt ist, betrachtete EVN die Beziehungen zwischen den 
Staatsoberhäuptern als essenziell. So wurde zum Beispiel eine Reihe von bilateralen Abkommen 
über den Ausbau von Wasserkraft am Se San Fluss unterzeichnet. Diese Kooperation könnte das 
Resultat einer engen politischen Verbindung zwischen Vietnam und Kambodscha sein, welche 
auf der Befreiung der Hun Sen Regierung von den Khmer Rouge Regime durch die 
vietnamesische Regierung im Jahr 1979 beruht. 
Zusammenfassend ergab das vorliegende Kapitel, dass die EVN trotz einer Vielzahl an 
Aktivitäten und Reaktionen von internationaler Ebene die Kontrolle über den Prozess 
übernehmen konnte. So konnten bestimmte Angelegenheiten von der internationalen Ebene auf 
die bilaterale Ebene verlagert werden, was den Prozess vereinfachte und die Diskussion darüber 
nur innerhalb einer bestimmten Akteursgruppe zuließ. Diese Strategie zielte darauf ab, das Risiko 
zu minimieren und die Wahrscheinlichkeit zu erhöhen, die Kontrolle über die Verhandlungen zu 
übernehmen. So sollten nicht nur Entschädigungszahlungen verhindert, sondern auch der 
zukünftige Bau von Staudämmen in Kambodscha – mit dem Ziel wirtschaftlicher Profite – 
ermöglicht werden. 
7. Fazit 
Diese Arbeit befasst sich mit der Frage wie verschiedene Akteure mit den Auswirkungen eines 
Staudamms im Se San Flusseinzugsgebiet umgehen und zeigt damit  Planungsprozesse im 
Rahmen des Managements eines Flußeinzugsgebietes in der Praxis auf. Diese Arbeit basiert 
dabei auf dem theoretischen Konzept eines "actor-oriented approach", welches zur Analyse eines 
Konflikts zwischen verschiedenen, in den Planungsprozess eingebundenen Akteuren, angewandt 
wird. Die Studie umschließt drei Konfliktebenen: lokale, nationale und internationale und globale 
Ebene. Im Rahmen der Analyse wurde der Begriff “Arena” verwendet um die verschiedenen 
Konfliktebenen zu benennen. Dieser Begriff spiegelt die soziale und räumliche Ebene wieder, auf 
der die verschiedenen Akteure miteinander interagieren, soziale Beziehungen knüpfen sowie 
Strategien anwenden um ihre Interessen und Ziele zu verfolgen.  
In der lokalen Arena konnten betroffene Gemeinden nicht wirklich erfolgreich ihre Rechte 
durchsetzten um ihre Verluste zu kompensieren und die Auswirkungen auf ihre 
Existenzgrundlage durch den Eigentümer des Staudamms zu verringern. Weiterhin zeigt diese 
 xxv
 xxvi
Arbeit, dass betroffene Gemeinden zwar deutliche Unterstützung von lokalen und internationalen 
NGOs erhalten haben, aber die am meisten betroffenen Gemeinden trotzdem immer noch 
Probleme durch schlechtere Wasserqualität und Nahrungsmittelknappheit und verringerte 
Dienstleistungen. Da diese Probleme weiterhin bestehen, verringert sich die Bereitschaft zur 
Teilnahme an den Protestaktivitäten.  
In der nationalen Arena hat die Studie aufgezeigt, dass die kambodschanische Regierung sich mit 
der vietnamesischen Regierung nicht darauf einigen konnte, den Forderungen der betroffenen 
Gemeinden nach Kompensation der entstandenen Schäden und Verringerung der Auswirkungen 
nachzugeben. Dafür wurden zwei Gründe gefunden. Zum einen hat die kambodschanische 
Regierung selbst ein Interesse am Bau eines Staudamms auf ihrer Seite des Se San Flusses und 
EVN mit den Baumaßnahmen betraut. Zum anderen sind der kambodschanische und der 
vietnamesische Regierungsführer eng verbunden, da der kambodschanische Regierungsführer 
dem vietnamesischen Regierungsführer bei der Befreiung aus der Unterdrückung durch die 
Khmer Rouge 1979 geholfen hat.  
In der internationalen und globalen Arena fand diese Studie heraus, dass EVN mehrere Strategien 
angewandt hat um Kosten zu sparen, u.a. hat es die Debatte um die Auswirkungen des Yali-Falls 
Staudamms vom internationalen Fokus auf eine bilaterale Ebene gelenkt, die eine einfachere 
Handhabung des Falls erlaubt.  Dadurch konnte das Problem von einem größeren in einen 
kleineren Rahmen gedrängt werden. In der internationalen Arena entdeckte der Autor, dass das 
MRC Sekretariat nicht zur Konfliktlösung beitragen konnte, da es kein Mandat hatte um 
tatsächlich Handeln zu können. Ein solches Mandat muss erst von den Regierungen vergeben 
werden. Daher hat sich das MRC Sekretariat eher um die Belange der Regierung gekümmert als 
die von der Regierung als weniger wichtig eingestuften betroffenen Gemeinden.  
Insgesamt hat der Planungsprozess im Se San Flusseinzugsgebiet in erster Linie den Interessen 
der Errichter des Staudamms sowie der Entwicklungsziele einzelner Länder gedient anstatt die 
Interessen der betroffenen Gemeinden miteinzubeziehen, deren Existenzgrundlage von dem 
Funktionieren des Fluss-Systems abhängen. Um ihre Interessen und Ziele durchzusetzen, haben 
mächtige Akteure undurchsichtige und vielfältige Strategien angewandt, um den Forderungen der 
betroffenen Gemeinden sowie NGOs auszuweichen.  
Daher sollten Organisationen, die zur Konfliktlösung in Flusseinzugsgebieten dienen, in Zukunft 
Mandate besitzen, die es erlauben Regeln und Vorschriften durchzusetzen, um die lokalen 
Gemeinden in ihren Forderungen unterstützen zu können. 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
This study focuses on how various social actors influence the planning process for Se San River 
Basin’s management in response to the effect of Vietnamese Yali-Falls dam on Cambodian local 
communities’ livelihoods. In this study, I examine why responses employed by dam development 
agencies produce a particular outcome. I attempt to demonstrate their strategies and cultural 
means in taking control over negotiation process to win the battle for expanding hydropower 
exploitation in Se San River for maximum economic gain. The organizing responses by local 
communities and their distant supporters are constrained and resisted by politics, resources and 
strategies of dam promoting agencies. The objectives of this study are as follows: 
- To develop an understanding of historical process of hydropower development in Se San 
River Basin; 
- To identify the major actors, their roles, interests, power relations and strategies in 
influencing decision-making process in hydropower development sector in Se San River 
Basin; 
- To provide a concluding remark on the impact resulting from responses as a mean for Se 
San River Basin management. 
1.2 Background to the study 
The Se San River is one of the largest tributaries of the Mekong River Basin and is well-known 
for hydropower development. The total capacity of energy that can be generated from this river 
amounts to 2,586 MW (PECC 1, 2006). Six hydropower projects with combined capacity of 
1,768 MW are in Vietnam while five with combined capacity of 818 MW are in Cambodia 
(ibid.). 
The attempt at hydropower development in the Se San River dates back to the time when the 
Mekong Committee (MC) was established in 1957. The most promising hydropower 
development project which was identified by the MC, in 1961, was the site at Yali-Falls located 
in the upper part of the Se San River in Vietnam. At that time the MC saw hydropower 
development as the cornerstone for improving the local community’s livelihoods through the 
provision of electricity and the expansion of irrigation system. For short term development the 
MC suggested a small-scale hydropower project which intended to fulfill the local need 
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(SwedPower, 1986). However, the MC also envisioned a large-scale hydropower project at the 
Yali-Falls if the future energy demand were to increase in the long run (ibid.). 
Because of the Vietnamese war in the early 1970s the development of the Yali-Falls project was 
not possible. Reassessment for the construction of the Yali-Falls was the main focus in the 1980s 
particularly when the Vietnamese government began economic reform in 1986. By early 1990s 
hydropower construction was given high priority in Vietnamese development agenda to cope 
with the deficiency of electricity demand which resulted from the growth of industrial sector in 
the Southern Region of Vietnam (Gracen and Palettu, 2007 in Lebel at al., 2007; Wyatt and 
Baird, 2007). The Yali-Falls dam was then reassessed in the early 1990s taking into account the 
maximum capacity that the site could offer for electricity generation. The Interim Mekong 
Committee (IMC), successor of the MC from 1978 to 1995, contributed to the assessment entitled 
“Environmental and Financing Studies on the Yali-Falls Hydropower Project”. The assessment 
was carried out from September 1991 to October 1992 and the report was published in May 1993. 
The construction of the Yali-Falls dam was started in November 1993. As laid out in the 1993 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) report, the intended capacity of the dam was 700 MW 
(Electrowatt, 1993). However, the actual capacity was slightly increased to 720 MW after the 
dam was put into full operation in 2001. 
During the process of Yali-Falls dam construction, there were widespread reports about the dam’s 
consequence on local community living along the Se San River in Cambodia in early 2000. Local 
news such as Phnom Penh Post, Cambodia Daily and Raksmey Kampuchea reported about flash 
floods released from the Yali-Falls dam that caused severe damage to properties and claimed 
lives of local communities living along the Se San River in Ratanakiri province at the end of 
February 2000. Responding to the news, Cambodia National Mekong Committee (CNMC) 
immediately lodged complains to Vietnam National Mekong Committee (VNMC) via Mekong 
River Commission (MRC) Secretariat, successor of IMC from 1995, in early March 2000. 
Responses by CNMC led to the establishment of Joint Committee for Management of Se San 
River, in 2000, representing Cambodia and Vietnam to discuss and find solutions, with MRC 
Secretariat as a facilitator. 
At local level, various responses have been organized by individuals of local Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) and provincial departments through the formation of Se San Working 
Group (Hirsch and Wyatt, 2004). At national and international levels, NGOs from Phnom Penh 
such as NGO Forum on Cambodia, Centre d’Etude et de Dévelopment Agricole Cambodgien 
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(CEDAC)1, and Oxfam America joined the Se San Working Group to discuss and document 
impacts as a way forward to calling Vietnam government and dam associate funding agencies to 
take responsibility over the damage and loss of lives (ibid.). The most influential report produced 
under the initiative of this working group was entitled “A Study of the Downstream Impacts of 
the Yali-Falls Dam in the Se San River Basin in Ratanakiri Province, Northeast Cambodia” 
conducted by Ratanakiri Provincial Fisheries Office in close cooperation with the Non-Timber 
Forest Products (NTFP), a local NGO supported by Oxfam America, in Cambodia. 
Although the study was conducted in 2000 the report strongly argued that the construction of the 
Yali-Falls dam caused untold flash floods and water level fluctuation since mid 1996 which 
harmed ecological, social and economic aspects on the downstream part of Cambodia (Fisheries 
Office, 2000). This report estimated that 20,000 people living in Ratanakiri province had been 
affected by the changes of river flow caused by dam construction. The negative impacts reported 
were reduction of fisheries, disappearance of riverbank plants, inundated agricultural land, bank 
erosion and the loss of life and property due to unforeseen floods. 
As a way forward, Oxfam America funded the establishment of Se San Protection Network 
(SPN) project that was affiliated with the NTFP office in Ratanakiri province at the end of 2001. 
The ultimate goal of SPN was to build a strong network at grass root level in order to establish 
dialogue and advocate Cambodia government to negotiate with Vietnam on mitigating dam 
impact and compensate past, present and future losses. Strategically, SPN establishes network 
with various development agencies and NGOs at national and international levels to form the 
strength of its advocacy work. By October 2005, SPN became a formal local NGO in Ratanakiri 
province under a new name of 3S Rivers Protection Network with the abbreviation of 3SPN to 
cover the other two rivers, Sre Pok and Se Kong, which join the Se San River near the Mekong 
mainstream in Stung Treng Province. After a long struggle of 3SPN as a response to the Yalli-
Falls dam impact, few successes have emerged in the form of responses taken by Cambodia and 
Vietnam governments to establish notification system of water release from the Yali-Falls dam, 
conducting EIA study, and constructing Se San 4A re-regulatory dam at the border to mitigate 
extreme flow fluctuation. However, these successes are associated with many constraints and 
uncertainty, for instance, the implementation of notification system does not work properly due to 
poor communication facilities. The status of Se San 4A re-regulatory dam which was said to put 
into operation during the dry season of 2009 has become a puzzle to communities since water 
                                                 
1 CEDAC is French acronym stand for Cambodian Center for Study and Development in Agriculture working in 
Cambodia. 
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level fluctuation still remains an issue. While the issue of the Yali-Falls dam has not yet been 
properly settled, Vietnam pushes forward to negotiate and build more dams on the Cambodia’s 
stretch of Se San River. 
This study aims to look at this empirical process from a planning perspective using the concept of 
planning as a process of action (Taylor, 1998: 66). In this context planning is not only meant as a 
set of plan that needs to be implemented but as an ongoing and continuous process of action and 
intervention, particularly when the implementation of “a plan or policy turns out to be ineffective 
or has undesirable effects which we have not foreseen (ibid: 67).” As far as the concept of 
“planning as a process of action” is concerned, river basin management requires an iterative 
process of action and intervention. The interventions are not simply the execution of a pre-
specified plan of action with expected outcomes. They are always part of a chain of events 
located within the broader framework of the activities of the state and the action of different 
interest groups (Long and Van der Ploeg, 1989). 
This research adopts an actor-oriented approach developed by Long (2001: 27) who defined 
intervention as “an ongoing transformational process that is constantly reshaped by its own 
internal organizational and political dynamic and by the specific conditions it encounters or itself 
creates, including the responses and strategies of local and regional groups who may struggle to 
define and defend their own social spaces, cultural boundaries and positions within the wider 
power field.” 
One of the central concepts of actor-oriented approach is the notion of “social interface”. 
“Interfaces typically occur at points where conflicting lifeworlds or social fields intersect in 
social arenas in which interactions become oriented around problems of bridging, 
accommodating, segregating or contesting social, evaluative and cognitive standpoints” (Long, 
2001: 65). Interface analysis concentrates upon examining “arenas”, which is a term important to 
the notion of development intervention, and entails understanding the struggles and power 
differentials taking place between actors involved (Long 2001: 72). Arenas are understood as 
“social and spatial locations where actors confront each other, mobilize social relations and other 
cultural means for the attainment of specific ends” (Long 2001:59). The image of interface and 
arenas can also be portrayed as a game in which the players (the social actors involved) compete 
with each other, all playing according to different rules. In this game the involved players posses 
different interests, different levels of power and different resources or capitals, which all enable 
them to influence the progress and the execution of the game (Olivier de Sardan 2005:185; 
Bierschenk 1988:146 in Dahlbom 2007:23). While the notion of arenas conjures up the picture of 
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a fight or struggle in particular local setting, the analysis also takes into consideration distant 
actors and social networks which shape the social processes, strategies and actions that take place 
in these localized settings (Long 2001: 59). 
Based on the above context of hydropower dam development, impacts and responses, this 
research is aimed at discussing dam associated social interfaces by examining arenas at local, 
national, and international and global levels. Though the three arenas are being discussed in 
different chapters they are obviously linked to each other. These linkages will be revealed in the 
discussion within the chapters, but the different arenas also have their own dynamics. It is noticed 
that when analyzing social interfaces and arenas, a key word is ‘conflict’ or what Long & Long 
(1992) refer to as “encounters at the interface”, where more or less serious interest conflicts are 
being fought. 
The three arenas which will be the focus of the discussion are local arena in chapter 4, national 
arena in chapter 5 and international and global arenas in chapter 6. In the first arena, I attempt to 
explore responses taken by local communities such as local coping capacity, knowledge and 
problems they encountered. More importantly, I discuss responses of local and international 
NGOs in forming SPN at local level and upscale this network to national, international and global 
levels to advocate that the rights of local community shall be respected. In the second arena, I 
discuss how the issue of Yali-Falls dam has been addressed by governmental agencies at national 
level. Although the focus is on national level, the analysis also touches upon responses by various 
individuals and agencies at provincial level and international level due to the complexity of inter-
relation of responses of national government agencies across spatial locations. The last arena, I 
examine cases of responses of international and global actors with regards to the effects of Yali-
Falls dam and other dam development on the Se San River. Negotiation for further dam building 
in Cambodia’s stretch of Se San River between Vietnam and Cambodia is also discussed in this 
level of arena. 
Further discussion on the concept will be given in Chapter 2 (theoretical review and analytical 
framework) which seeks to explain how actor-oriented approach shall contribute to the analysis 
of this study. 
1.3 An overview of the Se San River 
1.3.1 Physical Geography 
The Se San River is one of the largest tributaries of the Mekong River. It is a trans-boundary river 
originating in the Central Highlands of Vietnam and flows through two provinces in Vietnam 
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(Kon Tum and Gia Lai) and two provinces in north-east Cambodia (Ratanakiri and Stung Treng) 
before merging the mainstream of the Mekong (see figure 1.1). At the confluence, other two 
rivers, the Sre Pok and Se Kong, join the Se San River in Stung Treng province about ten 
kilometers before entering the Mekong River (ADB, 2006). The total length of the Se San River 
is about 462 km, of which the larger part of 252 km lies in Cambodia (SWECO et al., 2008). The 
catchment area of the Se San Basin is 19,150 km2, of which almost 60 per cent is located in 
Vietnam (ADB, 2006). This means that the upper catchment in Vietnam provides a significant 
water discharge to the lower reach of the Se San River in Cambodia. 
Table1.1: Administrative divisions and Area of Se San Basin 
Country Province Area (km2) Proportion (%) 
Kon Tum 7,900 41.3 
Gia Lai 3,450 18 
Vietnam 
Sub-total 11,350 59.3 
Ratanakiri 6,900 36 
Stung Treng 900 4.7 
Cambodia 
Sub-total 7,800 40.7 
Total  19,150 100 
Source: Adapted from Asian Development Bank, 2006 
Figure: 1.1 Overview of the Se San River Basin 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Australian Mekong Resource Center2 
                                                 
2 http://www.mekong.es.usyd.edu.au/case_studies/sesan/index.htm (access on 17 March 2009) 
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1.3.2 Elevation 
The Se San River rises at an altitude of around 2,500 meters at the western slopes of the 
Annamite Cordillera, locally known as Truong Son mountain range (VNMC, 2003). The 
mountains are the main sources of water for the Se San River. The average elevation of the basin 
is about 600 meters above means sea level (MRC, 2008). The lowest parts are located in 
Cambodia with average elevation at 100 meters above means sea level (ibid.). 
1.3.3 Climate and rainfall 
The climate is monsoon type with a dry and a wet season. The wet season lasts from May to 
October in general, but can extend to November in some extreme years (MRC, 2008). Usually the 
minimum flow occurs in April and the maximum in October (SWECO, 2007). The average 
annual rainfall ranges from 1,870 mm in the lower region at Veunsai station in Cambodia to 
2,183 mm at mountainous area at Kon Tum station in Vietnam (MRC, 2008). The month 
delivering the largest volume is August accounting for 20% of the annual rainfall. The extreme 
rainfall event normally occurs due to typhoons and could probably result in flash floods (ibid.). 
Table1.2: Average monthly rainfall (mm) in some stations in Se San basin (1985-2000) 
 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total 
Andong 
Meas 
18.6 13.5 29.0 78.6 215.5 295.4 341.5 398.9 340.1 163.4 63.4 24.2 1982 
Veunsai 13.1 14.2 29.4 67.9 204.3 280.4 328.8 396.9 330.5 131.9 54.2 18.4 1870 
KonTum  28.3 18.5 30.8 89.0 214.1 273.8 359.5 393.1 355.4 248.7 117.2 54.8 2183 
Yali 21.4 16.5 27.7 88.4 218.7 290.3 333.0 372.0 326.4 189.3 77.4 32.1 1993 
Source: Mekong River Commission, 2008 
 
1.3.4 Population, ethnicity and economic characteristics 
The upper Se San in Vietnam 
The upper part of the Se San basin constitutes two important provinces in Vietnam. These are 
Kon Tum and Gia Lai provinces. According to SWECO et al. (2008) the two provinces had a 
total population of about 710,000 in 1999. With the estimated annual population growth rate of 
1.8%, the population in the upper Se San basin is expected to rise to 900,000 inhabitants in 2020 
(ibid.). 
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The upper Se San basin is characterized by two distinct ethnicities, the autochthonous inhabitants 
(minority groups) of the area and the Kinh immigrant (Electrowatt, 1993). At the end of 1998 
Kinh accounted for 53.2% while the remaining belonged to the minority groups (SWECO et al., 
2008). 
Kinh is the dominant ethnic group in Vietnam. According to Electrowatt (1993) Kinh inhabitants 
in the Central Highlands were usually immigrants, from more heavily populated areas of the Red 
River Delta or coastal Vietnam, who have migrated to take advantage of the agricultural 
opportunities offered in the Highlands. Their main economic activities are wet rice cultivation, 
farming of industrial crops, trading, livestock breeding and handicraft product (SWECO et al., 
2008). The Kinh is said to be rather well off (ibid.). 
In addition to Kinh, there are two major ethnics belonging to minority groups (Electrowatt, 
1993). These are the Gia Rai and the Bana. At the end of 1998 the Gia Rai accounted for 16.7% 
and the Bana for 15.7% of the total population (SWECO et al., 2008). The Gia Rai is a local 
ethnic group living in the basaltic plane plateau (ibid.). Their main economic activities are 
farming on terraced fields in combination with livestock breeding, and handicraft. Agriculture 
production is centered on the production of crops by shifting cultivation. 
The Bana ethnic group usually resides on high mountains or in valleys surrounded by mountains 
(SWECO et al., 2008). They belong to the Mon-Khmer linguistic group and originated from the 
coastal area of Quang Ngai and Binh Dinh before gradually moving into the western mountainous 
region (Electrowatt, 1993). Their main economic activities are farming on terrace fields in 
combination with livestock breeding, exploitation of natural resources, particularly hunting and 
gathering (SWECO et al., 2008). 
The lower Se San in Cambodia 
In Cambodia there are five districts located in the Se San basin. Four districts are in Ratanakiri 
province with the total population of 23,738 in 2006 (own compilation from commune database, 
Ratanakiri, 2006) while another district is in Stung Treng province with 3,894 inhabitants in 2004 
(SWECO, 2007). 
Population in the Se San basin in Cambodia is well known for its diversity of ethnic minority 
groups. Nine out of thirteen minority groups in Ratanakiri province reside in the Se San basin. 
These include Lao, Jarai, Kachok, Tampuan, Brao, Kreung, Khmer, Kavet, and Chinese 
(Fisheries Office, 2000; Author’s field note). In Stung Treng province seven different ethnic 
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groups live in the basin including Lao, Lao Deum, Khmer, Khmer Kho, Khmer Padeum, Pnong 
and Kreung (Baird et al., 2002). 
Most of the population typically follows the pattern of houses in rows along the riverside. They 
do gardening closest to the river bank by taking advantage of river water for watering. Rice fields 
are also found along the river bank and further up. Subsistence economy is based on rain-fed 
paddy cultivation and on fisheries. Some villagers also have swidden upland fields further up 
from the village. Forests bordering rice fields provide firewood and construction material, 
vegetables, fruit, roots, mushrooms, leaves and other plant items for food and traditional 
medicine, as well as wild animal for hunting. 
1.4 Research approach and methodology 
1.4.1 Methodological design – three arenas 
This research examines how various social actors across spatial location respond to the Yali-Falls 
dam impact on the Se San River basin. To simplify the analysis, this research uses case study as 
the unit of analysis (De Vaus, 2001: 219). As briefly mentioned in section 1.2, the units of 
analysis in this research are the three different arenas in which interacts on impact take place, that 
is, the local, national, and international and global arenas. In this study, I use definition of arena 
which was adopted by Long (2001: 59) who defines arena as “social and spatial locations where 
actors confront each other, mobilize social relations and other cultural means for the attainment 
of specific ends.” In this definition, social actors are not necessary confined within their 
respective spatial location but they enter and interact at every level of arenas, be it local, national, 
international or global. 
For the local arena I study perception of local actors towards dam impact on local community 
livelihoods and compare perceptions of other actors at national and international levels. Through 
this analysis I can trace the main actors, their roles and interests and the strategies they play. In 
this arena, I look into how social relation and network are formed and built at local level as a 
strategic group to advocate Cambodia government agencies to negotiate with its counterpart, 
Vietnam government, to resolve hydropower dam impacts. This analysis allows me to explain the 
processes by which actors mobilize social relation and strategy aiming at influencing decision-
makers at national and international levels. 
For the national arena I investigate how Cambodia government agencies have been responding to 
find solution of dam impacts on the Se San River. The analysis unpacks the working system in 
Cambodia in relation to solving transboundary issue of hydropower dam development and its 
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impact. It explains the multiplicity of interaction between actors not only across national level but 
local and international levels. It also explains the success and failure of outcomes of intervention 
taken by national and international actors. 
For the international and global arenas I examine how the issue on dam impact and dam 
development on the Se San River was put into discussion in international and global agenda. The 
discussion identifies and analyzes pro-and anti-dam actors across international and global levels 
which explain how these actors interact and employ their strategy to influence decision-making 
for dam impact intervention for the Se San basin. In this level of analysis, I also investigate the 
processes by which Vietnamese dam development agency employs strategies to negotiate with 
Cambodian government to expand hydropower dam development on the Cambodia’s stretch of 
Se San River. 
In order to proceed with case study, analyzing information and data from case study must be 
guided by theory (De Vaus, 2001: 201). Further discussion of theory and analytical framework to 
examine the three arenas is provided in chapter 2. 
1.4.2 Methods of data collection 
This study involved a fieldwork of data collection of ten months from May 2007 to February 
2008. It mainly engaged qualitative method of data collection using semi-structured interviews, 
focus group discussion, and observation. Three levels of data collection were conducted. 
The first level focused on data collection at local level where I selected only affected 
communities in Ratanakiri province to be investigated from June to October 2007 (an overview 
of this area is given in section 1.5). I chose only this province because 1/ this province borders to 
Vietnam and is therefore proximate to the dam site, 2/ this province constitutes a large number of 
people living along the Se San river, 3/ the affected populations in this province were well 
informed about dam impacts by local and international NGOs as early as 2000 and therefore their 
perspectives on negative effect are influential, 4/ the presence of local NGOs and community-
based Se San protection network exist in this province, and 5/ the affected communities in 
Vietnam are not considered in the scope of this study because this study is about responses of 
transboundary issue where Cambodian local communities seek their Cambodian government to 
find solution with Vietnam government. 
In this local level, forty five of 60 villages located adjacent to the river were visited and studied 
regarding the affected communities’ perception towards hydropower dam impact, their actions in 
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coping river change and their role in solving transboundary issue of hydropower dam impact on 
the Se San River. 
Focus group discussion was mainly used to collect information from local community. Three to 
six persons from each village were invited for participating in focus group discussion. The 
number of participants varied from village to village depending on their availability and 
accessibility. In some villages, all residents abandon their home and move to live in the farm 
during the farming period from June to December. Therefore, a lot of time was spent in searching 
them. In some cases, I conducted semi-structured interviews with separate individual villagers at 
the farm spot located four to five kilometers from their residential village. 
Semi-structure interview was also conducted with individual fishers, farmers, village chiefs, 
members of commune council, and district governors. Beside these, observation was also 
employed during field visit and accommodation in the village to verify and understand real 
situation. When living in the village I conducted informal talks with local villagers in regards to 
river change, their livelihoods and their views on various interventions of government and NGOs. 
After the informal communication I transcribed the conversation into my field note in the next 
hour or in the following morning if evening talk was conducted. 
Prior to field research at local level, I conducted interview with various officials at provincial 
governor office, provincial government departments such Provincial Department of Water 
Resources and Meteorology; Provincial Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries; and 
Provincial Department of Planning. The aim was to gain insight about geographical location of 
affected areas, and to understand the views of provincial officials as regards to dam impacts and 
their interventions. 
In NGO sector, I worked closely with 3SPN to understand how this network operates at local, 
national and international levels. During my field work I often attended meetings and workshops 
organized by this local NGO and its partners such as monthly local community network meeting, 
annual Se San workshop, and NGO network meeting. 
The second level focused on data collection at national level. Semi-structured interview was 
mainly used to interview key informants who have been engaged in Se San issue such as officials 
and senior officials of CNMC; Ministry of Water Resources and Meteorology (MOWRAM), 
Ministry of Environment (MoE), and Ministry of Industry, Mine and Energy (MIME). The main 
aim of the interview at this level was to gather information about events related to dam impact, 
intervention, achievement, and constraints in resolving the Yali-Falls dam issue on the Se San 
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River. The interview was done partly in May and November 2007. At this level too, I conducted 
interview with various staff of NGOs in Phnom Penh including Oxfam America (OA), NGO 
Forum on Cambodia (NGO Forum), and Culture and Environment Preservation Association 
(CEPA) who have been involved in Se San issues since 2000. The interview was conducted 
partly in November 2007 and February 2008. 
The third level focused on data collection at international level. Semi-structured interview was 
mainly used to interview key informants who have been engaged in Se San issue in Vietnam such 
as officials and senior officials of VNMC, Electricity of Vietnam (EVN), Vietnam Power 
Engineering Consulting Company 1 (PECC 1), and Institute of Water Resources Planning of 
Vietnam Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. 
Beside this, I interviewed officials of the Embassy of Sweden and Embassy of Norway in Hanoi 
who support Vietnam government with financial and technical assistance to review Master Plan 
and a Feasibility Study for Se San 3 hydropower project in Vietnam and to conduct National 
Hydropower Plan Study for Vietnam between 1994 and 2004. Interview with officials in Hanoi 
was conducted in January 2008. 
In this level, I conducted one interview with the former senior staff of the MRC Secretariat who 
had been involved from the outset of the MRC Secretariat’s intervention in early 2000. With this 
communication, I had an access to some reports and minutes of meetings which are useful to 
analyze the written data. Beside this, interviews and meetings were conducted with team of Basin 
Development Program, Hydropower Program and Environment Program of the MRC Secretariat. 
Beside primary data mentioned above, I collected and analyzed secondary sources of data such as 
relevant statutes and agreements, policy papers, newspapers, newsletters as well as previous 
relevant analytical studies and consultancy reports from the MRC Secretariat in Vientiane, 
VNMC in Hanoi, CNMC and NGOs in Phnom Penh. One of the important sources which I 
obtained data to analyze responses of international and global actors is partly from the website of 
International Rivers3 organization which avails some of important information to public such as 
official letters relevant to the issue of the Se San dams. 
In addition, I participated in a stakeholder consultation workshop on EIA of Se San River 
organized by VNMC and CNMC in Phnom Penh on 5 July 2007. In this workshop I benefited 
from discussion and debate raised by Cambodia participants from different ministries and local 
                                                 
3 http://www.internationalrivers.org/ 
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governments of the affected areas in Ratanakiri province. During the workshop I taped the 
discussion, transcribed and summarized the finding of the workshop. 
 
1.5 An overview of dam affected area in Ratanakiri province 
1.5.1 Overall area and population affected by dam 
Ratanakiri is the most remote province located about 600 km from Phnom Penh capital city in 
north-east of Cambodia. It borders to Laos in the north and to Vietnam in the east. The province 
is currently characterized by poor infrastructure such as road and communication networks. The 
province consists of nine districts, 49 communes and 240 villages. In 2006, the total population is 
about 133,400 with the density of 12 persons/ km2. 
Figure 1.2 Map of Ratanakiri province 
 
Oyadao 
Taveng 
Andong Meas 
Veun Sai 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Canby Publications Co., Ltd.4 
                                                 
4  http://www.canbypublications.com/maps/provrattan.htm (access on 23 August 2008) 
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Ratanakiri province is home to Cambodia’s ethnic minority population, the so-called hill tribes or 
indigenous people. According to the 1998 National Population Census more than half of the 
country’s ethnic minority people reside in Ratanakiri, 101,000 vs 64,000 persons (ADB, 2002, 
cited in SWECO, 2007: 30). With reference to the 2006 provincial database, the province 
constitutes 11 ethnic minority groups:  Tampoun, Kreung, Jarai, Brao, Kachok, Lun, Rodeer, 
Phnong, Cham, Kavet and Lao. Khmer which hold the majority ethnicity in Cambodia represents 
only 23% of the total population in Ratanakiri Province and they mostly live in urban centers of 
districts and province. 
In Ratanakiri, the Se San River flows through four of its nine districts including Oyadao, Andong 
Meas, Taveng and Veunsai. 
Oyadao is the most upstream district located about 50 km from provincial town of Ratanakiri and 
it borders to Vietnam in the east. It serves as an economic gate way to Vietnam through national 
road number 78 which is currently under restoration. The district is divided into seven communes 
and 29 villages with the total population of 13,970. Only one commune is situated along Se San 
River with population of 1,143 in 2006 and all of which are Jarai ethnic minority group. This 
commune called Se San, comprises three villages namely Phi, Katang and Padal. This commune 
is one of the most remote areas of Oyadao district with poor road conditions. The commune is 
located approximately 35 km from the district town and 85 km from the provincial town. 
Riverbank villagers depend on farming, gardening, hunting and fishing for their livelihood. There 
is neither a market nor a health center present in the commune. The villagers often go to markets 
in Vietnam by foot, selling their vegetables, bamboo shot, soybean, cashew nut, wild animals and 
forest products. In return they purchase rice, foods, cloth and shoes. The area is characterized by 
steep hill and mountain terrain which is difficult in traveling. The villagers take a whole day to 
travel up and down between home and market. Travel by boat between the villages is difficult 
because of rapids. There is no machine boat present in the commune except pedal boat used to 
cross the river from one side to another. 
Andong Meas district is downstream of Oyadao located approximately 60 km north-east of 
Ratanakiri provincial town. This part of river stream is less steep than at Oyadao district. It allows 
villagers to navigate their boats in most parts of the river. The district is divided into three 
communes and 21 villages. In 2006, the total population is about 9,445. One third of the district 
population resides along the Se San River and almost all of which are ethnic minority belonging 
to Kachok, Lao, Jaray, and Tompoun. 
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Taveng is the third downstream district located 48 km north east of Ratanakiri town, bordering to 
Laos in the north and to Vietnam in the east. The district comprises two communes and 20 
villages with a total population of 5,503 in 2006. In total, 19 villages are located adjacent to the 
Se San River. Most of the population belongs to Brao and Kreung ethnic minority groups who 
believe in animism. This part of river stream is navigable all year round. In wet season the 
community usually uses pedal boats and engine boats traveling up and down between their 
village and district town. Two thirds of the villages cannot be accessed by road in the wet season 
except by commuting on foot. 
Veunsai is the fourth dense downstream district located 40 km north of Ratanakiri town. The 
district comprises nine communes and 34 villages with 16,305 inhabitants in 2006. In total, 25 
villages are located along the Se San River with 13,522 inhabitants. All belong to ethnic minority 
groups such as Lao, Brao, Kachok, Kreung, Tompoun, Lun and Kavet. A part from this a small 
portion of Chinese is also presented near the district town. This part of river stream is navigable 
all year round. 
In total there are 23,738 inhabitants living adjacent to Se San River in Ratanakiri Province in 
2006 (see below table). 
Table 1.3: Number of Se San’s riverbank population in Ratanakiri Province, 2006 
District No. of 
communes 
No. of villages No. of 
families 
No. of people 
Oyadao 1 3 244 1,143 
Andong Meas 3 9 839 3,869 
Taveng 2 19 1,181 5,204 
Veun Sai 9 25 2,621 13,522 
Total 15 56 4,885 23,738 
Source: Author’s compilation from commune database 2006, Ratanakiri Department of Planning, 
Cambodia 
1.5.2 Overview of socio-economic characteristics 
The landscape in the research area varies from hilly with relatively steep riverbank slopes in 
Oyadao district to flat lowland area in the lower part of the basin in Veun Sai district. The most 
densely populated parts are within Veun Sai and Taveng districts. The land use consists of 
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agricultural area, settlement area and a vast tropical rainforest area. The present agricultural use is 
dominated by wet season paddy and swidden rice, fruit tree, vegetable, cashew and rubber. 
Animal husbandry is predominant at household level. The river is mainly used for drinking, 
cooking, bathing, fishing, and navigating. The settlements are mostly located along river bank. 
Forests provide firewood, construction materials, vegetables, fruits, roots, mushrooms, leaves and 
other plant items for food and medicine as well as wild animals for hunting. 
Crops 
The four districts are rich in natural resources including forest, fertile soil, river and streams. Rice 
farming is common and the main source for daily livelihood. Some indigenous communities 
remain engaged in shifting cultivation. Slash and burn practices have long been used to clear 
forest for cultivation. They believe that slash and burn practices enhance soil fertility through ash 
and kill insects. For rotation purpose farmers usually own three to four pieces of farmland. 
Farmers cultivate only one piece of farmland for two to three years and allow the rest to have 
enough time to return to fertility. Apart from rice, substitute crops are grown such as corn, 
potatoes, vegetable, peanut, sesame, sugar cane, and cashew. Most farms lie on flatland near the 
river bank while others lie on the foot hills. Some farmers grow rice and cashew together in the 
farm. Rice yields range from half to two and a half tonnes per hectare. This low yield results from 
poor soil and water management. Some villagers do not produce enough rice for year round 
consumption. They depend on other cash crop for income in exchange for rice. Presently growing 
of cashew is on the increase due to its high economic value and it can protect their land from 
being encroached by others. The farmland is usually far from their residential village at two to 
five kilometers. Walking is usually their means of transport. The farmers begin rice cultivation 
and crop growing during rainy season starting from June to November. During this period they 
leave the village and stay permanently in the farm. In the dry season some people grow 
vegetables on the river bank but get low yields. Crops are sometimes damaged by fluctuation of 
river flow. 
Table 1.4 below shows the total land area used for rice cultivation. Most of farmers in Veun Sai 
district engage in lowland method cultivation which yield one and a half tone to two and a half 
tonnes per hectare where as the rest in upstream engage in upland method cultivation which yield 
half tonne to one and a half tonnes per hectare. 
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Table 1.4 Rice cultivation areas by district and commune adjacent to Se San River, 2006 
Wet season rice (ha) District Commune 
Lowland method 
cultivation 
Upland method 
cultivation rice 
Total 
Oyadao Se San 0 111 111 
Nhang 12 792 804 
Talav 350 163 513 
Andong Meas 
Malik 31 35 66 
Taveng Leu 0 669 669 Taveng 
Taveng Krom 0 937 937 
Koh Pong 117 109 226 
Koh Peak 0 349 349 
Ka Chon 442 83 525 
Kok Lak 55 20 75 
Ban Pong 354 9 363 
Veun Sai 523 30 553 
Phnom Kok 231 20 251 
Pak Kalann 193 23 216 
Veun Sai 
Hatt Pok 1425 36 1461 
Total 3,733 3,386 7,119
Source: Author’s compilation based on data provided by Ratanakiri Department of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries 
Livestock and poultry production 
Livestock and poultry are common animals raised in the community for various purposes ranging 
from using as power for rice farm cultivation (for cow and buffalo) to using as cultural belief for 
spiritual sacrifice and home consumption. Over the past ten years or so, farmers often lost their 
animals due to unknown epidemic diseases and drowning in river floods. 
Fisheries 
The Se San River is part of the Mekong – Tonle Sap (Great Lake) River system that is known to 
be among the most species rich and fish productive rivers in the world (SWECO, 2007). SWECO 
(2007: 25) confirmed that a large part of the fish populations are highly migratory and several 
species perform migrations as far as from the Mekong delta and most likely far up in Vietnam. 
The Se San River has gentle slope and contains a large number of deep pools, which made it 
possible for large fish to survive in the dry season. Fisheries contribute about 90% of the protein 
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supply for the riverbank population (ibid.). Fisheries also provide opportunities for riverbank 
villagers to diversify their livelihood activities and optimize their labor resources as well as give 
them access to an income-generating activity with very little capital investment. The river is 
therefore the life nerve for people to maintain and improve nutrition, as fresh and processed fish 
represent a significant source of protein. 
The results of the socio-economic description indicate clearly that the livelihoods of the 
population in the Se San River Basin are very closely connected with the annual hydrological 
cycle of the basin. Therefore any change of hydrological pattern of the river system implies the 
effect on their livelihoods. 
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
This study contains seven chapters. The first chapter is introductory laying out a short overall 
introduction, background of the study, an overview of the Se San river basin, research approach, 
and an overall view of the affected area in Ratanakiri Province of Cambodia. The second chapter 
explores the theoretical debates relating to river basin management, concepts of development and 
hydropower development, and concepts of planning. In this chapter an analytical framework 
forms an important part of this thesis to unpack the impacts of planned intervention of 
hydropower dam development in the Se San River basin. An actor-oriented approach developed 
by Norman Long (2001) is employed in this analysis. 
The third chapter is a background chapter about water resources management in the Mekong 
basin which explores how water resources have been planned and managed at the basin and sub-
basin levels. It introduces important historical water resources management regimes in the Lower 
Mekong Basin and therefore shows a first hand knowledge about key actors and policy 
development in promoting hydropower in the Se San River basin. 
The forth, fifth and sixth chapters are the analytical chapters which analyze three levels of arena 
of intervention taken by various social actors in responding to the effect of Yali-Falls dam at 
local, national, and international and global levels. The forth chapter I examine local arena which 
explains actions taken by various social actors at local level in responding to the Yali-Falls dam 
impact. The analysis provides insight how social network at local level has been developed and 
what successes and constraints this social network has met and faced. 
The fifth chapter explores the national arena in which Cambodia government responds to the 
Yali-Falls dam impact and other dam development on the Se San River. The sixth chapter 
discusses responses undertaken at international and global levels which outlines the effort of 
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some international and global actors in contributing to solving the Se San issues. It discusses how 
social actors play their role in influencing decision-making for dam development in Se San River 
basin at international and global levels. The seventh chapter concludes the study by integrating 
the theoretical concepts with the empirical findings and outlining lessons learnt for future dam 
interventions. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL REVIEW AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to review and discuss relevant theoretical and analytical terms and 
concepts to river basin planning and management. The following four sections are devoted to 
theoretical review while the sixth section discusses the analytical framework. The seventh section 
proceeds to summarize and conclude this chapter. 
Section 2.2 begins with the issues of river basin development as a starting point to capture 
various problems which arise as the results of development process and social change. Section 
2.3 delves into the discussion of terms and concepts of river, river basin, and management. The 
aim is to examine the nature and significance of river and river basin and show the needs for 
water resources management. Section 2.4 discusses concepts of development and relates its 
meaning to the field of hydropower development. 
Section 2.5 discusses the concepts of planning. The discussion of planning is the introduction to 
the analytical framework of the thesis, which is discussed in details in section 2.6. Section 2.6 
presents the analytical tool that will be used in the thesis to unpack the planning process of river 
basin management. In this study, an actor-oriented approach to social interfaces is identified as an 
important analytical concept since it helps to analyze the arenas of conflict during the 
development process. Apart from being an analytical tool, it can also be used as a tool for 
implementing agencies and policy makers to identify the issues and problems during the policy 
implementation process and thereby corrective measures can be taken right during the analysis of 
the policy implementation process. Finally, section 2.7 provides the summary and conclusion to 
this chapter. 
2.2 Issues of river basin development 
Globally, there are more than 200 international river basins that shared by two or more countries, 
accounting for about 60% of the earth’s land area (World Bank, 1993: 38). These river basins 
constitute a significant portion of the world’s fresh water resources. Fresh water resources within 
a basin serve human needs such as drinking, cooking, and washing and sanitation; allow land to 
become productive through irrigation; provide a habitat for plants, fish, and wildlife; supply 
urban and industrial uses; generate electricity through hydropower; and support many 
recreational uses. Empirically, river resources around the world have been utilized for centuries 
to control volatile supplies of water in order to meet demands for water quantity, quality, and 
reliability in time and space (Loucks et al., 1981 cited in Lee and Dinar, 1995: 2). While river 
basins provide such a great freshwater resource and asset, they also constitute a potential source 
of conflict (Meijerink, 1999: 3). The dominant use conflicts over river basin resource allocation 
are usually for water quantity and water quality in space and time (Lee and Dinar, 1995: 3). 
Lee and Dinar (1995: 3) classified water use conflicts as either consumptive or non-consumptive. 
Consumptive use is defined to be the amount of water withdrawn from the system in such a way 
that it is no longer available for other uses. In this respect, river basin water has common pool 
characteristics in the sense that one use precludes other uses. Examples are agricultural irrigation 
and urban water use. Although agriculture produces return flows and seepage to the basin, a large 
amount of water is consumed by evaporation. According to a Comprehensive Assessment of 
Water Management in Agriculture, the total amount of water evaporated in crop production 
would increase from 7,130 km3 of today to 12,000 – 13,500 km3 by 2050, corresponding to an 
increase by 70% to 90% for the next four decades (IWMI, 2007: 14). 
Moreover, consumptive uses may compete by sector (e.g. municipal, agricultural, and industrial), 
within sectors (allocation to one farm versus another farm); or regionally (upstream versus 
downstream). On the other hand, non-consumptive uses do not result in a significant reduction in 
net stream flow, and depending on the type, may allow for multiple non-conflicting uses at the 
same time and location. Examples of non-conflicting non-consumptive uses include reservoir 
storage, fish habitat, and sightseeing recreation. More problematic situations occur when non-
consumptive uses interfere with or lower the value of water precluding or impairing its use by 
others. For instance, non-consumptive uses such as leaching salts from agricultural field and 
using the river to dispose of untreated waste, degrades water quality at the expense of other uses. 
Although the upstream users may be best suited to improve the quality of downstream water by 
altering water use practices, often the upstream user has no means of capturing the benefits or 
even of recouping the costs, thereby having no incentive to reduce pollution loads. 
Non-consumptive uses of water also conflict in time. For example, residential users may prefer 
that a quantity of water be stored for future use, environmentalists may prefer that water be 
released to support the fish habitat, and the industrial sector may prefer a release for electricity 
generation. For each user, although the water extracted and its quality remains the same, one use 
at a particular time precludes another use. 
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Over the past decades, global economic development, population growth and technological 
modernization have caused an increase in the number and severity of problems emerging in 
international river basins. Population and economic growth means that the necessity for energy 
consumption is on the increase. Therefore, to keep sufficient supply for energy growing demand, 
exploitation of river basin potential for hydropower dam construction has been widespread, 
particularly since the middle of the twentieth century when improvements in engineering and 
construction skills, hydrologic analysis, and technology made it possible to build dam safely 
(Gleick, 1998: 69). During that time large dams were perceived as one of the most significant and 
visible tools for the management of water resources (ibid.). Large dams were seen by many 
countries and development agencies to play an important role in helping communities and 
economies harness water resources not only for energy generation but also for food production, 
flood control and domestic use (WCD, 2000: 11-15.). Moreover, it was viewed as symbols of 
modernization and humanity’s ability to harness nature and therefore the construction of large 
dams was seen as synonymous with development and economic progress. 
The World Commission on Dams (2000: 14) estimated that dams generate about 19% of world 
electricity. Gleick (1998: 71-74) shows that the construction of large dams still continues to 
increase in many parts of the world, including China, India, Laos, Nepal, Malaysia, Russia, the 
Philippines, Brazil, Honduras, Mexico and Ecuador, Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, Greece, Iceland, 
Macedonia, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, America, and Canada. While dams provide numerous 
benefits as stated above they also drive numerous conflicts between upstream and downstream 
countries due to the fact that dams bring profound change to river flow. One of these changes is 
the alteration of the stock of fisheries and other resources consumed by users downstream 
(McCully, 1996)9. Further discussion on the issues of hydropower development is presented in 
section 2.4. 
2.3 Terms and concepts of river, river basin, and management 
In this section, terms and concepts of river, river basin, and management are defined and 
discussed. The section aims to explain the characteristics and importance of rivers and river 
basins, which require an integrated management. Section 2.3.1 defines the term ‘river’ and its 
significance. Section 2.3.2 defines the term ‘river basin’ which is identified as a unit for water 
resources management. Section 2.3.3 defines the term and concept of river basin management. 
                                                 
9 There are a number of literatures on hydropower dam and dam’s impacts which I have reviewed. These include 
Goldsmith and Hildyard, 1986; Covich, 1993; Gleick, 1993 and 1998; McCully 1996; WCD, 2000; Cech, 2003; 
Postel and Richter, 2003; and Jain and Singh, 2003. 
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Section 2.3.4 discusses the organizational models of river basin management. And finally, 
Section 2.3.5 focuses on the complexity of river basin management, which points to the issues 
and constraints in river basin management. 
2.3.1 River 
A river can be defined as a “large natural stream of water flowing in a channel” (Oxford 
dictionary, 1995). The main characteristic of a river is that water flows downhill from the so-
called “headwaters or source” to the end point of a river, the so-called “river mouth – a place 
where the river enters the sea”. The river consists of a main channel and its tributaries. Tributaries 
are smaller streams that flow into the main channel. The meeting point between the tributary and 
the main channel is called confluence. 
Provided that river water flows from upstream to downstream, two distinguished parts of the river 
system are usually identified, the upstream and the downstream. The upstream denotes a location 
toward the headwaters of a river or tributary, whereas downstream is toward the direction of a 
confluence with a large stream, mouth, or other end point of a river (Cech, 2003: 63). 
According to Cech (2003: 62) rivers originate in several sources. Most are fed by springs or small 
streams coming together to create larger rivers of water. Some originate in lakes, such as the 
Mississippi River at Lake Itasca in northern Minnesota, or Nile River which begins near Lake 
Tama in the highlands of Ethiopia. Other rivers, such as the Colorado River in the Rocky 
Mountains of Colorado, begin as trickles of melted snow water. 
A great significance of river is that it provides fresh water resources which riparian communities 
can use for drinking, cooking, washing, bathing and swimming, fishing and irrigating crops. 
River is considered to be as important as human life in many communities, particularly, it is true 
for those of indigenous people who depend on river for their life and livelihoods. 
While we have seen the importance of the term ‘river’, ‘river basin’ is another terminology which 
usually used to term as the unit for water resources management. Succeeding section discusses 
such terminology. 
2.3.2 River basin 
River basin is a terminology used to express more than just a river as defined above. It is a term 
used to denote the total land area that contributes water to a river. As McCully (1996: 8) puts it 
“all land is part of river basin and is shaped by water that flows over it and through it.” 
Conventionally, the Helsinki Rules define a river basin as the geographical area determined by 
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the watershed limits of the system of waters, including surface and underground waters, flowing 
into a common terminus (cf. Article II of the Helsinki Rules, International Law Association, 
1966). 
The term ‘river basin’ is relatively straightforward, but it can be defined at almost any spatial 
scale. According to Mostert (1999: 9), river basins can range from a small size of a few hectares 
to over six million square kilometers (for instance, the Amazon basin) and they can be located in 
as many as 14 countries (for instance, the Danube). River basin can be divided into several sub-
basins. Sub-basin is the area from which tributaries drain their waters to the mainstream of river. 
In this study, Se San River is identified as a tributary of the Mekong River therefore Se San is a 
sub-basin of the Mekong basin. 
Since water is not static, a river basin is viewed not just as geographical area but as a unit in 
which strong relations exist between the different elements: land and water, ground water and 
surface water, quantity and quality, upstream and downstream (Mostert, 1999: 9). These 
interrelations turn river basins from a geographical area into a coherent system (Lundqvist et al., 
1985: 14) of interacting and interdependent elements. For instance, an increase in irrigated 
agriculture and use of pesticides upstream can decrease the quantity and quality of the water 
available downstream. Through mechanisms such as these water and soils in the river basin come 
into some sort of integration (ibid.). Mostert (1999: 9) argues that sustainable development can 
only be ensured if these interrelations are taken into account in the management of the natural 
environment, and this makes the notion of river basin so important. This conveys the meaning 
that river basin shall be treated as the unit for water resources management. For this purpose, the 
term ‘river basin management’ is often used. 
2.3.3 River basin management 
Mostert et al., (1999) pointed out that river basins are open systems with sometimes ill-defined 
boundaries, as rivers may have a shared delta, their boundaries often do not correspond with 
aquifer limits and in flatland and extremely dry areas are either vague or human-made. In 
addition, river basins interact continuously with the atmosphere (such as precipitation and 
evaporation, airborne pollution) and the receiving waters (such as seas and sometimes lakes). 
Despite their open and sometimes ill-defined boundaries, river basins are very important systems. 
They fulfill many important functions, such as water supply for households, industry and 
agriculture, navigation, fishing, recreation, and living space. Economic and social development 
and even life itself cannot be sustained without sufficient water at the right time and space and of 
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the right quality. Moreover, water has shaped and continues to shape the environment in which 
we live. It erodes mountain areas, transports sediment and creates delta areas. It can cause floods 
but it is a structure and mechanism through which nature reproduces and reshapes itself. 
River basin management is about all of these things. It is much broader than traditional water 
management and includes significant parts of land-use planning, agricultural policy and erosion 
control, environmental management and other policy areas. It covers all human activities that use 
or affect freshwater systems. To put it briefly, river basin management is “the management of 
water resources of a basin as part of the natural ecosystem and in relation to their socio-economic 
setting (Jain and Singh, 2003: 788).” 
According to Mostert et al. (1999) the term ‘river basin management’ emphasizes the relation 
between water and land resources and the geographical and often international dimension 
(upstream-downstream). Moreover, this term does not imply that all management should take 
place at the basin level, or that river basins are closed systems or the only relevant geographical 
areas. It does imply, however, that river basins are important units that should be managed 
carefully, for the benefit of present and future generations (ibid.). To explain how river basins are 
managed at different scales and through different methods, the next section discusses the 
organizational model of river basin management. 
2.3.4 Organizational models of river basin management 
Mostert et al. (1999) identify three organizational models for river basin management: the 
hydrological, administrative and co-ordination models. According to them, the hydrological 
organizational model is structured based on hydrological boundaries in which all water 
development and management decisions are typically concentrated in one single agency namely 
the “river basin authority”. This river basin authority is charged with decision-making powers, is 
highly autonomous and has its own finance. Extensive river basin planning is usually developed 
by this river basin authority. The most famous example of this model is the Tennessee Valley 
Authority (TVA), created in 1993 in the United States (Mostert, 1999; Wester and Warner, 2002). 
The administrative organizational model is the opposite of the hydrological model. In this model, 
the zones of control follow the political and administrative boundaries. Various bodies, for 
instance, provincial, municipal, etc. may be assigned responsibilities for water management in the 
area of their jurisdiction. Clearly, in this model, the water management responsibility is not based 
on hydrological boundaries. In this model there is no river basin planning. This model applies in 
most countries in the world, where water is not managed along basin lines. 
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The coordinated organizational model falls somewhere between the hydrological and the 
administrative models. In this model water management is performed by “river basin 
commissions” with a coordination task. Coordination by these commissions will typically include 
strategic river basin planning. In these plans strategic goals are set. The choice and application of 
the measures to reach these goals are left to different bodies that are not based on hydrological 
boundaries. Pioneering countries in applying this approach are France and England, which have 
had functioning coordinating bodies at the basin level for the past 30 years (Betlem, 1998; Buller, 
1996 cited in Wester and Warner, 2002). 
In the coordination model, the river basin commission is not charged with decision-making 
powers. According to Mostert et al. (1999) there are two types of river basin commissions: 
technical commissions and policy commissions. The tasks of technical commissions can include 
the implementation of joint monitoring, the execution or supervision of joint research, the 
preparations of technical specifications for joint projects, and the preparation of technical bylaws. 
Policy commissions, however, deal more directly with policy issues and sometimes develop a 
non-binding river basin management plan, which has to be adopted by the different managers. 
They do not manage river basins on their own, but they offer a platform for discussions between 
the different managers involved and stimulate, structure and institutionalize interactions. 
As described above, each model has advantages and disadvantages. In the hydrological model 
administrative boundaries coincide with hydrological boundaries and there seems to be little 
chance of upstream-downstream conflicts. However, since river basin authorities usually deal 
with water management only, this model may isolate water management from other relevant 
policy sectors, and intersectoral coordination may become a problem (Mostert et al., 1999). 
Moreover, in countries with decentralized water management the adoption of this model would 
imply centralization, and in international river basins it would imply the establishment of a 
supranational authority (ibid.). Consequently, river basin authorities are often only an option for 
smaller national basins. 
In the administrative model of water management, land-use planning and other relevant policy 
sectors can be or cannot be kept together (Mostert et al., 1999). A major disadvantage is the 
serious risk of upstream-downstream conflicts and the lack of a platform to discuss these 
problems. In the coordinated model such platforms exist: river basin commissions. The different 
bodies participating in these commissions could each individually ensure coordination between 
water management and other policy sectors, and together, in commission, they could coordinate 
their water management. 
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Even though, river basin is managed in different models with advantages and disadvantages, river 
basin management are very complex and contested in nature. The following section will discuss 
this complexity. 
2.3.5 The complexity of river basin management 
In many aspects, river basin management is highly politically contested as river basin provides 
natural resources potential from which competition among users arises. Wester and Warner 
(2002) argue that river basins are as much political units as they are natural units; and that, to 
address these issues, it is necessary to bring politics back into river basin management, as 
explanations grounded in politics show that boundaries and institutional arrangements are not 
natural but matters of choice and contestation. In short, water use is highly political, that is, 
requires “mediation of social power, and strategic action, that is, the process through which the 
social relations of power are constituted, negotiated, reproduced, transformed or otherwise shaped 
(Mollinga and Bolding, 2004: 6).” 
Since the river basin is treated as a political unit therefore it becomes the territory of governance 
(Wester and Warner, 2002). The governance concept has been widely used and implemented in 
many countries. Governance can be defined as the prevailing patterns by which public power is 
exercised in a given social context (Jenkins, 2002: 485). Governance is comprised of the complex 
mechanisms, processes and institutions by which citizens and groups articulate their interests, 
mediate their differences and exercise their legal rights and obligations. According to GWP 
(2003: 4), the concept of governance encompasses law, regulations, and institutions. It also 
relates to government policies and actions, to domestic activities, and to networks of influence, 
including international market forces, the private sector and civil society. Governance continues 
to be shaped by political constraints, including the interests of powerful actors, the changing 
nature of sovereignty and the performance of development agencies (Jenkins, 2002: 488). 
The fundamental principles of good governance entail the creation of effective partnerships to 
ensure that political, social and economic priorities are based on broad consensus in society and 
that the voices of the poorest and most vulnerable are heard in the decision-making process. 
Hence, stakeholder participation in river basin management is essential. However, its success is 
still questionable as the participation discourse draws the attention away from the need between 
different people for redistribution of resources, entitlements and opportunities (Wester and 
Warner, 2002). This is based on the recognition that those who wield little power have limited 
opportunities to express their interests and needs, and are generally excluded from key decision-
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making processes, and their knowledge is considered insignificant (Kothari, 2001: 142). Kothari 
(2001: 140) points out that participatory methodologies require the formulation and adoption of a 
framework in which the micro is set against the macro, the margins against the center, the local 
against the elite, and the powerless against the powerful. From this point of view, river basin 
management would require a layered system of participation (Wester and Warner, 2002); and 
thus establishment of a participatory platform at basin level is the essence of sustainable 
development of water resources as it provides a regional platform for all interest stakeholders to 
meet and work together. This creates a kind of working environment and reduce the complexity 
by setting rules, assigning roles and allocating rights to the actors involved; and that, rules and 
rights create boundaries, ownership titles, permitted activities and in-groups and out-group, where 
roles structure the field (Wester and Warner, 2002). 
2.4 Concepts of development and its meaning in relation to hydropower development 
In this section, the main objective is to discuss the concepts of development from which we can 
derive and relate its meaning to the field of hydropower development. Section 2.4.1 discusses the 
concepts of development. Following this, section 2.4.2 discusses the meaning of development in 
the field of hydropower development. 
2.4.1 Concepts of development 
The term ‘development’ is rather amorphous and there is a multiplicity of views as to what 
constitutes development. Often, the ethical question remains: development for what? What is the 
purpose of development and who are the beneficiaries of development? These questions are 
crucial in providing the necessary benchmarks to guide the objectives of the development process 
and the nature of development itself. 
In the recent past, the tendency has been to define and perceive development almost exclusively 
in terms of economic growth targets. As Mabogunje (1980: 35) puts it “the primary role of 
economic forces in bringing about the development of a society has often been taken as 
axiomatic, so that development and economic development have come to be regarded as 
synonymous”. However, development is seen to be more than just economic growth. According 
to Seer (1969) ‘development’ involves increasing outputs in all sectors of the economy and 
distributing this output in order to enhance the quality of life of the broad mass of population. 
Thirdwall (1986), on the other hands, defines ‘development’ as growth accompanied by change. 
The above definitions refer to one perception wherein the term development is used to describe 
the process of economic, technological and social transformation within societies and countries. 
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This implies that development carries some sorts of a societal context. As Dale (2004: 1) puts it 
“development is viewed as a process of societal change that generates some perceived benefits 
for people, or as a state of perceived human well-being attained through such a process”. He 
argues that when analyzing development, we should be able to clarify who benefits from societal 
changes and, in cases of diverging opinions about benefits, who considers changes to be 
beneficial and who may not do so. At this point Dale (2004) sees development as societal 
development which has meaning in relation to human beings. He asserts that if development is a 
people-focused concept, its contents in specific situations must be clarified in relation to people-
related problems. 
In a broader context, Gore (1984: 241) defines development as a purpose towards which the 
exercise of state power is directed. He states that what development denotes in terms of both 
rhetoric and actual policy measures varies considerably between states. In rhetoric, development 
might mean for example, closing the income gap with the rich countries of the world and 
adopting socialist forms of economic organization (that is, all facets of development and 
development activities initiated, controlled and dictated largely by the state). In this regard, he 
argues that “with the adoption of development as a central purpose of the exercise of state power, 
the strategic field of state intervention has become potentially all-embracing (Gore, 1984: 242)”. 
New institutions are subsequently established within the state administration, public and para-
statal corporations as well as various types of state-owned banks are set up and centralized 
development plans are drawn. Infrastructures, housing, and social services are all re-organized for 
development. And state intervention is actively directed towards stepping up production either 
through the establishment of state enterprises or through support to private investors such as the 
provision of physical and economic infrastructure, the organization of technical research and 
promotion of innovation and technology transfer, the creation of business training schemes and 
agriculture extension facilities, and the negotiation of trade agreements in international markets 
as well as for foreign loans or development financial capital. 
Goulet (1971), also attempts to distinguish three basic components or what is known as core 
values in this wider meaning of development, which he itemizes as life-sustenance, self-esteem 
and freedom (cited in Thirlwall, 1986). Life-sustenance is concerned with the provision of basic 
needs, which he views as very crucial. To him, no country can be regarded as fully developed if it 
cannot provide all its people with basic needs, such as housing, clothing, food and minimal 
education. A major objective of development according to him, must be to raise people out of 
primary poverty and to provide basic needs simultaneously. This basic need approach to 
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development was largely adopted by the World Bank in the 1970s. Self-esteem is concerned with 
the feeling of self-respect and independence. No country can be considered as fully developed if 
it remains in economic and political subjugation to another powerful nation. That is, if the nation 
is exploited by others and does not have the power and influence to conduct relations on equal 
terms. Freedom denotes freedom from the three evils of ‘want, ignorance and squalor’ so that 
people are more able to determine their own destiny. According to Goulet, no man is free if he 
cannot choose; if he is imprisoned by living on the margins of subsistence with no education and 
no skills. The advantage of material development is that it expands the range of human choice 
open to individuals and societies at large. Sen (1999) argues that freedoms depend on various 
determinants such as access to facilities for education and health care, and liberty to participate in 
public discussion and scrutiny. He further argues that “development requires the removal of 
major sources of unfreedom: poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as 
systematic social deprivation, neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance or overactivity of 
repressive states (ibid: 3).” 
According to the above conceptions development has occurred when there has been an 
improvement in access to basic needs of the people, when economic progress has contributed to a 
greater sense of self-esteem for the country and individuals within it, and when material 
advancement has expanded the range of choice for individuals. Finally, the need for societal 
development stems from the rising search to improve conditions of living for better. That is to 
say, every human society is dynamic and at the same time prone to have a strong and growing 
desire for growth and change. 
2.4.2 The meaning of development in relation to hydropower development 
This section aims to discuss and conceptualize hydropower development as part of the 
development concept. As discussed above, development is about change, process, and progress, 
which aims to bring about economic growth, life-sustenance, self-esteem, and freedom for a 
particular society or a country. The ultimate goal of hydropower development is also about all of 
these things. In the following I try to explain my argument. 
First of all, the advancement of water use evolved over thousands of years from basic human 
needs (such as food, shelter and drinking water) to complex technological innovations (i.e. from 
waterwheel to hydropower). This is a development process which, according to Mosse et al. 
(1998), is understood as a ‘progress’. The progress of technological innovation from waterwheel 
to hydropower development was discussed by Cech (2003) and by McCully (1996). According to 
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Cech (2003) the concept of hydropower development was borne from the history of using 
flowing water to power waterwheels for irrigation and grinding grains, which dates back to at 
least 3200 B.C. Later, waterwheel technology was improved and used to power a number of 
factories, such as textiles, wood, and metal. And finally, modern waterwheels were used to 
generate electricity when constructed within hydropower facilities of a dam. Based on 
information from Cech (2003) the evolution of hydropower development is summarized as 
follows. 
From the early civilization the Egyptian waterwheel known as the Noria (which has buckets 
around its rim to scoop up water from a river) was used to divert water from a river for irrigation 
(Cech, 2003; McCully, 1996). Water was lifted by the buckets and then spilled into an irrigation 
channel. If the flow of the stream increased, more jars were added to the waterwheel. If water 
flow decreased, jars were removed to allow the waterwheel to rotate more efficiently. By 100 
B.C. waterwheels were used to grind grains (such as corn and wheat) in Greece. This technology 
was then called ‘watermill’ (McCully, 1996). Around A.D. 300 the Romans improved 
waterwheel design by using a horizontal drive shaft attached to a vertical wheel for efficiency of 
scooping water. By 1086, there were 5,624 watermills in England (ibid.). By 1800 the number 
had multiplied to over 500,000 watermills through out Europe to serve various purposes, 
including grinding corn and wheat, powering bellows and hammers to make iron, grinding 
ingredients to make paper, cutting wood, crushing olives for oil, drilling gun barrels, and 
powering textile factories. In 1875, the Niagara Falls Hydraulic Power & Manufacturing 
Company built a canal 11m wide and 2.4 m deep to divert water from the Niagara River (in the 
U.S.), above the falls, to a sawmill sites below. The 46 m drop in elevation provided massive 
amounts of water energy to turn the waterwheels. A few years later Thomas Edison developed 
incandescent light bulb which created the demand for cheap electricity. The first hydropower 
station for Edison’s electric system was a waterwheel constructed on the Fox River in Wisconsin 
in 1882. Hydropower generators were soon constructed along the Niagara Falls in New York and 
Ontario, and at other locations in the United States and Canada. Between 1902 and 1930 the 
United States built about 50 large dams, and from 1930 to 1980 the United States constructed a 
thousand more, together with tens of thousands of smaller dams (Gleick, 1998: 69). 
As we have seen above, the invention of the waterwheel was an extremely important event in the 
history of hydropower development. According to the development theory described above, the 
emergence of hydropower development was the result of technological innovation and 
transformation. The innovation can be attributed to the economic force where the opportunity for 
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maximizing agricultural and industrial production is extremely essential to serve the demand for 
population growth and promote economic development. For instance, the history for improving 
waterwheel was more often to serve irrigation and milling agricultural and industrial products for 
economic prosperity. 
The same is true for hydropower development. The hydropower dams regulate, store and divert 
water from rivers for electricity generation, agricultural production and flood control. In addition, 
large reservoirs of the dam are also used for recreation, tourism, and aquaculture, all of which 
contribute to the promotion of cash income. For instance, the World Commission on Dam (2000: 
11) states that, “hydropower dams have been promoted as an important means to meet the need 
for water and energy services and strategic investments with the ability to deliver multiple 
benefits”. The benefits include regional development, job creation and fostering an industry base 
with export capability. Other goals include creating income from export earnings, either through 
direct sales of electricity, or by selling cash crops or processed products from electricity intensive 
industry such as aluminum refining (ibid.). According to Gleick (1993: 73) global hydropower 
production increased more than 20% during the 1980s. He argues that the development of new 
hydropower facilities has slowed greatly in the industrialized nations as the best sites have been 
developed and as the environmental costs of further construction rise. However, the greatest 
hydropower development is now occurring in those regions that have seen little development. 
During the 1980s, hydroelectric production increased 50% in Asia (ibid.). 
However, while hydropower dams provide much advantage (in terms of economic growth, food 
production, and surface water recreation enhancement, storing water during wet season for later 
use during dry periods), they also provide much disadvantage (including urban sprawl, loss of 
wild habitat, and destruction of river corridors). As Cech (2003: 149-150) puts it, “dams and 
reservoirs have enhanced the health and economic prosperity of citizens around the world. 
However, dam construction comes with a price: it alters natural and human environments. 
Reduced flows, degraded water quality, and impacts on migratory fish are among serious 
problems caused by dams.” Much has been written about the environmental impacts of dams for 
example Goldsmith and Hildyard, 1986; Covich, 1993, Gleick, 1993 and 1998; McCully, 1996; 
Cech, 2003; Postel and Richter, 2003; Cernea, 2004. In the following, I summarize the dams 
impacts from these various literatures. 
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Environmental impact 
 Dams change the characteristics of rivers. Water released from behind a dam has a 
different temperature than native river water (Cech, 2003). Water released from the 
bottom of a reservoir is usually cooler in summer and warmer in winter than river water, 
while water from outlets near the top of a reservoir will tend to be warmer than river 
water all year round (McCully, 1996). These thermal variations can be extremely stressful 
to aquatic species downstream (Goldsmith and Hildyard, 1984). 
 Dams act as rigid barriers to migratory fish and can wipe out entire aquatic populations 
(Covich, 1993). Although fish ladders have been installed and fingerlings are being grown 
in hatcheries, the adverse effects of dams on fish migration are very serious (Cech, 2003). 
 Water releases from a reservoir maybe uniform or erratic and can cause significant 
changes downstream. Uniform flow releases can reduce historic sediment loads, allowing 
‘cleaner’ water to scour the downstream riverbed and banks for long distance. Erratic, 
large-volume releases usually transport high sediment loads and can harm native plants 
and animals (ibid.). 
 Water released through outlets near the reservoir surface may be low in dissolved oxygen 
and nutrients in the summer but high in salts and nutrients in the fall. Water flow and 
water quality variations can be fatal to downstream aquatic wildlife (ibid.). 
 Prior to the construction of dams, sediment was transported downstream until river 
velocities decreased and sediment loads were deposited. Dams completely change this 
natural system by capturing most of this silt in the reservoir behind the dam (ibid.). 
Social impact 
Impacts at the reservoir and dam sites 
 The sudden inflow of large construction workers and related groups within small, often 
traditional and remote local communities causes social/health/economic and cultural 
problem at local community level. Socially destabilizing effects have been compounded 
by circumstances that made labor-camp settlements into a spreading source of AIDS 
(Cernea, 2004). 
 Loss of cultural heritage assets: places of cultural, spiritual, or religious meanings were 
flooded by dam reservoirs (ibid.). 
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 Displacement of population who reside in the reservoir sites: living standards tend to drop 
in the years immediately following resettlement (ibid.). 
Impacts in downstream 
 Poor water quality released from dams caused waterborne diseases, diarrhea, and skin 
disease (Goldsmith and Hildyard, 1984). 
 Loss of fisheries, aquatics and edible plants due to poor water quality, and water level 
fluctuation affect livelihoods of downstream communities who usually depend on natural 
resources for living (Cernea, 2004). 
 In many downstream areas, agriculture has been historically based on the recurrence of 
natural and limited annual floods, and the local cultivators have adapted their agricultural 
and settlement patterns to this recurrence: they learned to “absorb” the flood into their 
agricultural strategies, practicing what is often called recessional agriculture or wetlands 
agriculture. Damming the annual limited floods and the flow of rich nutrients deeply 
disrupts recessional agriculture (ibid.). 
To this point, it becomes evident that the environment which provides the natural and physical 
milieu as well as the input for development would need to be preserved if development itself has 
to be sustainable, benefiting not only the present generation but a future one as well. The 
proponents of sustainable development argue that sustainable development need be viewed as an 
integrated approach seeking the physical, environmental, economic, social, cultural and spiritual 
well being of the people. It is the strand of development approach which, places particular 
emphasis on ecological balance and social equity in development planning. It involves the 
management of our resources in such a way that we can fulfil our economic, social, cultural and 
aesthetic needs without inflicting permanent damage to the resource base and the life support 
system on which we all depend. That is, sustainable development advocates for development 
strategies that manage all resources both natural and human, as well as financial and physical 
assets for increasing long term wealth and well being. 
To that end, I argue that managing water resources requires the right planning procedure. To do 
this, I seek to discuss the concepts of planning from which a framework for investigating 
planning practices can be derived. 
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2.5 Concepts of planning 
The objective of this section is to discuss the concepts of planning in order to seek for a 
framework to investigate planning practices. Section 2.5.1 discusses general views of planning. 
Section 2.5.2 outlines some characteristics and the intrinsic nature of planning. Section 2.5.3 
discusses the process view of planning. This section discusses two concepts of planning namely 
the blueprint and the process mode of planning. Section 2.5.4 discusses a political process of 
planning, which conveys the meaning of constraint.  Subsequently, a conclusion is made in this 
section that the process mode of planning requires an actor-oriented approach to social interface 
as an analytical framework to unpack the contested nature of planning process. 
2.5.1 General views of planning 
“Planning is concerned with where to go. However, where we are and where we have 
been are questions of low interest for most planners. The former task is intellectually 
stimulating and has captured the attention of planners and politicians.” (Jenssen, 1992: 21) 
Planning practices have been central to development since its inception. Even in primitive times, 
the concept and practice of planning was an important part of agrarian life (Fude, undated). As 
the application of scientific and technological knowledge has been improved from time to time, 
planning lent legitimacy to, and fuelled hopes about, the development enterprise (Escobar, 1998). 
That is, the concept of planning carries the belief that social change can be engineered, directed, 
and produced at will (ibid.). 
In organizational management, planning is defined as the process of establishing goals and a 
suitable course of action for achieving those goals (Stoner et al., 2000). In a simple term, 
planning is dedicated to contemplation of the future and preparing for the future. Therefore, 
planning is an integral part of development. Planning implies that one thinks through one’s goals 
and actions in advance and that these actions be based on some methods, plans, or logics rather 
than on a hunch. Plans give the organization its objectives and set up the best procedures for 
reaching them. In addition, plans are the guides by which (1) the organization obtains and 
commits the resources required to reach its objectives; (2) members of the organization carry on 
activities consistent with the chosen objectives and procedures; and (3) progress toward the 
objectives is monitored and measured so that corrective action can be taken if progress is 
unsatisfactory (ibid.). 
Planning involves making choices among feasible courses of action and development 
possibilities. For social and economic development it aims at the best utilization of human, 
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capital and natural resources to meet growing demand of population. In order to arrive at the 
optimum exploitation of resources, the plans must take into account the greatest number of 
relevant factors as well as of possible effects. 
As part of regional development, Jenssen (1992) argues that planning shall be seen as a result of a 
dialogue between public and private institutions and groups with different levels of formal 
organization and development objectives. For instance, in the regional context, planning is 
discussed region-wide with the objective to formulate a regional development consensus. The 
regional approach brings the understanding of development and its prospective outcome closer to 
the local population concerned, who are not only considered as an object of development, but as 
active participants. 
Taking the main functions of regional development planning into account, the term of integration 
becomes evident which contains two aspects. On one hand it refers to the horizontal and vertical 
coordination of planning activities on the regional level. On the other hand it refers to the aspect 
of participation aimed at increasing involvement of the population at the grass root level, giving 
them the opportunity to take active part in the economic, social and political life of their nation as 
a precondition to mobilize all resources for national development. For planning agencies, 
participation can provide information, improve communications, and fulfill legislative mandates. 
It also can open up the political process, involve low income and minority citizens, and develop 
community organization. For citizens, participation can offer opportunities to gain representation, 
exercise legal and political rights, and influence policy decisions. 
However, recent years have witnessed an increased in uneven participation methods employed by 
agencies. Private economic interests usually exercise power in planning decisions and resist 
efforts to share this power with others. Citizens often receive information through networks 
influenced by private interests and hesitate to intrude in areas involving private power. All in all, 
private economic interests remain the most active, organized and influential actors in planning 
process (Checkoway, 1986). As Escobar (1998: 140) puts it, “planning relies upon and proceeds 
through, various practices regarded as rational or objective, but which are in fact highly 
ideological and political.” 
2.5.2 Characteristics and intrinsic nature of planning 
As discussed above, planning carries various characteristics, distinctive features and intrinsic 
values. Fude (undated: 7-11) identifies them as follows; 
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Planning involves predictions, forecasts and projections: The shape of the future is influenced 
by conscious choice in the present. If the choices are to be effective, the present decision or 
action must be guided by adequate understanding of the future and its relationship to the present. 
Planning therefore calls for forecasting possible future happenings, projections or estimates of 
future events or conditions. Planning by its nature is for the future. 
Planning is information based: Information is the basis of sound planning. Decision-making is 
the process of converting information into action or data into a workable plan. To arrive at a valid 
decision, accurate information is required. 
Environment and energy are vital components in planning: The arrival of environmental 
awareness has added a new dimension to resources development planning. Whereas resources 
exploitation renders immediate benefits, it may result in adverse impacts. Future generations do 
have a right to make use of nature’s finite endowment on the one hand, and should not be 
subjected to suffering from the irreparable effects of senseless and irresponsible over-exploitation 
of natural resources on the other. 
Planning is an interdisciplinary exercise: Water resources planning embraces a very broad 
scope involving the application of a great many disciplines. Water planners need a broad 
perspective covering a variety of expertise and human endeavor so as determine how these 
resources can be put to the best possible use. Water resources planning can no longer be 
considered the exclusive domain of engineers. Engineers must learn to work with people of other 
professions as well as with other engineers. 
Planning is a continuous process: Planning is a continuous activity, a ceaseless cycle of decision 
making, modification or revision. Plans should be reviewed and revised in line with changing 
conditions. Due to the inability to project ahead with certainty, the planner must be alert in order 
to react promptly. Reaction time could be speeded up by systemization of the planning process. 
Plans may have to be made and revised on a continuing basis. 
In addition, planning is not only about the plan itself but, as we shall see in the next section, it 
also involves implementation and monitoring and evaluation. This gives the intrinsic value of 
“planning” more than just a plan but a mean to manage. Put it in other words, “no planning no 
management”. 
2.5.3 The process view of planning: management from the planning perspective 
Planning means different things to different people. Traditionally, planning meant ‘blueprint 
planning’. Blueprint planning involves the detailed description of the desired future situation, and 
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the realization of this situation. Faludi (1973: 131) defines blueprint planning as an approach 
whereby a planning agency operates a program thought to attain its objectives with certainty. In 
his view, certainty means that a decision-taker is bound to execute the program according to the 
set objectives and that, modification during implementation is not anticipated. 
As opposed to this blueprint planning approach, Brown (1966) argues that every plan is liable to 
come up against unforeseen occurrences or accidents during the course of implementation (cited 
in Taylor, 1998). This means that every plan is subject to an ongoing process of modification and 
adaptation. Faludi (1973) terms this approach as the ‘process mode of planning’. According to 
him the process mode of planning is an approach whereby programs are adapted during their 
implementation as incoming information requires such changes (Faludi, 1973: 132). This 
approach is also seen as synonymous to ‘process planning’, which according to Friedman (1966) 
is an approach in which strategic information and feedback impinge directly on action, providing 
signals that lead to incremental adjustments to its direction and intensity (cited in Faludi, 1973: 
132). 
The process view of planning is seen as the best method by urban planners, for instance, J. Brian 
McLoughlin (1969), and Nigel Taylor (1998). Taylor emphasizes that process planning does not 
end after a plan has been formulated or finalized. A plan is usually followed by some actions. As 
he points out, “action or implementation is a further stage of the process of planning. Once 
implemented, for instance, a plan may turn out to be ineffective or it may have undesirable effects 
which we have not foreseen. So it is important to monitor the outcomes of our actions to check if 
they are having the effects we want them to have and, if not, we may need to review and revise 
our actions or plans (Taylor, 1998: 67).” Thus, according to his view, planning cannot be 
separated from implementation and monitoring/evaluation. In this sense the planner should also 
be responsible for implementation so that the initial plans can be adjusted on the basis of 
experience (Van den Hoek, 1992). This kind of iterative planning process that includes planning, 
implementation and monitoring is also called ‘planned development’ (Staveren and Van 
Dusseldorp, 1980). Taylor (1998) terms this iterative planning process as the process of planning 
or planning as a process of action. 
From the above views on process planning, Taylor (1998: 66-69) distinguishes five main ‘stages’ 
in a process of planning. The diagram of these stages, which is entitled “planning as a process of 
action” is shown in Figure 2.1 below. 
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According to the diagram, the first stage is devoted to identifying some problems or goals which 
prompts the need for a plan of action. From an analysis of this, a definition of the problems or 
goals is arrived at. Notably, Taylor explains that this analysis is necessary not only to guide any 
empirical investigation but also because, on closer inspection, the initial perceptions of the 
problems and/or goals may be questionable. It may be that the problem is not really a problem at 
all, or that what is a problem for one group may not be for another group, or that there are 
additional problems that were not noticed at first and so on. 
The second stage is to consider whether there are alternative ways of solving the problem or 
achieving the aim and, if there are, to clarify these. The third stage is to evaluate which of the 
feasible alternatives is most likely to achieve the desired end. At this stage, Taylor points out that, 
the task of evaluating alternatives in complex decision-making situations is, obviously, 
correspondingly complex, and therefore may require a more systematic analysis of the likely 
consequences of implementing any alternative. After the decision has been made, a plan or policy 
is produced at this stage. 
However, as stated above, the process of planning does not end here but the process of planning 
requires that a plan or policy needs to be implemented. To this point, Taylor (1998: 68) maintains 
that, “it is thus more accurate to describe the process of planning as a theory or model of action, 
rather than ‘decision-making’.” Accordingly, implementation or action is included in a fourth 
stage in this process of planning. Notably, McLoughlin (1969: 101) makes an important note 
toward implementation/or action stage that “the action phase of the cycle is a permanent feature 
of planning. This does not mean that the planner must mount a 24-hour watch, seven days a week 
like the crew of a sailing vessel, but rather that like his fellow-cultivator, the gardener, he must 
pay regular and periodic attention to his changing care, pruning here, weeding there, planting 
from time to time, and at certain intervals taking a larger and more thorough look at the situation 
to see whether or not it is developing broadly along the right line.” 
To complete the planning cycle the fifth stage involves monitoring the effects of the plan to see 
whether it achieves the desired ends. 
Central to this model, feedback loops presented in Figure 2.1 below indicates that the process of 
planning has no final end-state. Feedback loops may return to any stage of the process. For 
instance, we may need to review our actions, revise our view of the problems, consider other 
alternatives which we did not consider before, or accept our initial definition of the options. 
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Figure 2.1: Planning as a process of action 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1. Definition of 
problems and/or goals 
2. Identification of 
alternative plans/policies 
3. Evaluation of 
alternative plans/policies 
4. Implementation of 
plans/policies 
5. Monitoring of effects 
of plans/policies 
 
Dotted line with arrows represents the feedback loop 
Source: Adapted from Taylor, 1998: Urban Planning Theory Since 1945 
The above discussion suggests that the process of planning or planning as a process of action 
denotes a kind of meaning of developmental management. However, one should also understand 
that all development activities which resulted from the planning process are embedded in a larger 
political sphere. Planning processes which lead to development activities are therefore also a 
political dynamic one. The following section discusses the political process of planning. 
2.5.4 Planning as a political process 
The argument that planning is a political process is that the process of planning involves political 
judgments and decisions. As Taylor (1998: 83) puts it “some planning theorists were alert to the 
political nature of planning and therefore saw that planning should not be construed purely as a 
technical or scientific activity.” He argues that one of the planning theorists who first articulated 
the political nature of planning is Norton Long (1959:168). 
“Plans are policies and policies, in a democracy at any rate, spell politics. The question is 
not whether planning will reflect politics but whose politics it will reflect. What values 
and whose values will planners seek to implement? … plans are in reality political 
programs. In the broadest sense they represent political philosophies ways of 
implementing differing conceptions of the good life. No longer can the planner take 
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refuge in the neutrality of the objectivity of the personally uninvolved scientist.” (cited in 
Taylor, 1998: 83) 
Another argument that emphasized the political nature of planning is Paul Davidoff and Thomas 
Reiner. 
“The choices which constitute the planning process are made at three levels: first, the 
selection of ends and criteria; second, the identification of a set of alternatives consistent 
with these general prescriptive, and the selection of a desired alternative; and third, 
guidance of action toward determined ends. Each of these choices requires the exercise of 
judgment; judgment permeates planning.” (Davidoff and Reiner, 1962, p. 11-12, cited in 
Taylor, 1998: 84) 
Davidoff and Reiner point out the political nature of these value judgments by urging that a 
planner 
“cannot, as an agent of his clients, impose his own ideas of what is right or wrong… Our 
contention rests on the thesis that goals are value statements, that value statements are not 
objectively verifiable, and, therefore, that the planner, by himself, cannot reasonably 
accept or reject goals for the public. This is crucial: we maintain that neither the planner’s 
technical competence nor his wisdom entitles him to ascribe or dictate values to his 
immediate or ultimate clients. This view is in keeping with the democratic prescriptive 
that public decision-making and action should reflect the will of the client; a concept 
which rejects the notion that planners or other technicians are endowed with the ability to 
divine either the client’s will or the public will. (ibid.: 22, cited in Taylor, 1998: 84) 
Another view on political process of planning is by Preston (1996: 300): 
“planning are not technical neutral exercises: they are political projects, and plans emerge 
from a highly complex bureaucratic context (including cultural, professional and political 
matters) and their deployment is again a political process of some complexity.” 
The above quotations suggest that planning is inherently political. However, political process 
means more than just the processes by which the power of actors with high authority is exercised 
in the development process but the powerless ones as well (for instance, the communities who 
affected by the development process). As Mollinga (2008: 8) puts it “politics is a dimension or 
quality of many social processes, i.e. all social processes in which interests of individuals or 
groups are mediated.” Hence, planning as a political process can be understood as the processes 
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by which a wide range of concerned actors play an important role in influencing planning and 
development. 
Green (1999) argues that planning tends to fail if the application of planning procedures is limited 
to only a small group of technocrats. Indeed, planning is concerned with change, and the prospect 
of change inevitably brings opponents and supporters. Therefore, the relationship between 
planners, policy makers, service managers, communities, and other stakeholders in the planning 
process is critical to the success of planning (ibid.). To this point Taylor (1998: 85) also stresses 
the need for public participation in the planning process as follows. 
“The recognition that planning decisions were ‘political’ naturally implied, in any 
political system purporting to be democratic, that the public should have some say in, or 
should participate in, those decisions.” 
On the other hand, Warwick (1982) points out to the success of development process by arguing 
that implementation should be viewed as a transactional process involving negotiation over goals 
and means between parties with conflicting or diverging interests, and not simply as the 
execution of a particular policy or plan (cited in Long and van der Ploeg, 1989). 
To investigate the diverging interests in planning or in development process Norman Long (2001) 
suggests an actor-oriented approach which focuses on interactive relations at the interface 
between development agencies and affected communities. According to Booth (1994: 16), the 
actor-oriented approach is the key to uncovering a diversity of outcomes of planning efforts. 
Further, Booth (1994) continues that actor-orientation or interface analysis is the paradigm, while 
the discovery of variable outcomes and unanticipated consequences is the payoff. 
This study, therefore, attempts to employ an actor-oriented approach of social interface in the 
planning process as an analytical approach to uncover the planning process of river basin 
management. The following section discusses the analytical framework focusing on the actor-
oriented approach. 
2.6 Analytical framework – an actor-oriented approach to social interface in planning 
This section aims to discuss the central concepts of actor-oriented approach through which a 
general analytical framework can be derived and developed for guiding the analysis of the dam 
associated social interfaces between various actors at local, national, international and global 
levels. Section 2.6.1 discusses the general concepts of actor-oriented approach. Section 2.6.2 
discusses the concept of agency in which the meaning of actor can be clearly defined. In this 
section, the meaning of knowledge and power which forms part of the concept of agency will 
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also be explained. Section 2.6.3 discusses the concept of social interfaces, which is an important 
term to analyze conflict between actors involved. Section 2.6.4 explains the concepts of arenas, 
which is a term used to identify the social and spatial location in which actors are engaged in 
conflict. 
2.6.1 General concept of actor-oriented approach 
An actor-oriented approach has been developed mainly by Norman Long and his colleagues at 
the Wageningen Agricultural University in the Netherlands as a tool for the analysis of a situation 
in which various actors repeatedly interact and fought over resource use in the development 
process. It is a sociological and anthropological type of approach which arose around the late 
1960s and gained more concretized in the late 1980s (Long, 2001; 1989; 1977; Long and Long, 
1992). 
In 1977, Long published a book on “An Introduction to the Sociology of Rural Development” in 
which he discussed the shortcoming of two types of development theories, that is, the 
modernization theory and the dependency theory which were popular in the 1960s and the 1970s. 
Long criticized both theories as a generalized linear model of socio-economic development which 
accords analytical priority to the role of exogenous factors in promoting change. Long (1977: 
187) argues that “neither approach gives sufficient attention to the ways in which local groups 
and processes can contribute and modify the patterns of regional and national development; and 
therefore both of the approaches tend to take too deterministic view of socio-economic change 
and do not allow sufficiently for the interplay of local and national forces.” Taking an 
anthropological stand, Long suggests the need of an actor-oriented model which focus on the 
process by which individuals and groups evolve ways of dealing with their changing 
environment. As Long argues, 
“Such an approach aims to integrate both micro and macro levels of analysis, and to give 
equal attention to horizontal and vertical patterns of cooperation and control. It also 
recognizes the importance of explaining the variations in response to similar types of 
macro factors and of identifying the flexibilities in the pattern of pre-existing relationships 
and values (Long, 1977: 189-190).” 
Even though Long indicated an importance of actor-oriented model as early as 1977, the concept 
of such model was only discussed broader during the late 1980s and early 1990s which brought 
the whole spectrum of discussion on interface analysis (Long, 1989), demythologizing planned 
intervention (Long and van der Ploeg, 1989), and the battlefields of knowledge (Long and Long, 
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1992), all of which are under one roof of actor-oriented approach. Further, various scholars (such 
as Schuurman, 1993; Booth, 1994; and Preston, 1996) have brought up actor-oriented approach in 
their discussion, in the 1990s, as a new direction of research on social change and development. 
The arguments were around the critics of structural analyses within the development theory. For 
instance, based on the actor-oriented approach, Preston (1996: 296) argues that, “…development 
theory must deconstruct notions of intervention and shift away from untenable rational models of 
plan-making followed by plan-execution, and grant that intervention itself is a drawn-out and 
complex social process involving many agents.” This argument indicates that development is a 
contested process which requires further analysis of various actors involved. 
Further, Long consolidated his previous publications and published the latest version of actor-
oriented approach, entitled “Development Sociology: Actor Perspective”, in 2001. As discussed 
earlier, an attempt of this approach was to deconstruct the concept of linear policy process (or 
what Norman Long called planned intervention) which was a dominant theoretical paradigm 
during the 1960s and 1970s. The concept of linear policy process was, at that time, understood as 
a mechanical model which assumed that the relationships between policy, implementation and 
outcomes are linear in process. For instance, a certain policy implementation will lead to a certain 
expected output. However, Long (2001) criticizes such concept as shortcoming because 
development process is non-linear in the sense that the outcome of development intervention is 
shaped by the interaction between various social groups. As Long (2001: 13) puts it, “all forms of 
external intervention necessarily enter the existing life-worlds of the individuals and social 
groups affected, and in this way they are mediated and transformed by these same actors and 
structures.” To put it more concretely, Long (2001: 27) views intervention as “an ongoing 
transformational process that is constantly shaped by its own internal organizational and political 
dynamic and by the specific conditions it encounters or itself creates, including the responses and 
strategies of local and regional groups who may struggle to define and defend their own social 
spaces, cultural boundaries and positions within the wider power field.” 
His argument on intervention indicates that actor-oriented approach denotes the study of conflict 
between and among various actors who involved in the development process. For this reason, he 
adopted social interface analysis which aims to identify and analyze the critical points of 
intersection between different fields or levels of social organization, since it is at these interfaces 
that discrepancies and discontinuities of value, interest, knowledge and power are clearly 
revealed (Long, 2002). 
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Hence, this research will focus on social interface analysis which in turn will unpack how impacts 
of the intervention of dam building has been transformed and what factors will help in solving the 
issues at local level. The following section will sketch out the essential terms and concepts which 
are used to interpret and analyze social interface from an actor-oriented perspective. The guiding 
analytical concepts to this approach are agency and social actors, the notion of multiple realities 
and arenas of struggle where different life-worlds and discourses meet, interface encounters and 
interface in terms of discontinuities of interests, values, knowledge and power and structural 
heterogeneity (Long and van der Ploeg, 1994: 82). The first important terms and concepts which 
will be discussed in the next section are that of agency, knowledge and power. 
2.6.2 Agency, knowledge and power 
Long (2001; 1989) considers the concept of agency as centrally important in or as the point of 
departure for actor-oriented approach. The concept allows us to be able to identify and analyze 
social actors, their social relations and strategies in solving problems, and power dynamics. As 
we shall see in the following discussion knowledge and power are embedded in the concept of 
agency. 
Building on Giddens’ notion of agency, Long (2001; 1989) refers agency to the individual actor 
with the capacity to process social experience and to cope with life, even under the most extreme 
forms of coercion. Adding to this statement, Long argues that social actors are knowledgeable 
and capable. They attempt to solve problems, learn how to intervene and monitor their actions, 
observing how others react to their behavior and taking note of the various contingent 
circumstances (Giddens, 1984, cited in Long and Long 1992: 23). 
In addition, however, Long adds the views of Hindess (1986) that individual actors are not the 
only entities that reach decisions and act accordingly but other social actors such as private 
enterprises, state agencies, political parties and other forms of organization may have means of 
reaching and formulating decisions and of acting on at least some of them. 
Accordingly, Long builds up his notion of agency by incorporating the position that agency is 
composed of social relations and it can only be effective through social relations. However, Long 
warns that one must not equate agency with decision-making capacity alone. Effective agency 
also requires the organizing capacity to manipulate network of social relations and to channel 
specific items (such as claims and order) through certain nodal points of interaction. Based on 
Latour (1986), Long argues that the ability to influence others or to pass on a command (e.g. to 
get them to accept a particular message) rests on “the actions of chain of agents …and power is 
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composed here and now by enrolling many actors in a given political and social scheme” (Latour, 
1986; cited in Long and Long, 1992: 23).  
Although, social actors tend to win or lose the struggles in particular events through network of 
social relations, the battle is never over since all actors exercise some kinds of power, including 
those who appear to be powerless (Long and Long, 1992). As Giddens puts it, “all forms of 
dependence offer some resources whereby those who are subordinate can influence the activities 
of their superiors (Giddens, 1984, cited in Long and Long, 1992: 24).” 
Pushing the argument further, Long advances the idea that social actor is a social construction 
rather than just simply synonym for the individual human being. According to him the social 
construction of actors touches upon the issue of two principal elements of agency identified by 
Giddens, that is, knowledgeability and capability. Further, Long argues that the notions of agency 
are constructed differently in different cultures and in different segments of the same society 
(Long and Van der Ploeg, 1994, in Booth 1994). Such differences underline the importance of 
examining how notions of agency (knowledgeability and capability) are differently constituted 
culturally and affect the management of interpersonal relations and the kinds of control that 
actors can pursue (Long and Long, 1992). This means analyzing how differential conceptions of 
power, influence and knowledge may shape the responses and strategies of different actors 
(ibid.). 
According to the above discussion, the notion of agency encompasses power and knowledge due 
to the fact that the agency is composed of social relations, and the concept of agency signifies that 
social actors are socially constructed and they are knowledgeable and capable. As Long and Long 
(1992: 27) argue, “power and knowledge is not something which is possessed and accumulated 
(Foucault, in Gordon 1980) …it emerges out of processes of social interaction…” They point out 
that, someone having power or knowledge does not entail that others are without. Instead, power 
and knowledge is regarded by Long and Long (1992) as material or concrete things possessed 
naturally by agents in social life. Hence, Long views the process of this reification as part of the 
ongoing struggles over meaning and the control of strategic relationships and resources. Long 
refers this to knowledge encounters which involve struggle between actors who aim to enroll 
others to accept their particular meaning and viewpoints. Analyzing knowledge encounters 
therefore could help us to look closely at the issue of whose interpretations prevail over those of 
other actors and under what conditions. 
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Finally, we can conclude that the analysis of ‘agency, knowledge and power’ could help us to 
indentify the crucial actors, their social relation and strategy, interest, resources, their knowledge 
encounters and the power relations. It also helps us to identify and explain the nature and degree 
of social and political space associated with different types of social actors – not only the affected 
community but also the other intervening parties such as local and international 
NGOs/organizations, development agencies, and officials of government departments. The 
analysis therefore can throw some lights on how different actors take part and struggle in planned 
intervention which, according to Long, is an ongoing transformational process. 
2.6.3 Social interface 
Long (1989) develops social interface perspective as an analytical tool to understand cultural 
diversity, social difference and conflict inherent in processes of development intervention. It 
allows us to analyze the processes by which affected communities respond to development 
process and develop their strategies for dealing with new circumstances they face and therefore it 
shows how the interaction between intervening parties and local actors shape the actual outcomes 
of particular intervention policies. Social interface requires a careful analysis of the dynamics of 
social arenas in which struggles over resources and meaning are explicitly fought out. 
In general terms, interface is defined as “a point where two subjects, systems, processes, etc. meet 
and affect each other (Oxford Dictionary, 1995).” From a sociological perspective, interface is 
seen as the dynamic and potentially conflictive nature of social interaction (Long, 1989), in which 
it conveys the idea of some kind of face-to-face encounter between individuals with differing 
interests, resources and power (Arce and Long, in Long and Long, 1992). Long terms this 
perspective as social interface which can be defined as “a critical point of intersection between 
different social fields, domains or life-worlds, where social discontinuities based upon differences 
in values, social interests and power are found (Long, 2001: 177).” Referring to this definition, 
the study of interface is concerned with the analysis of discontinuities. These are characterized by 
discrepancies of social interest, cultural interpretation, knowledge and power through which they 
are mediated and transformed at critical points of confrontation and linkage (Long, 2001: 89). As 
such, interface analysis reveals the dynamic and emergent character of the struggles and 
interactions that take place, showing how actors’ goals, perceptions, interests and relationships 
are reshaped by the process. However, interfaces contain within them many levels and forms of 
social linkage and discontinuity. As Arce and Long argue, “studies of interface should not be 
restricted to observing what goes on during face-to-face encounters, since these interactions are in 
part affected by actors, institutional and cultural frameworks, and resources that may not actually 
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be physically or directly present (in Long and Long, 1992: 214).” Hence, although the 
methodology of interface studies focuses upon specific social interactional processes, the analysis 
should situate these within broader institutional and power fields (Long, 1989). 
In regard to the above meaning and importance of the concept of social interface, Long (1989) 
points out three reasons for conducting an interface approach, which are quite relevant for the 
analysis of this study. First, an interface approach can help to develop an analysis of planning 
process. That is to understand the relationships between planning, implementation and outcomes, 
by looking at the point at which planned intervention take place and at studying the social 
consequences and responses to the process. As he argues,  
“Development interface situations are the critical points at which not only policy applied 
but at which it is transformed through acquiring social meanings that were not set out in 
the original policy statements. It is impossible to separate policy, implementation and 
outcome into watertight compartments: there is considerable seepage between them and 
therefore a mixing of elements such that it is often difficult to say where one stops and the 
other begins.” (Long, 1989: 3) 
Further, he continues that: 
“One solution to this problem is to concentrate research on implementation processes so 
that one reaches a fuller understanding of the structural dynamics and degree of freedom 
or room for maneuver associated with particular interface situations” (ibid.). 
Second, an interface approach enables us to understand more fully the differential responses by 
local groups including both affected and non-affected populations. It explores how different types 
of communities develop strategies for dealing with new circumstances they face. It contextualizes 
the new types of choices generated by specific interventions within the framework of the 
livelihood and organizational problems faced by communities. In order to undertake such an 
analysis one needs to document the differential responses of particular affected community 
groups. This requires undertaking a set of comparisons aimed at explaining why different groups 
react differently to apparently similar circumstances, as well as analyzing the relations between 
the affected and non-affected groups, and the implementing agency. In addition, the issue of 
differential responses requires a much more careful mapping out of how implementing agencies 
and their personnel interact and present themselves to local groups and vice versa. Third, an 
interface approach assists us in forging a theoretical ground between the so-called “micro” and 
“macro” theories of development by showing how the interactions between intervening parties 
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and local actors shape the outcomes of particular intervention policies at regional, national and 
international/global levels. 
Up to this point, it is clear that social interface analysis is concerned with social situations 
wherein the interactions between actors become oriented around the problem of devising ways of 
bridging, accommodating to, or struggling against each others’ different social and cognitive 
worlds (Long, 1989). Moreover, Long (2001) points out that, interface analysis is also concerned 
with multiple realities made up of potentially conflicting social and normative interests and 
diverse and contested bodies of knowledge. Although interface interactions presuppose some 
degree of common interest, they also have a tendency to generate conflict due to opposing 
interests and objectives or to unequal power relations. Negotiations at the interface are sometimes 
carried out by individuals who represent particular groups or organizations. Their position is 
inevitably ambivalent since they must respond to the demands of their own groups as well as to 
the expectations of those with whom they must negotiate. One should however not assume that 
because a particular person “represents” a specific group or institution he or she necessarily acts 
in the interests or on behalf of his/her fellows (Long, 2002). Long and Long (1992) argue that it is 
in the field of intervention that struggles over social meanings and practices take place. 
Therefore, when looking at responses to development intervention one should look at who is part 
of the conflicts and how these conflicts are fought. 
As we have seen from the above discussions, the key term for social interface analysis is conflict 
or what Long and Long (1992) refers to as “encounter at the interface”, where more or less 
serious interest conflicts are being fought on the arenas. Long and Long’s book (1992) entitled 
“Battlefields of knowledge” underlines this image or idea about contested arenas in which actors’ 
understandings, interests and values are pitched against each other. Long and Villarreal (in 
Schuurman, 1993: 148) stress the importance of examining arenas that, “by analyzing arenas, 
interface analysis entails not only understanding the struggles and power differentials taking 
place between the parties involved, but also an attempt to reveal the dynamics of cultural 
accommodation that makes it possible for the various world views to interact.” Another 
argument, Bierschenk (1988: 146) asserts that, “arenas of conflicts are often linked to the 
implementation of projects, constituting a social field where different groups compete with each 
other for material, symbolic or institutional resources provided by the project.”  
To that end, we can summarize and conclude that the analysis of social interface requires a 
careful analysis of the dynamics of social arenas in which struggles over resources and meaning 
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are explicitly fought out. In so doing, further discussion on concept of social arenas is essentially 
important. The following section discusses the concept of arenas. 
2.6.4 Arenas 
As illustrated in previous section, the concept of arenas is important for conducting social 
interface analysis because it is seen as “social and spatial locations where actors confront each 
other, mobilize social relations and other cultural means for the attainment of specific ends 
(Long, 2001: 59).” In this way, it allows us to identify and conceptualize what actions or 
confrontation taken by which actors at what social and spatial locations, for instance at local, 
national or international levels or at all three levels. 
In simple and abstract term, ‘arena’ can be shortly described as “a place or scene of activity or 
conflict (Oxford Dictionary, 1995).” From an institutional analyst point of view, ‘arena’ refers to 
“the social space where individuals interact, exchange goods and services, solve problems, 
dominate one another, or fight (Ostrom, in Sabatier, 1999: 42).” This definition somewhat differs 
to Long’s, which according to him ‘arena’ is understood as “space in which contests over issues, 
claims, resources, values, meanings and representations take place (Long, 2001: 242),” or more 
concretely as “social and spatial locations where actors confront each other, mobilize social 
relations and other cultural means for the attainment of specific ends (Long, 2001: 59).” 
The concept of arena can be utilized to analyze and explain social encounters or a series of 
situations in which contests over issues, resources, values and representations take place. In this 
sense, the concept of arena is especially important for identifying the actors and mapping out the 
issues, resources and discourse entailed in particular situations of disagreement or dispute (Long, 
2001: 59). In addition, resources and strategies that actors used to support their interests, aims and 
dispositions will also be analyzed. Furthermore, the essence of the analysis of arena, as Long 
warns, is that: 
“While…the idea of an arena conjures up the picture of a fight or struggle taking place in 
some clearly demarcated local setting, we should not assume that arenas primarily involve 
face-to-face confrontations and only local interests, values and contests. On the contrary, 
external and geographically distant actors, contexts and institutional frames shape the 
social processes, strategies and actions that take place in these localized settings. 
Furthermore, local situations, struggles or networks are, as it were, often stretched out or 
projected spatially as well as temporally to connect up with other distant social worlds. 
Very few social arenas in fact are self-contained and separate from other arenas and areas 
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of social life. The impact of modern communication and information technologies has 
been crucial here, since these allow for much more spontaneous, technology-mediated 
interactions of global proportions, thereby underlining the importance of developing 
analyses of interlocking arenas that go beyond earlier territorialized conceptions of social 
space based on dichotomies such as ‘rural-urban’, ‘center-periphery’, and ‘national-
international orders’.” (Long, 2001: 59-60) 
According to Long’s statement above, it is clear that the analysis of arena does not limit to only 
local actors or setting but it also takes into account distant actors and social networks which shape 
the social processes, strategies and actions that take place in these localized settings. 
Arena is especially useful when analyzing development projects and programs since intervention 
processes consist of a complex set of interlocking arenas of struggle, each characterized by 
specific constraints and possibilities of maneuver (Long, 2001: 29). The image of arenas can also 
be portrayed metaphorically as a “game” in which the players (the social actors involved) come 
face to face and compete with each other, all playing according to different rules. In this “game” 
the involved players possess different interests, different levels of power and different resources 
or capitals, which all enable them to influence the progress and the execution of the game 
(Olivier de Sardan, 2005: 185; Bierschenk, 1988: 146). 
The unit of analysis of arenas may include the home; the neighborhood; local, regional, national, 
and international councils; firms and markets; and the interactions among all of these arenas with 
others (Ostrom, 2005: 13). As already described in chapter 1, this study will focus on the analysis 
of dam development conflict or dam associated social interfaces by examining three levels of 
arenas at local, national and international/global. Each of the arenas will be discussed in a 
different chapter while keeping in mind the interrelation and inter-linkage between the three 
levels of arenas. The local level arena which focuses on local responses to hydropower dam 
impacts will be discussed in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 discusses responses in the national arena. 
Chapter 6 discusses responses in the international and global arenas. 
2.7 Summary and conclusion 
This chapter discussed two important aspects serving as a searching tool to uncover how planning 
process for river basin management work in practice. The first was a discussion of theoretical 
terms and concepts which relate to the issues of river basin management. This includes the first 
four sections containing the description of river basin issues followed by explanation of key terms 
and concepts of river, river basin and the management aspects, conceptualizing the term 
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development and its meaning in regard to hydropower development and discussing the concepts 
of planning as an introductory part to analytical concepts. The second was an identification of key 
analytical concepts which serves as analytical tool to unpack the planning process and to search 
for a better way of river basin management. This section summarizes and concludes the core 
notions and links them to the next chapter. 
The issues related to river basin management as identified in section 2.2 are multiple in nature. 
They range from the pressure of water shortage and water quality degradation due to over 
extraction and improper use of water resources. This water stress generates an increasing 
tendency of conflict between upstream and downstream. One of the issues identified as important 
to this study is related to hydropower development. The notion of hydropower dam is that the 
river is blocked, particularly in upstream or at the headwaters, to store water for generating 
electricity through using the power of flowing water to move the turbines. While hydropower 
provides electricity to power industries and urban population, its consequences discussed in 
section 2.4 are prevailing and countless. The consequences include environmental and social 
impacts. This is due to the fact that the natures of river basin as discussed in section 2.3 is such a 
connected system  in which living micro organisms, flora and fauna depend on each other and on 
water in both quality and quantity and in time and space. Change in flow regime in time and 
space could deteriorate water quality and thereby affect the system. Since human beings are part 
of and depend on this system for their livelihoods, they are also affected. The most likely affected 
population due to dam is the communities who have been living along the river and depend on 
river system for living long before the existence of hydropower dam. Therefore, the impacts 
include not only environmental and social aspects but also economic and cultural ones. 
An attempt to understand what factors have facilitated such promotion of hydropower 
construction, the concepts of development has been extensively discussed in section 2.4. The 
term ‘development’ in this study is understood as change, process, and progress, which bring 
about economic growth, life sustenance, self-esteem, and freedom for a particular society or a 
country. To facilitate development to be sustained, the proponents of sustainable hydropower 
development need to be viewed as an integrated approach taking into consideration various 
aspects such as environmental, economic, social, cultural and spiritual well being of the people in 
the development planning process. Here, it is important to note that the meaning of development 
planning process discussed in section 2.5 is a cyclic one. Sustainable hydropower development 
shall therefore take into account this meaning of planning process. Its definition should be 
understood as a cyclical continuous process and therefore covers an endless time span. The 
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components of this planning process include planning, implementation and monitoring. The three 
components are interrelated in a cyclic manner or a feedback loop. That is, in the planning 
process, the plan is designed and is followed by implementation of planned activities. Since 
implementation involves and affects a large pool of resources and human being, the 
implementation scheme which is laid down in the plan rarely coincide with the reality in time and 
space during the process. The planning process often produces a variety of conflicts between 
users during the execution of development activities. Therefore, monitoring during 
implementation phase allows implementer/or developer to revise the plan by taking into 
consideration the emergence of new circumstances. After the plan is revised, implementation 
goes on and monitoring takes place again. In this way, such process is repeated in a cyclical 
manner without ending. 
Although planning process shall follow the cyclical processes, development activities usually 
tend to be influenced by political process. In this study, political process described in section 2.5 
is identified as the processes by which contested and conflicting interest between users are 
mediated, be they farmers, developers, or decision-makers. To unpack the political planning 
process which is the main theme of this study, I adopted an actor-oriented approach of social 
interface, which was presented exclusively in section 2.6, to study interactive relations at the 
interface between development agencies and the affected communities, and to uncover the 
outcomes of planning efforts. 
The study of social interface requires two other concepts, including ‘agency, knowledge and 
power’; and arenas. The earlier points to the need to identify actors, and their social relation so as 
knowledge and power can be revealed. The later is identified as an important concept for social 
interface analysis since it conveys the meaning of social and spatial location of confrontation of 
various actors. Here, it is noticed that when analyzing social interfaces and arenas, a key term is 
‘conflict’ or what Norman Long refer to as ‘encounters at the interface’, where more or less 
serious interest conflicts are being fought. 
Finally, as explained carefully in this chapter, I apply an actor-oriented approach in this thesis 
conceiving the field of hydropower development as an arena or a social interface, in which 
contest over issues, resources, practices, knowledge and values take place. By recognizing 
development intervention as a social event where different social actors with different interests 
interact in the planning process, I seek to understand and analyze how this contest unfolds at 
three different arenas which in this thesis I identify as the spatial location or unit of analysis to 
study the interest conflicts of various actors involved in hydropower development intervention in 
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the Se San River basin. The three levels of arenas which identified in this study include local, 
national and international/global. To keep path for analysis according to this spatial scale, three 
chapters corresponding to this three arenas are developed. Chapter 4 focuses on local arena, 
chapter 5 on national arenas, and chapter 6 on international and global arenas. Although each 
arena is discussed in different chapter, it does not mean that the interrelation and interlink across 
boundary is absent but they are interrelated and dynamic. 
Before delving into the discussion and analysis of the three arenas, it is necessary to discuss the 
general context of water resources development planning process in the Lower Mekong Basin 
from which an empirical experience and history of hydropower development in the Se San sub-
basin can be derived. This discussion is therefore presented in the next chapter 3 which provides 
a basic background of various actors involved in the development intervention in the Se San sub-
basin. The three chapters of arenas which discussed above will then proceed accordingly in 
chapter 4, 5, and 6. And finally, chapter 7 comes with the conclusion of the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 3 
WATER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN THE LOWER MEKONG 
BASIN: AN EMPIRICAL EXPERIENCE FOR HYDROPOWER DEVELOPMENT IN 
THE SE SAN SUB-BASIN 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The Se San basin is transboundary to the Mekong River. Therefore, any development which takes 
place in the Se San basin is closely associated with the Mekong planning history. This chapter 
seeks to explore the history of the Mekong planning and cooperation from which planning 
process for hydropower development in the Se San basin can be derived. This chapter contains 
five sections. Section 3.2 provides a historical review of water resources planning and 
management in the Mekong basin. Section 3.3 explains the process of hydropower development 
in the Se San basin. Section 3.4 discusses hydropower development in the Se San basin from the 
Vietnamese perspective. And section 3.5 provides conclusion to the chapter. 
3.2 Historical review of water resources planning and management in the Mekong River 
Basin 
The Mekong planning history has evolved over the past 60 years from a simple Mekong project 
run by the United Nations to presently a complex inter-states organization called the Mekong 
River Commission (MRC). The Mekong planning has gone through four phases, namely the 
Mekong Project from 1947 to 1956, the Mekong Committee (MC) from 1957 to 1977, the 
Mekong Interim Committee (IMC) from 1978 to 1994, and the MRC from 1995 to present. This 
section will review the four phases of the Mekong planning which provides a general picture on 
how Mekong regime has sequentially evolved. But before discussing the four phases, I will 
provide an overview of geographical location of the Mekong basin which is presented in sub-
section 3.1.1. This is followed by the discussion of the above four phases of the Mekong planning 
in four different sub-sections, 3.1.2, 3.1.3, 3.1.4 and 3.1.5, respectively. And sub-section 3.1.6 
provides discussion and conclusion to this section. 
3.2.1 Geographical location of the Mekong basin 
The source of the Mekong River is located on the Tibetan Plateau, Qinghai Province, China, at an 
elevation of over 5,000 m. The Mekong River flows through six countries including southern 
China, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam before entering the South China Sea 
(see figure 3.1). Globally, the Mekong ranks eighth in terms of discharge (15,000 m3/second), 
12th in terms of length (4,800 km), and 21st in terms of catchment area (795,000 km2) (see Table 
3.1) (Ringler,  2001: 4). 
Although the Mekong flows through six countries, the Mekong planning history includes only the 
four latter countries which are known as the countries of the Lower Mekong Basin. Map of the 
Mekong basin in figure 3.1 shows the physiographical and political divisions between the upper 
and the lower basins. 
The upper basin includes China and Myanmar and the lower basin includes Laos, Thailand, 
Cambodia and Vietnam. In the upper basin, China contributes 16% to the Mekong flows and 21% 
to the catchment area while Myanmar has the lowest contribution to flows and catchment area, 
two percent and three percent respectively. In the lower basin, 97% of Laos territory are located 
in the basin sharing a quarter of the total catchment and 35% of total flows. Thailand consists of 
36% of its land area located in the Mekong basin and contributes 17% of total flows and 23% of 
total catchment area. Eighty-six percent of Cambodia’s land area is contained in the Mekong 
basin and the country contributes 19% of total flows. In Vietnam, the country contributes eight 
percent of the basin area and 11% of basin flows (see Table 3.1). 
Table 3.1 Distribution of water resources in the Mekong River Basin 
Catchment Country/Region 
Area (km2) Share/country 
(%) 
Share/basin 
(%) 
Average 
flow 
(m3/sec) 
Flow 
contribution 
(%) 
Yunnan, China 165,000 38 21 2,410 16 
Myanmar 24,000 4 3 300 2 
Laos 202,000 97 25 5,270 35 
Thailand 184,000 36 23 2,560 17 
Cambodia 155,000 86 20 2,860 19 
Vietnam 65,000 20 8 1,660 11 
Total 795,000  100 15,060 100 
Source: Mekong River Commission, 1998 cited in Ringler, 2001 
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Figure 3.1 Physiographical and political divisions map of the Mekong Basin 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Mekong River Commission, 2003 
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3.2.2 The birth of the Mekong project from 1947 to 1956 
Historically, the Mekong project grew from as early as 1947 when the United Nations General 
Assembly established the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE)10 in 
Bangkok, Thailand. In its early work the ECAFE focused attention on flood issues, which led to 
the establishment of Bureau of Flood Control for the lower Mekong basin in 1949. China and 
Myanmar were not part of this Mekong project because during that period China was not a 
member of the United Nations and Myanmar was not interested in participating (Jacobs, 2002: 
356) perhaps due to low physical benefits from the river’s water, since the river is touching only a 
minor part of an inaccessible part of the country (Mekong Secretariat, 1989: 11; Öjendal, 2000: 
141; Backer, 2007: 44). 
In the early 1950s, the Bureau’s mission was shifting from a focus on flood-related problems to 
addressing floods as part of a broader, multiple purpose approach to river basin planning (United 
Nations, 1950 cited in Jacobs, 2002). For such reason the Bureau of Flood Control and Water 
Resources Development was renamed. 
As the focus was shifted to a wider development approach, in 1951 the Bureau started carrying 
out preliminary studies and field investigations on a broader aspect including technical flood 
control and the development of irrigation and hydropower schemes. A report of these studies 
completed in 1952, noted that the Mekong River offered highly attractive opportunities for the 
development of hydropower and irrigation schemes (Mekong Secretariat, undated). Further, in 
1953 the ECAFE consultant, Yutaka Kubota, recommended hydropower development as a mean 
for electricity generation, flood control and irrigation (Kawai, 1984). The broadening of interest 
from flood control to multiple purpose use of river also led to the reconnaissance study on lower 
Mekong basin carried out by the United States Bureau of Reclamation in 1955 which became a 
basic document for planning the river’s development. The report emphasized the need to collect 
data on hydrology, meteorology, topography, sedimentation and geology which was followed by 
further investigation (Mekong Secretariat, 1989). 
In 1956 the ECAFE Secretariat prepared plans for a team of several international experts to 
investigate the Mekong basin’s potential in close cooperation with the governments of Cambodia, 
Laos, Thailand and Vietnam, and resulted in a report, “Development of Water Resources in the 
Lower Mekong Basin” (ECAFE, 1957, cited in Mekong Secretariat, 1989). The report provided a 
conceptual framework for planning the development of the river basin as an integrated system. 
                                                 
10 ECAFE is predecessor to the current United Nation Economic Commission for Asia and the Pacific (U.N. ESCAP) 
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One of the main conclusions of the report was to call for close cooperation of the four riparian 
countries in data collection, planning and development through establishment of a permanent 
committee to oversee and coordinate further studies on the lower Mekong basin. The report stated 
as follow: 
“It is necessary to establish an international channel or clearing house for the exchange of 
information and plans and the coordination of projects. The clearing agency may be a 
working group of experts, a standing committee or commission, as may be decided by the 
countries concerned. Ultimately, the process may lead to the signing of a convention and 
the establishment of a permanent body for the development of the basin.” (ibid: 10) 
After the ECAFE report was adopted, a meeting of representatives of the four countries was held 
in March 1957 to consider further actions for the formation of Mekong Committee. Sub-section 
3.2.3 below explains the formation and the role of the Mekong Committee. 
3.2.3 The Mekong Committee (1957-1977): an era for promoting hydropower development 
on the Mekong’s tributaries 
In September 1957 representatives of the four countries adopted the “Statute of the Committee 
for Coordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin”. This statute formed the basis for 
the establishment of the Mekong Committee (MC) for the first time in the Mekong planning 
history. 
The statute sets forth the term of reference of the committee that: 
“The Mekong Committee consisted of one member from each country with 
plenipotentiary authority … to promote, coordinate, supervise and control the planning 
and investigation of water resources development projects in the lower Mekong basin” 
(Mekong Secretariat, undated: 24) 
The ultimate goal of this committee was to develop the water and related resources of the basin 
for hydropower, irrigation, flood control, drainage, navigation improvement, watershed 
management, water supply and related development for the benefit of basin’s population (ibid.). 
Even though the committee goal was to bring a full spectrum of infrastructure development for 
both mainstream and tributaries, the international expert group made a strong recommendation 
toward development on the tributaries as an early stage of the Mekong development intervention. 
At that time it was understood that the development of the tributaries was regarded as the most 
important short-term issue because such projects could be initiated more easily since they were 
smaller and required much less investment and were therefore more acceptable both politically 
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and economically by the riparian governments (Mekong Secretariat, 1989). The United States, 
France and Japan were the first to make official commitment to provide international aid after the 
formation of the Mekong Committee. 
Japan gave particular attention to the Mekong’s tributary planning. In 1959 a Japanese team 
conducted a reconnaissance study on the Mekong’s tributary which identified 16 out of 34 major 
tributaries of the lower Mekong basin with development potential (ibid.). The MC then made a 
short-list of four projects, one in each riparian country for further study and consideration. All 
projects were involved in multipurpose dam for hydropower and irrigation and to some extent for 
the purpose of flood control. Upper Se San in Viet Nam was one of the projects. 
In addition to the engineering approach in the 1950s in which the tributaries should be developed 
first, the Mekong Committee’s planning in the 1960s was also directed to include the social and 
economic aspects for the lower Mekong basin development (Kawai, 1984). A survey on these 
aspects was conducted by a small team of international consultants headed by geographer Gilbert 
White in 1962. The White team’s report provided 14 specific recommendations that emphasized 
human resources development, inventories of basin resources, economic and organizational 
issues, flood forecasting and warning, and agricultural improvement (White et al., 1962 cited in 
Jacobs, 2002). The report also recommended that engineering projects be constructed on the 
Mekong’s tributaries before mainstream projects were initiated (ibid.). 
Between 1964 and 1968, the MC began programs in data gathering and moved to standardize 
data collection methods between the riparian countries. Studies and investigations were begun 
along three tracts including investment potential and engineering feasibility, social and economic 
aspects, and financial matters and prospects (Mekong Secretariat, 1989). The studies focused on 
both mainstream and tributaries’ civil works on irrigation, hydropower, flood control, fisheries 
and navigation improvement. 
Later, as a result of two decades of study efforts the MC commissioned a team of independent 
international consultants to prepare the Indicative Basin Plan in 1970 (Mekong Secretariat, 1989). 
The 690 page report which was published in the same year was the first ever master plan for the 
lower Mekong basin development covering Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam. It served as 
a menu of water resources development projects presented to the donor nations for funding 
(Jacobs, 2002). Taking into consideration the planning procedure in the 1960s that the 
engineering projects be constructed on the Mekong’s tributaries first, the master plan was 
designed in a way that a short-range program be initially undertaken on the Mekong’s tributaries 
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between 1971 and 1980, and then followed by a long-range program for the mainstream from 
1981 to 2000. For convenience in implementing individual projects and actions, the report of 
Indicative Basin Plan outlined the two distinct time spans of the plan as follows. 
“The short-range plan allows for the successive implementation of independent tributary 
projects… to fill localized needs and meet the development objectives of the countries. It 
is anticipated that during the decade 1971 to 1980 the demand for power will reach the 
following amounts: Cambodia – 50MW firm and 97MW peaking; Laos – 25MW firm and 
51MW peaking, Thailand – 1,266MW firm and 2,376MW peaking; Vietnam – 639MW 
firm and 1,232MW peaking. 
The long-range plan, extending to the year 2000, comprises several possible sequences of 
mostly mainstream projects which are to a large extent interdependent and which are 
aimed primarily at meeting national and regional needs.”  (MC, 1970: I-12 – I-13) 
The report also acknowledges that the Indicative Basin Plan is a sectoral plan for which 
development of water and related resources of the basin was to provide essential infrastructure 
relating to flood control, irrigation and drainage for increased agricultural production, and 
hydropower for industrial and other uses (Kawaki, 1984; MC, 1970). Specifically, the 1970 plan 
focused much attention on hydropower production and irrigation for both in the short range and 
the long range (IMC, 1988). The plan proposed a cascade of dams consisting of seven major 
mainstream dams and some 87 dams on tributaries (MC, 1970). Though some projects have been 
investigated ranging from complete study and design, some tributary projects were limited to 
only simple desk studies due to the nature of remoteness and inaccessibility (ibid.). 
3.2.4 Interim Mekong Committee (1978-1994): planning during an uncompleted member 
During the mid 1970s, planning came to a halt due to political instability in Vietnam, Laos and 
Cambodia. Communist regimes took power in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. The communist 
regimes in Vietnam and Laos were absent from the committee in the 1976 and 1977 meetings, 
but returned in 1978 to work in the committee (Jacobs, 1992, cited in Öjendal, 2000: 119). The 
Khmer Rouge, however, made Cambodian participation impossible during 1975-1978. The result 
was a Cambodian absence in the Committee and a de facto breakdown of the original MC 
(Öjendal, 2000). To be able to continue to work, the remaining three countries (Laos, Thailand 
and Vietnam) signed an agreement to establish Interim Mekong Committee (IMC) in January 
1978. 
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In the 1980s, one of the first major activities of the new IMC was to reassess the 1970 Indicative 
Basin Plan in the light of changes which had taken place since the plan was originally formulated. 
The Committee stressed the need for revision of the 1970 plan as follow. 
“The 1970 plan covered a period of three decades, but the first half of this period saw a 
number of important changes in the region. For this reason, the Interim Mekong 
Committee decided that a major updating of the plan was necessary.” (IMC, 1988: I) 
Consequently, the IMC endorsed a proposal to revise the Indicative Basin Plan in October 1980 
(MC, 1989). The revised indicative basin plan was published in 1988 entitled “Perspectives for 
Mekong Development: Revised Indicative Plan (1987) for the development of land, water and 
related resources of the lower Mekong basin.” 
Up to the date of the publication of the 1987 revised plan the IMC noted that little progress had 
been made to achieve the short-range plan for the tributary development particularly on the part 
of Cambodia and Vietnam: 
“The short range plan (1971-1980) was largely carried through in Laos and Thailand, but 
in Cambodia and Vietnam, war and lack of money prevented much progress. The long 
range plan, however, remains more or less as it stood in 1970.” (IMC, 1988: XI) 
For such reason the 1987 Revised Indicative Basin Plan retained the 1970 vision of a cascade of 
Mekong River mainstream dams, but the 1987 configuration called for smaller dams in order to 
reduce environmental impacts (Jacobs, 2002). While the 1987 revised plan outlined specifically 
on investment plan for Laos, Thailand and Vietnam covering the period from 1988 to 2000, the 
plan for Cambodia was totally shelved. The investment plan, however, prioritized 29 projects to 
be studied and investigated. Twenty-six projects are national in scope and the remaining three are 
international. All involve either hydropower or irrigation development or both. 
The 26 national projects in the investment plan consist of five hydropower and 21 irrigation 
projects. There were two hydropower projects each in Thailand and Vietnam and one in Laos. 
The hydropower project in Vietnam included a staged development of hydropower plants of 24 
MW and 480 MW respectively at Yali-Falls in the central highlands of Vietnam. 
3.2.5 Mekong River Commission (1995-Present): reactivation of full committee’s members 
In 1991 when Cambodia entered into peace through the signing of Paris Peace Accord, Cambodia 
requested readmission and reactivation of the MC. The request triggered lengthy discussion in the 
form of a series of meeting between the four riparian nations to discuss a new legal framework 
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for cooperation from 1992 to 1995. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) assisted 
and supported the meeting process. Eventually a legal agreement was reached and signed by the 
governments of Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam in Chiang Rai, Thailand on 5 April 1995. 
Since then the 1995 Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the 
Mekong River Basin opened up a third chapter in the Mekong planning history with the new 
establishment of the MRC. 
The establishment of the MRC articulated principles of cooperation and outlined a set of rules for 
reasonable and equitable use of the basin’s water resources. The agreement represents a milestone 
in international water resources management treaties due to its emphasis on joint development, 
ecological protection, and a dynamic process of water allocation. 
Figure 3.2: Organizational structure of Mekong River Commission 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Mekong River Commission, 2006c 
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It also mandated a new organizational structure consisting of three permanent bodies: the 
Council, the Joint Committee, and the MRC Secretariat (see figure 3.2). The Council, which 
composed of one member from each member country at the Ministerial and Cabinet level, is the 
highest body within the organization and is responsible for overseeing MRC activities and 
directing MRC policies. The Joint Committee is responsible for implementing Council initiatives 
and supervising the activities of the Secretariat. The Secretariat, currently based in Vientiane, is 
responsible for the day to day administration of MRC affairs and for the development of 
implementation of MRC programs. For neutrality reason, the Secretariat is headed by a Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) who is non-riparian nationality (Hirsch et al., 2006). The CEO is 
recruited by the Joint Committee to serve a three year term and renewal upon satisfaction by 
majority approval of the member countries. 
Base on the 1995 Mekong Agreement, the MRC Council approved a strategic plan in 1998 that 
provided direction to the 2001 Work Program (Jacobs, 2002: 261). The Work Program was 
divided into three areas including core, support and sector. The core program included a basin 
development plan (BDP), a water utilization program (WUP) and an environment program (EP). 
The sector program encompassed fisheries, agriculture/irrigation/forestry, water resources and 
hydrology, navigation, and tourism. The support program focused on capacity-building and 
improved financial management. 
Between 1995 and 2005, the three core programs seemed to be given high priority by riparian 
countries and donors. According to Hirsch et al. (2006: 90), when the 1995 Mekong Agreement 
was signed, bilateral donors, the U.N. and development banks stood ready to increase their 
assistance. Some donors have chosen to direct their assistance more towards the core programs 
including the BDP, WUP and EP (ibid.). 
The three core programs were given much attention because they were built upon a section of the 
1995 legal agreement that focuses on a basin-wide development plan that is equitable (promoted 
by WUP) and sustainable (promoted by EP) (Jacobs, 2002: 362). The BDP produced a basinwide 
planning process, planning guidelines and criteria, and a basinwide list of priority projects. The 
WUP included hydrologic modeling, social science analysis of transboundary management 
issues, and institutional and human resources capacity building activities. The EP included 
environmental monitoring and assessment, water quality studies and studies of the link between 
people and aquatic ecosystems. The two core programs (WUP and EP) were intended to feed into 
the BDP, which according to Jacobs (2002: 361), the BDP is a key mechanism for the MRC in 
promoting international cooperation. 
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In 2006, the MRC program structure was somewhat changed to place the BDP in a top tier 
program (see figure 3.3) which was intended to provide the knowledge base and river science that 
was necessary to support planning and decision-making (Hirsch et al., 2006). The distinction of 
programs into core, sector and support were discontinued (MRC, 2006c). According to the MRC 
strategic plan 2006 to 2010, the new MRC program structure comprises Flood Management and 
Mitigation; Drought Management; Agriculture, Irrigation and Forestry; Navigation; Hydropower; 
Fisheries and Tourism. This cohesive set of programs is cross-cut by four programs in 
Environment Management, Information and Knowledge Management, Integrated Capacity 
Building and Water Utilization (ibid.) (see figure 3.3). All of these programs feed into BDP 
which aims to promote regional cooperation for sustainable development of water and related 
resources in the Mekong River Basin. 
Figure 3.3 Mekong River Commission Program Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Mekong River Commission, 2006c 
 
3.2.6 Discussion and conclusion 
Water resources planning and management in the Mekong basin was mainly driven by 
international donors and engineers since the birth of the Mekong project. Despite the MC and 
IMC operated in a context of instability such as war, changes in membership and erratic funding 
levels, infrastructure development such as hydropower and irrigation was put in the forefront of 
water resources planning in the Mekong basin. One of the most reasonable justifications for dam 
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building which was perceived by international engineers from the 1950s as we have seen from 
the above sub-sections is that dam plays an important role in reducing flood in downstream areas 
and increasing agricultural production through irrigation. From this perspective, a great effort of 
exploring hydropower potential began to grow through a number of studies funded by donor 
agencies from the 1950s onwards. Once a series of studies was produced, a plan was drawn to 
give a picture of how the development of the basin looked like. For instance, after almost two 
decades of studies the MC produced an Indicative Basin Plan in 1970 as the first master plan for 
the lower Mekong basin in history. The plan was not only seen as the outline of what was to be 
done in the future but as a strategic document to seek funds from international donors to bring the 
prioritized projects into reality. As we have seen in the foregoing sub-sections it becomes clear 
that hydropower development promotion was on high agenda of the MC and the IMC with the 
support of international donors and the influence of the work of international engineers. 
With the new establishment of the MRC in 1995, the support of hydropower development 
became less prominent. The focus of the MRC from 1995 put more emphasis on joint 
development, and ecological protection through a number of programs, in particular the BDP, the 
WUP and the EP. 
However, after 10 years of work program, the MRC was criticized as ineffective in implementing 
the 1995 Mekong Agreement because of the domination of national interest over the 
transboundary one (Hirsch et al., 2006). According to Hirsch et al. (2006: 45), “national interest 
in the Mekong prevails: governments maintain sovereignty over their own stretch of the river, 
and they invoke the discourse of national interest to legitimize development of the basin’s 
resources.” Hirsch et al. (2006: 45-46) saw that formal structure through which national interest 
represented and mediated at the MRC is very narrow. Each country has different mechanisms for 
negotiating, optimizing and mediating these interests and therefore the strong state usually 
dominates over the weaker one. One of the perceptions emerged from civil society groups is that 
the MRC is reluctant to protect the interest of the weak, be they sections of society vulnerable to 
the impacts of infrastructure development or weaker member states – notably Cambodia, whose 
geographical position is inherently most vulnerable to the impacts (ibid.). More striking is that the 
MRC Secretariat cannot act directly to resolve transboundary dispute if there is no request from 
the concerned member state. And if there is any request, the MRC Secretariat just plays as a 
facilitation and mediation role, and the decision is fully up to the concerned negotiating states. In 
this context, Hirsch et al. (2006) criticized the MRC as lacking legal teeth to enforce rule and 
regulation set forth in the 1995 Mekong Agreement. 
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Finally, it has also been suggested that many state actors of the riparian member states prefer the 
MRC to be a rather toothless organization that identifies development projects and attracts 
external funds, whilst the control of the development remains with the states themselves (Dore, 
2003: 425 cited in Backer, 2007). 
3.3 The process of hydropower development in the Se San sub-basin 
As we have seen in previous section water resources planning for the Se San River took root 
within the planning process of the Lower Mekong Basin which had been evolved since late 
1940s. Since the early 1950s hydropower development became one of the main focuses of the 
Mekong development history. The focus of hydropower development plan, however, has shifted 
from mainstream to tributaries from late 1950s onward. 
In 1959, the Japanese reconnaissance team of the Mekong Committee identified 16 major 
tributaries as development potential involving hydropower establishment. On the Se San River 
the MC selected upper Se San hydropower project in Vietnam to be further investigated under the 
sponsorship of the United Nations Special Fund. The main focus of the plan was to stress on 
building a multi-purpose dam for the development of power, flood detention and irrigation of the 
area between Kontum, Pleiku and Yali-Falls by gravity and pumping (United Nations Special 
Fund, 1962: 1). The studies were conducted by a Japanese Nippon Koei firm from 1961 to 1964. 
The report was finalized in 1966 which indicated that there were possibilities for building a 
number of hydropower plants for electricity generation as well as for equalizing water flow in 
downstream. There were eight hydropower sites that were listed for construction (see table 3.2). 
Since the prerequisites were lacking for implementation of major projects, the Mekong 
Committee prioritized three Upper Se San projects. One of which was small scale dam project at 
Yali-Falls with the initial installed power capacity of 6 MW and it could be extended to 12 MW 
(SwedPower, 1986). The other two projects were related to irrigation development (ECAFE, 
1968: 02). At that time it was foreseen that this development was to serve the local needs at 
Kontum and Pleiku areas. Although six megawatts hydropower was recommended, Nippon Koei 
envisaged large-scale Yali-Falls plant with a capacity of 100 – 200 MW if the demand was to 
increase in the future (SwedPower, 1986). 
Even though Nippon Koei’s report could only pinpoint a number of hydropower potential on the 
upper Se San in Vietnam it served as an input for further investigation and planning which 
resulted in the first master plan of 1970 produced by the Mekong Secretariat. Compared to the 
Nippon Koei’s report which emphasized only upper Se San in Vietnam, the 1970 master plan 
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extended its focus to cover the whole Se San River for both Vietnam and Cambodia. The plan 
identified 16 possible hydropower development sites on the Se San River which included five 
projects in Cambodia, ten in Vietnam, and one border project (Hirsch and Wyatt, 2004: 54). 
Table 3.2: Name of hydropower project listed by Mekong Committee in 1968 
Name of hydropower project Initial Extension Order of 
development
Potential 
power supply 
Yali-Falls 6,000 kW 12,000 
kW 
First 100,000 kW 
Yali-Falls   Second 100,000 kW 
Plei Krong   Second 60,000 kW 
Se San 2 (7 km downstream 
Yali-Falls) 
  Third 165,000 kW 
Se San 3 (13 km downstream 
Yali-Falls) 
  Third 150,000 kW 
Se San 4 (53 km downstream 
Yali-Falls) 
  Third 165,000 kW 
Dak Bla   Final 28,000 kW 
Se San 1 (upstream Yali-Falls)   Final 30,000 kW 
Total potential power supply 798,000 kW 
Source: Mekong Committee, 1968 
During the 1970s the MC’s short range plan which outlined hydropower development on the Se 
San River was hardly implemented due to political instability. However after the activation of the 
IMC in the late 1970s, the Mekong Secretariat speeded up the process to harness the development 
of hydropower dam on the upper Se San River in the 1980s. The previous plans for Se San were 
revised by a consultancy firm (WATCO, 1984) in collaboration with the IMC. This study 
identified six hydropower projects and five irrigation projects in the upper Se San in Vietnam, 
and three hydropower projects and one irrigation project in Cambodia (Öjendal et al., 2002). 
According to Öjendal et al. (2002) the WATCO study was a desk study which built on the work 
of the Mekong Secretariat in 1970.  
Apart from the revision of the Se San plan by WATCO, the Mekong Secretariat sought funding 
from SIDA (Swedish International Development Agency) for the purpose of project appraisal for 
harnessing development of Yali-Falls dam. Consequently, the Mekong Secretariat commissioned 
Swedish Power Service to undertake the appraisal in May 1984. During a visit to Hanoi in June 
1984 by representatives of SwedPower and the Mekong Secretariat for the project the 
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Vietnamese authorities requested the appraisal to be aimed at the project developing 48 MW 
hydropower dam comprising two phases with 24 MW developments in each phase. SwedPower 
accepted the modified terms in order to comply with the wishes of Vietnamese authorities. At the 
same time the Mekong Secretariat confirmed that these modified terms shall be valid in the 
relationship between the consultant and the Client. This shows that Vietnamese authorities had a 
strong influence of decision making on hydropower development on the Se San River. 
Later in 1989, the Vietnamese Ministry of Energy envisaged a large hydropower plant of 700 
MW at Yali Falls. A feasibility study on the Yali Falls dam was concluded in 1990 by the 
Vietnamese Ministry of Energy with assistance of Nippon Koei Co. Ltd. In connection to this the 
Mekong Secretariat undertook several appraisal missions to Vietnam to assess the feasibility 
study in 1990 and 1991. The assessments showed that the feasibility study had only lightly 
touched on environmental topics and that further detailed investigations would be necessary 
within the framework of an environmental impact assessment in order to make the project 
acceptable to international financing institutes. The Mekong Secretariat then prepared a project 
description and submitted to donor countries for funding. Switzerland, as one of the supporting 
countries of the Mekong Secretariat, undertook the financing of the environmental and financing 
studies through the Mekong Secretariat. Swiss Electrowatt Engineering Services Co. Ltd. was 
contracted and the studies entitled “Environmental and Financing Studies for the Yali Falls 
hydropower project” were conducted in 1991. The construction of the Yali-Falls dam was then 
smoothly preceded without any further requirement or objection in November 1993. 
As we have seen from the above description, the Mekong Secretariat was playing an important 
role as an intervening agency for water resources planning in the Se San River basin from the 
early 1960s till the early 1990s. And the main agenda for the water resources planning in the Se 
San River was mainly related to hydropower development. Since Yali Falls project is located in 
Vietnam, the nature of project harnessing was also triggered from the Vietnamese internal 
development policy. To understand the context of this development policy the following section 
explains how hydropower development in the Se San River has placed an important agenda in 
Vietnam particularly from the end of the 1980s onward. 
3.4 Hydropower development in the Se San River: from Vietnamese perspective 
3.4.1 The role of Se San River in economic development trajectory in Vietnam 
Vietnam stretches over a distance of about 1,600 km in an S-shape along the eastern coast of the 
Indochinese Peninsula. The total land area is 329,566 km2 of which 75% consist of mountain and 
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hills. This exhibits a large hydropower resources potential of more than 2,200 small, medium, and 
large rivers (Luy, 2008). Geographically, Vietnam is divided into three regions namely the north, 
the south and the central. Two large rivers run through Vietnam. The Red River originates in the 
Tibetan highland and flows through Vietnam in the northern region while the Mekong River 
flows through its southern region before entering the South China Sea. The central region hosts 
the origin of one of the largest Mekong’s tributaries, Se San River. This river merges with the 
Mekong’s mainstream in Stung Treng Province of Cambodia. Historically, rivers play an 
important role as part of Vietnamese economic development including agriculture, navigation and 
hydropower. 
In mid -1980s Vietnam began economic policies reform to promote economic development and 
social welfare. The reform transformed Vietnam to a market base socialist economy under the 
reforms of Doimoi (renovation thinking) which paved the way for private sector investments, 
both domestic and foreign into its economy in 1986 (Wyatt, 2002). With this reform the 
Vietnamese government hopes that this liberalization of Vietnam’s economy will lead to a strong 
economic development. Accordingly, the Vietnamese government set the target rate of growth for 
industrial output – the main determinant of electricity consumption – to nine percent for the 1991 
– 1995 periods (Electrowatt, 1993). Due to the development of the industrial sector and social 
services the actual growing electricity consumption rose on average by 12.6% annually between 
1990 and 1995 (Wyatt, 2002). The high rise of electricity consumption placed Vietnam in a 
position of power crisis nationwide in the early 1990s. In the central and particularly the southern 
regions the shortage of electricity was felt strongly (Electrowatt, 1993). According to a survey 
conducted by England and Kammen (1993) the industrial sector and household users in the 
southern region struggled through electricity blackouts that extended over 3-4 days of the week. 
Although in the north the Hoa Binh hydropower was under construction with an installed 
capacity of 1,920 MW of which 820 MW were generated in 1991, and in the south the Tri Anh 
hydropower with installed capacity of 400 MW was commissioned in 1989, the central and 
southern region were lacking sufficient power supply (Electrowatt, 1993). Consequently the 
Vietnamese government has adopted the policy to meet the growing demand by developing the 
hydropower potential of the country estimated at about 300 TWh/year (ibid.). 
In Vietnam three river systems were identified as the most important source for hydropower 
generation including the Da River in the north, the Se San in the central region, and the Dong Nai 
in the south. While the generating potentials of the Da and Dong Nai Rivers are 6,258 MW and 
2,500 MW, respectively (England and Kammen, 1993), the Se San River stands at the third range 
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with the total capacity of 1,796 MW from six hydropower projects (see table 3.3). In the Se San 
River basin, the site of Yali-Falls has been identified as a very promising location for the 
construction of large-scale hydropower scheme in the end of the 1980s. As mentioned in previous 
section Vietnam government has reconsidered the potential of the development of the Yali-Falls 
dam from 48 MW which were supposed to be developed in the mid 1980s to 700 MW in the end 
of the 1980s in order to relieve and eradicate the power shortage. The plan in the early 1990s was 
to connect the power grid from major hydropower plants in the northern region (future Son La 
3,000 MW and the existing Hoa Binh 1,920 MW) to the southern region through the Yali-Falls 
hydropower plant in the central region (see figure 3.4). The aim was to bring the excess power 
supply from the north and the central regions to feed the demand of the industrial zone in the 
southern region. 
Figure 3.4: Map of planned hydropower stations and the location of the proposed North-to-South 
500 kV high-tension power line in Vietnam (in the early 1990s) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Source: England and Kammen, 1993 
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3.4.2 Status of hydropower development in the Se San River 
Hydropower sources envisaged by the Vietnamese government to be exploited with the highest 
priority are the upper reaches of the Se San River in the Central Highlands which due to its 
mountainous environment has many rapids and falls, where suitable locations for hydropower 
development were identified on the river. The total capacity which Vietnam could tap from Se 
San River is estimated at about 1,796 MW from six hydropower projects (see table 3.3). This 
figure contributes almost nine percent of total proportion of hydropower potential in the entire 
country if all are to be developed. Below I describe the six hydropower projects under three 
subsections including hydropower projects in operation, hydropower projects under construction, 
and hydropower power projects under planning. In addition to the six hydropower projects, a re-
regulatory dam located near the border between Vietnam and Cambodia was also constructed to 
regulate flow downstream. 
Hydropower projects in operation 
Yali-Falls dam: As mentioned earlier the Yali-Falls dam is the first dam which Vietnam began to 
construct on the mainstream of Se San River in November 1993. The Yali-Falls dam is located 
just downstream of the confluence between Krong Poko and Dak Bla rivers, the two major 
tributaries of the Se San River (see figure 3.5). It is located approximately 70 km from the border 
of Cambodia. The dam has an installed capacity of 720 MW. It is the third largest hydropower in 
Vietnam after the 3,000 MW Son La and the 1,920 MW Hoa Binh dams in the northern region. 
The Yali Falls dam’s reservoir was completed and filled in May 1998. The first turbine trial run 
took place in late February 2000 (Raksmey Kampuchea News, 2000) and its first official turbine 
operation began only in June 2000 while the rest three turbines followed in January 2002 
(SWECO, 2007). 
Se San 3 dam: The Se San 3 is the second dam constructed on the Se San River. The construction 
of the dam started in May 2001 and completed by the end of 2005. The total capacity of this dam 
is 260 MW. It is located 15 km below the Yali-Falls dam. The first trial run took place in April 
2006, and the plant was commissioned in June 2006 (ibid.). 
Se San 3a dam: Following the second dam Vietnam began constructing the third dam (Se San 
3a). The construction of Se San 3a dam started in January 2002. It is located about ten kilometers 
downstream of Se San 3 dam. This dam has an installed capacity of 96 MW. By the end of 2005 
the dam was finished. The first run took place in May 2006 and final completion was in 
September 2006. 
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Hydropower projects under construction 
Pleikrong dam: The construction of the fourth dam “Pleikrong” commenced in December 2003 
with total capacity of 100 MW. The dam is located on Krong Poko River some three kilometers 
upstream of the confluence with Dak Bla River (see figure below). The planned date for 
completion of this dam is unknown. 
 Figure 3.5: Cross section map of hydropower dam cascades on Se San River in Vietnam 
 
Source: Adapted from PECC 111  
Se San 4 dam: Se San 4 is the fifth dam in range of construction which began in April 2004. It is 
located close to the border between Vietnam and Cambodia, and some 22 km downstream of Se 
San 3a dam. The installed capacity of this dam is 360 MW. The planned date for completion of 
this dam is unknown. 
Hydropower projects under planning 
Upper Kontum dam: Presently, Upper Kontum dam project is under feasibility study. This dam 
is planned with the installed capacity of 260 MW. The location of this dam is at the most upper 
part of Se San River (see figure 3.5). 
Se San 4a Re-regulatory dam: In order to regulate water flow and mitigate water fluctuation in 
downstream Cambodia, Vietnam constructed a re-regulatory reservoir dam, called Se San 4a, 
located approximately five kilometers downstream of Se San 4 or one kilometer from the 
Cambodia border. The reservoir dam is expected to be put into operation before the rainy season 
of 2008 (Cambodia-Vietnam Joint Committee, 2008). However, the future status of this dam is 
becoming unclear since the reservoir of this dam has a potential to put forward hydropower plant 
                                                 
11 This cross section map was collected from Vietnam Power Engineering Consultant Company 1 (PECC 1) during 
the author’s field work in Hanoi (Vietnam) in January 2007 
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with the installed capacity of 60 MW. According to Luy (2008: 6), Se San 4a is one of the seven 
hydropower projects which is under study and planned for use in 2015. 
Table 3.3: Dams on Se San River in Vietnam territory 
No. Dam name12 Distance 
from 
Cambodia 
border 
(km)13 
Generating 
capacity 
Begin date 
of 
construction
Begin date of 
operation 
1 Upper Kon 
Tum 
- 260 MW Feasibility study 
2 Pleikrong ~ 90 100 MW Dec. 2003 Not yet 
3 Yali Falls ~ 70 720 MW Nov 1993 1st turbine: 06. 00 
All turbines: 01. 03 
4 Se San 3 ~ 55 260 MW May 2001 06. 06 
5 Se San 3a ~ 45 96 MW Jan. 2002 09. 06 
6 Se San 4 ~ 6 360 MW Apr. 2004 Not yet 
7 Se San 4a ~ 1 None Nov. 2004 Expected before the 
wet season of 2008 
Total  1,796 MW   
Source: Adapted from SWECO, 2007 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
The attempt of this chapter was to review how water resources planning and management in the 
lower Mekong basin has an implication or influence on hydropower development on the Se San 
River. This chapter found that hydropower development planning in the upper Se San River in 
Vietnam involves an array of actors, not only nationally but internationally and globally. The 
initiative for hydropower development was initially influenced by the Mekong project that was 
established by ECAFE of the United Nations. The Mekong project was the point of departure to 
bring the four lower Mekong basin countries namely Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand and Laos to 
come into cooperation for water resources management of the Mekong. It was the first time in 
history in which state cooperation on the management or sharing of the waters of the Mekong 
was formed in Southeast Asia during the 1950s (Hirsch et al., 2006: 80). 
Although cooperation between the four lower Mekong countries has been largely steered and 
engineered by externals such as the U.N, U.S, and donors since the creation of the MC in 1957, it 
is also valid to argue that a group of international engineers and experts was also largely 
influencing the water resources development and planning in the Mekong basin as well as 
                                                 
12 Dam name is orderly listed from upstream to downstream 
13 Source: RCC, 2007a 
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hydropower development process of the Se San River. Without international engineers and 
experts who were contracted to support the Mekong project in the 1950s, the MC would not have 
existed because they served as agents to bring the concerned authorities of the four lower 
Mekong countries to come into relation to discuss and negotiate the establishment of the 
committee. 
With the support of the MC and IMC from 1957 to 1991, hydropower development planning for 
the upper Se San River had gone through a long process of investigations and studies. The dam 
development came to light only from the mid 1980s when a series of financial support were made 
available to Vietnamese government through the IMC. For instance, through this committee, 
SIDA financed a study of the Yali-Falls power station in 1985, and Swiss government 
contributed to fund environmental and financing studies of the Yali hydropower project in 1991. 
This clearly shows that the IMC and the donor countries (Sweden and Switzerland) were the key 
promoters to push the construction of the Yali-Falls dam. 
This chapter also reviewed the role of the MRC in regard to water resources management of the 
lower Mekong basin. Although the MRC did not play a key role in promoting hydropower 
development as its predecessors (the MC and the IMC), it was criticized as an inactive body in 
regard to conflict resolution. Hirsch et al. (2006: 120) gave their claim as follows. 
“the MRC’s direction intervention role in conflict management remain unclear. What is 
clear is that aggrieved parties sometimes expect the MRC, being a transboundary river 
management agency, to step in when water-related transboundary conflict occur. In many 
cases, these expectations may exceed what the MRC sees as its role. Se San is a case in 
point. Civil society groups assisted indigenous minority in Cambodia who were affected 
by upstream hydropower development in Vietnam, to request direct intervention from the 
MRC. The MRC’s response was that it could not act directly on a non-governmental 
request. It did, however, help set up an only marginally-effective intergovernmental 
committee, but that was the extent of its intervention.” 
In addition, some describe the 1995 Mekong Agreement as weak, allowing the members to 
interpret it as they please or simply sideline it (Backer, 2007; Lebel et al., 2005). 
Besides exploring how planning process shaped hydropower development intervention at basin 
level, this chapter linked the issue to analyze the development policy of energy sector in Vietnam 
to understand how Vietnam has placed Se San River in its hydropower development agenda. To 
this end, this chapter found that the increasing demand for energy consumption was one of the 
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main factors, which contributes to the acceleration of hydropower development in the Se San 
basin in Vietnam. 
The negative effects of hydropower development, as I discussed in chapter 2, are countless and 
usually result in conflict between downstream and upstream users. How various social actors act 
or respond to the effects of dam development and influence over one another require an analysis 
of interaction of social actors at various levels. In the following chapter I will analyze how social 
actors interact at local level in response to the effect of Vietnamese dam development in the Se 
San River. 
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CHAPTER 4 
LOCAL ARENA: STRUGGLE THE BATTLE – SUCCESS VERSUS CHALLENGE 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter is aimed at analyzing and explaining local level contestations over hydropower dam 
impacts. This chapter contains eight sections. Section two begins with the analysis of differences 
in viewpoints regarding hydropower dam impacts. The aim is to discover the contradicting views 
of various actors with regard to hydropower dam impacts so that discrepancies of social interests 
and cultural interpretation can be revealed. 
Section three discusses local coping capacity, knowledge and problems encountered by affected 
community. The aim is to understand to what extend the affected community can cope with the 
changing condition of the river system, what knowledge they have acquired in order to cope with 
the changing condition, and what problems they have encountered. Section four discuses the 
emergence of responses of non-governmental organization in to dam impacts. The aim is to 
discuss what actions have been taken by NGOs. 
Section five discusses the formation of local organization as a social construction for advocating 
change. The aim is to discuss how local organization was formed and with what structure, and 
what is its roles in regard to hydropower dam development. Section six discusses the local 
organization’s strategies and choices. The aim is to analyze how power, influence and knowledge 
may shape the responses and strategies of local actors. Section seven discusses the outcomes and 
consequences of local organization. And finally, section eight presents the conclusion of the 
chapter. 
4.2 Hydropower dam impacts: differences in viewpoints 
This section discusses different viewpoints of various actors in regard to hydropower dam 
impacts caused by the Yali-Falls dam. The important actors who engaged in the dam impacts 
include the affected communities in Ratanakiri province, various non-governmental 
organizations, Cambodian government agencies and Vietnamese government agencies.  The aim 
of this section is to discover the differences in views of various actors so that discrepancies of 
social interests and cultural interpretation can be traced. This section divides into three sub-
sections. Sub-section 4.2.1 discusses the perspective of different local communities on dam 
impacts. Sub-section 4.2.2 discusses other viewpoints on local impacts. Sub-section 4.2.3 
provides a concluding remark to this section. 
4.2.1 The perspective of riverbank communities 
The riverbank-villagers living in two upstream districts (Oyadao and Andong Meas, see map in 
figure 1.2 on page 14) experienced the impact of hydropower dam development as the impact of 
several intense floods that struck their villages as early as September 1996. The riverbank-
villagers describe the 1996 floods as the worst tragedy in their life. Riverbank-villagers in 
Oyadao district recall the situation that “our village has never been flooded as the river is steep 
and riverbank is high from water, but 1996 floods brought our village under water as high as two 
meters.”19 
During the 1996 floods the riverbank-villagers were not aware of Yali-Falls dam construction and 
at that time, according to their ethnic cultural belief, they assumed that floods were caused by the 
angry spirit of the water. The riverbank villagers in Andong Meas district describe that “after the 
excessive floods, our villagers gathered and held a ritual ceremony to worship the river water by 
sacrificing buffaloes and wine to say pardon and get excuse from the water spirit, but, long after 
the ceremony we observe more changes in river water such as fluctuation, surge and dirty water.”  
After the 1996 event, the riverbank-villagers started to search for information regarding the 
changes of river water particularly from the community living upstream in Gia Lai province 
which located just downstream of Yali-Falls dam in Vietnam. The Jaray community living in 
Oyadao and Andong Meas districts, who often get in touch with their ethnic fellows in Gia Lai 
province for reason of commodity exchange reported that floods were caused by large-scale dam 
construction in Vietnam, and that, is the “Yali-Falls dam”. The information was circulated within 
the community that the dam constructor used poor Vietnamese cement instead of the Japanese’s 
cement which then caused the dam to break and flooding downstream. 
After realizing the dam impact the riverbank-villagers in Oyadao and Andong Meas districts 
stopped holding ritual ceremonies for worship the river water spirit. They particularly say that 
“we stopped holding our cultural ceremony (traditional sacrificing of animal and wine to the 
spirit) because the river flood was not caused by an angry spirit but was caused by bad behavior 
of human activity which releases dirty water from the upstream dam and affects us.” Such 
cultural belief and practices were also abandoned by riverbank-villagers in downstream districts 
of Taveng and Veun Sai, which became aware about dam impacts after the flood event in 
February 2000. 
                                                 
19 Quotes in this chapter are taken from field notes and interviews in Ratanakiri province from 01 July to 30 October 
2007 
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Riverbank-villagers claim that flooding used to occur in the Se San basin before the construction 
of Yali-Falls dam but that the nature of floods has changed over the past ten years. On average, 
floods used to occur once every six to seven years and usually happened only a few days during 
the high peak of the rainy season. Riverbank-villagers claim that this type of flooding was often 
favorable, since floods were not very high and did not cause damage to crops. Instead this short-
term flooding helped deposit fertile soil in crop lands which often increased yields. However, 
over the last ten years the situation has been rapidly changing. Unexpectedly, floods have 
sometimes occurred at the end of rainy season. Moreover, riverbank-villagers have observed that 
water levels rise much quicker than before and often they can no longer predict flood according 
to their traditional methods and beliefs. The riverbank-villagers in Andong Meas district state that 
“in the past we predicted flood based on rainfall which we traditionally observed, and based on 
observation of nature such as wild animals’ and insects’ behaviors but now we can no longer do 
that because flood is not only caused by rainfall but by water release from hydropower dam too.” 
Besides flooding, riverbank-villagers maintain that the hydropower dam has intensified water 
level fluctuation in the river. Riverbank-villagers report that fluctuation of water level may now 
occur daily and sometimes hourly, the fluctuation ranging from half meters in the dry season to 
two meters in the wet season. In the upstream part at Oyadao district, riverbank-villagers claim 
that water usually rises early morning and declines in the afternoon but sometimes it is the other 
way around. In the downstream portion at Veun Sai district the riverbank-villagers maintain that 
water rises in the evening and declines at noon. However, they claim that it is hard to predict and 
generalize when water goes up and goes down. Sometimes water rose and dropped in one to 
seven days intervals. Such uncertainty made them fearful in crossing the river by their small boats 
between their village and farmland. It also makes their fishing activity harder due to uncertainty 
of daily water level fluctuation. A fisher in Taveng district reported that “the fishers in our village 
can no longer depend on river for fishing because of water fluctuation; sometimes our fishing 
traps or fishing hooks which we deployed under water before evening appear above water level 
the next day; and sometimes they are washed away by a strong current of water flow.” 
The riverbank-villagers also claim that water level fluctuation has stopped them from gold 
panning in 1998. As claimed by them, gold panning used to be one of their important activities 
for extra income during the dry season particularly for the community residing in Taveng and 
Andong Meas districts. The riverbank-villagers said that “we stopped gold panning as early as 
1998 because water level fluctuation had frequently filled in the hole that we dug for gold 
panning and more importantly we were increasingly fearful of unknown water surge.” 
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Furthermore, riverbank villagers also confirm that water level fluctuation has been causing 
serious riverbank erosion compared to the past 15 years or so. Many hectares of farmland fell into 
the river through bank erosion and many houses were shifted away from the bank for safety 
reasons. In Andong Meas district, three villages had been heavily affected by bank erosion within 
the scale of ten to twenty meters bank encroachment including Talav, Kanat and Bokham 
villages. Similarly, seven villages in Taveng district have also been seriously affected by bank 
erosion including Ke Koung, Phayang, Siand Sai, Phao, Tompoun Reung Toch, Tompoun Reung 
Thom and Tagarch villages. Likewise, riverbank villagers in Veun Sai district claim that four to 
ten meters of bank erosion is common in most villages. 
Apart from water level fluctuation, the riverbank-villagers observe that the river water has turned 
turbid all year round. They said that river water used to be very clear in the dry season before the 
dam was constructed but over the last ten years water is more turbid and sometimes smells badly. 
The riverbank-villagers state that this water condition has been causing serious human health 
problems after bathing and drinking, such as itchiness, rashes, vomiting, and diarrhea. In some 
cases, they said that dirty water has poisoned and killed many fishes as in the past few years they 
used to see many dead fishes floating down from the upstream river. They also claim that the 
drinking of turbid water has been causing their animals to die, such as chickens, pigs, cows, and 
buffaloes. Presently, most villagers use pump-wells which have been installed, in some riverbank 
villages, by German Agro-Action (GAA) during 2005. Many of them do not satisfy using water 
from wells as their home is situated far away from the center point where the pump-well was 
generally installed. They also express discontent of using well water because their cultural sense 
of using river water has been changed. The riverbank villagers in Taveng district strongly argue 
that “we are happy when we use river water for bathing because we can swim in river but well 
water cannot give us a swim. However, pump-well is good and saves our life when river water 
turns dirty.” River bank villagers also claim that natural vegetables and plants that they used to 
harvest freely from the riverside have disappeared due to poor water quality and water level 
fluctuation. 
4.2.2 Other viewpoints on local impacts 
Based on the above presentation, this sub-section discusses the contradicting views of various 
actors according to several themes, including differences in viewpoints on occurrences of unusual 
floods, consequences of floods and the level of destruction, water level fluctuation, bank-erosion, 
impact on fisheries, water quality and health impacts, and the dry season flow. 
 80
Occurrences of unusual floods 
While riverbank-villagers in Cambodia believe that dam impact begun in 1996 after several 
intense floods hit their village, the Vietnamese officials refused to accept the local claims by 
claiming that the Yali Falls dam had not been completed and that the reservoir had not been 
closed and filled by September 1996. For instance, a Vietnamese official stated that “the 1996 
floods were caused by extreme weather conditions known as tropical cyclone centered on the Se 
San basin which generated and prolonged heavy rain and then overflowed the riverbank” 
(Interview 3.1.3). The official maintains that “the Yali-Falls dam reservoir had not yet been 
filled-up until 1998 therefore there were no reasons that floods resulted from dam construction.” 
The hydrological assessment conducted by the International Development Research Center and 
UNDP service project in Ratanakiri province led by Himel and Nhem in 1997 confirms that a 
tropical cyclone occurred in September 1996, but floods still continued to happen several times 
till November 1996 without cyclone effect (Fisheries Office, 2000: 10). In 2000, the Ratanakiri 
Fisheries Office led by the Non-Timber Forest Product Organization (NTFP – a local NGO 
supported by Oxfam America) conducted an impact study which concluded that an excessive 
water discharge was released from the dam to avoid Kon Tum town of Vietnam from flooding 
when there was an extreme flood in 1996. The conclusion was drawn based on the Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA) report for the Yali-Falls dam conducted by the Swiss Electrowatt 
company in 1993 which warns that “if water levels in the reservoir are allowed to reach high 
peaks, there is a risk that flooding could occur in Kon Tom town” (Fisheries Office, 2000). 
The Cambodia Ministry of Water Resources and Meteorology (MOWRAM) was reluctant to 
confirm that the 1996 floods were caused by the construction process of Yali-Falls dam due to 
lack of basic data and information. As a Cambodian official put it, “it is very difficult to judge 
whether the 1996 floods were caused by dam construction because during that period we did not 
have hydrological and meteorological stations to record data for analysis; so we do not have the 
basis for such claim” (Interview 1.2.4). The official confirmed that 1996 was an extreme flood 
year which also prevailed in the Mekong Basin. 
In addition to the 1996 floods, a provincial official argued that floods continued to occur several 
times annually till 2003 but considerably large floods occurred in 1999, 2000 and 2001 
(Interview 4.2.5). The rest of the floods were considered to be less severe or mild, and included 
floods in 1997, 1998, 2002 and 2003 (ibid.). According to the Fisheries Office’s report (2000), in 
1997 and 1998, rainy season flooding occurred twice each year in lower parts of Veun Sai 
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district, while in 1999 some villages reported being flooded three times over two meters high 
inside the village. Moreover, the duration of floods has been longer in the lower parts of the 
basin. While 1999 floods in Andong Meas lasted for only three days, they occurred for over a 
week in Taveng, and for over 20 days in some villages in western Veun Sai (Fisheries Office, 
2000). 
Consequences of floods and the level of destruction 
Ratanakiri Fisheries Office in association with NTFP are the first two agents that have jointly 
done a comprehensive study on Yali-Falls dam impacts in Ratanakiri Province in 2000. The 
report states that there were at least 32 people killed by water surge and floods from 1996 to early 
2000. During the same period, Ratanakiri Water Resources Department conducted a short field 
survey in two districts, Andong Meas and Taveng, taking into account the destruction of floods 
caused by the dam in 1999 and early 2000. The report, which was also acknowledged by the 
provincial governor, found one person dead in Andong Meas district in 1999 and six people dead 
in Taveng district in early 2000 as a result of surges and floods caused by water release from 
Yali-Falls dam. Another source which reported on dam associated death cases is the Phnom Penh 
Post (an English language Cambodian Newspaper). In its issue 9/6 of March 17-30, 2000, five 
Cambodians were reported killed by surges during testing of Yali-Falls dam’s spillway in the dry 
season at the end of February 2000 (Phnom Penh Post, 2000b). The Vietnamese official 
recognized and accepted the February 2000 tragedy as the only flood event which was caused by 
a technical error of dam spillway testing (Interview 3.1.3).  
While Vietnam official asserts that flood caused by Yali-Falls dam occurred only once in 2000, 
NTFP and its financial supporter, Oxfam America, claim that dam impacts have occurred since 
1996. In its study, Oxfam America estimates an annual income lost of the affected communities 
to the amount of 2.5 million U.S dollars for 3,434 households in Ratanakiri Province from 1996 
to 1999 (Oxfam America, 2001). This figure corresponds to a drop of average monthly income 
from US$ 109 to US$ 46 per household (ibid.). In addition, this report also claims other tangible 
losses – including lost fishing equipment, boats, livestock, housing, and rice stocks – to the 
amount of US$ 800,000. Other non-quantified impacts were also listed in this report, which 
included deaths and illness, livestock deaths due to suspected water quality problems, and other 
natural resources impacts. Table 4.1 below shows a summary of key impacts caused by the Yali-
Falls dam, which were found by Oxfam America in 2001. 
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In regard to the findings of the report, the Vietnam official seems to claim that the figures tend to 
be exaggerated. For instance, the Press Attaché for the Embassy of Vietnam in Phnom Penh 
responded, to a question regarding drowning of more than 30 people which was documented in 
the Fisheries Office report, that “all the things you have just mentioned must be studied carefully, 
because there can be many reasons for drowning and loss of life, not just floods. I do not object to 
the fact that the floods caused some drowning, but not all of them” (Watershed, 2000a). 
Table 4.1: Key impacts caused by the Yali-Falls dam as found by Oxfam America 2001 
Impacts quantified 
Impact category Losses for 3434 households in 59 villages 
2398.5 ha of paddy and swidden rice 
86% reduction in fish catch 
54% reduction in vegetable garden (and tobacco) yield 
Livelihood impacts caused by annual flow 
changes and sudden flooding from dam water 
releases (1999) 
100% loss of gold panning revenue 
609 buffaloes 
322 cows 
2,293 pigs 
38,876 chickens 
Livestock deaths caused by sudden flooding 
from dam water releases (1996-1999) 
3,559 ducks 
9,563 gillnets 
129 castnets 
304,006 hooks 
24,192 small basket traps 
5,606 large basket traps 
2,187 funnel traps 
5,247 falling-door traps 
1,173 dugout boats - paddle 
18 engine/motor boats 
Fishing equipment and boat losses caused by 
sudden flooding from dam water releases 
(1996-1999) 
1 electric generator 
37 houses washed away Housing losses caused by sudden flooding 
from dam water releases (1996-1999) Items/possessions in 37 houses washed away 
Rice stock losses caused by sudden flooding 
from dam water releases (1996-1999) 
44,708 kg of rice stocks 
Impacts non-quantified 
Impact category Losses for 3434 households in 59 villages 
32 deaths due to sudden flooding from dam releases 
952 deaths due to suspected water quality problems 
Deaths and illness (1996-1999) 
Unknown number of illnesses 
Food insecurity, malnutrition, and increased 
vulnerability 
Indebtedness, migration, and community 
fragmentation 
Lost wild vegetable/plan collection, wildlife hunting 
Potential future loss of livelihood/cultural knowledge 
base 
Increased domestic conflicts and village disputes 
Reduced river crossing and boat travel due to dangers 
Other livelihood impacts 
Alternative drinking water sources, reduced 
bathing/swimming 
4909 buffaloes 
2238 cows 
7854 pigs 
Livestock deaths due to suspected water 
quality problems (1996-1999) 
147,709 chickens 
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1670 ducks  
2448 dogs 
Agricultural tools (e.g. plows, shovels, hoes) Other agriculture losses 
Field houses and rice barns 
Other housing losses Housing construction materials and household items 
Loss of riverine vegetation, birds, reptiles, wild 
animals and aquatic life, riverbank erosion, and 
damage to habitate 
Other natural resources impacts 
Increased exploitation of forest resources 
Source: Oxfam America, 2001 
Water level fluctuation 
Besides flooding, a provincial government official in Ratanakiri claims that water level 
fluctuation remains a problem to date although no flood has occurred during the dry years of 
2004, 2005 and 2006 (Interview 4.2.5). Figure 4.1 gives the magnitude of the daily water level 
fluctuation at Andong Meas district from January 2004 to May 2006. The graph reveals that in 
2004 water fluctuated frequently from half to one meter within a day. Extreme fluctuation 
occurred in July 2005. The extreme fluctuation usually happens during the wet season as a result 
of water discharge from the hydropower dam as well as rainfall runoff. 
Figure 4.1: Magnitude of daily water fluctuation at Andong Meas from January 2004 to May 
2006 
Magnitude of daily water fluctuation at Andong Meas from January 2004 to May 2006 
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Source: Author’s data processing based on data source from Department of Hydrology and River 
Works, Cambodia20 
 
                                                 
20 Note: magnitude of daily water fluctuation is calculated to find the difference between maximum and minimum of 
water level recorded within 24 hours. 
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Regarding the magnitude of water level fluctuation, a Cambodian official at the Ministry of 
Industry, Mines and Energy stated that water level fluctuation in Se San River shall be considered 
normal if daily fluctuation is generally below 30cm during the wet season (Interview 1.3.1). The 
official also stated that the Vietnam party has already committed to keeping the discharge of 
water as close to natural flow as possible. In relation to this, the Vietnam party has also 
acknowledged that water level fluctuation will be improved once the re-regulatory dam is put into 
operation before the wet season of 2008 (ibid.). Figure 4.2 shows the frequency of water level 
fluctuation from 2002 to 2004. The graph indicates that at Andong Meas district through out 2003 
and 2004 the daily change in water level predominantly falls within the 0.51 to 0.75 meter range.  
Figure: 4.2 Frequency of water level fluctuation within the day at Andong Meas from 2002 to 
2004 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0,0
1 -
 0,
25
0,2
6 -
 0,
50
0,5
1 -
 0,
75
0,7
6 -
 1,
00
1,0
1 -
 1,
25
1,2
6 -
 1,
50
1,5
1 -
 1,
75
1,7
6 -
 2,
00
2,0
1 -
 2,
25
2,2
6 -
 2,
50
2,5
1 -
 2,
75
Level of water fluctuation within the day in meter
Frequency of water level fluctuation within the day at Andong Meas from 
2002 to 2004
2002 2003 2004
 
Source: Author’s data processing based on data source from Department of Hydrology and River 
Work, Cambodia21 
 
Bank-erosion 
According to a Cambodian hydrologist, water level fluctuation leads to collapsing of riverbanks 
in many parts of the river system and then excessive sediment is trapped in the riverbed and deep 
pools (Interview 1.4.1). This causes destruction of habitat for migratory fish that usually moves 
up and down from Tonle Sap Lake and the Mekong for breeding and spawning in the dry season. 
                                                 
21 Note: frequency is a calculation result of a series of water level fluctuation with the day through the year with the 
interval of 0.25 meter 
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Furthermore, as the river gets shallow water becomes warm and unfavorable for fish habitat. The 
hydrologist claims that water level fluctuation causes physical change of the riverbank 
morphology which leads to severe bank-erosion (ibid.). Though there is such a conclusion from 
hydrologist and the local community, a Vietnamese official maintains that bank-erosion occurred 
not only recently but long in the past (Interview 3.1.3). Other factors such as deforestation and an 
increase of machine boats in the river are all affecting bank-erosion. According to this official, 
until now, there is no any study or survey that proves that Yali-Falls dam caused bank-erosion 
(ibid.). 
Impact on fisheries 
Local communities reported during my fieldwork that fish catch has declined drastically. The 
Department of Hydrology and River Works reported that water level, which sometimes was too 
low particularly in the dry season, had caused severe damage to fisheries due to the increase in 
water temperature (MOWRAM, 2000). Similarly, the Se San Protection Network Committee 
complains that since the construction of Yali-Falls began the river often dries up, particularly in 
the dry season, for several days before it begins to rise again. For instance, the river has recently 
been empty during the middle of the dry season at Andong Meas district from 11 to 13 February 
2008 (Interview 4.1.9). Because of low water level, combined with sedimentation, many deep 
pools were shallow with no place for fish to stay. 
In contrast, an argument by a Vietnamese official shows a disagreement regarding the reduction 
of fish catch by riverbank villagers. As the official asserts “the claim is very difficult to assess 
because the impacts were not all attributed to the dam alone. Instead, other factors could also 
cause such impacts such as population growth, illegal fishing, chemical pollution from industrial 
and agriculture, extinction of fisheries in other parts of the Mekong Basin etc.” (Interview 3.1.3). 
Water quality and health impacts 
During the fieldwork, the local community reported that water in the Se San River turns more 
turbid than it was a decade ago. Hirsch and Wyatt (2004) attributes this to increased river bank 
erosion and possible riverbed scouring associated with fluctuating river flows and levels. As a 
result, the community has reported an increase in health problems associated with the unusual 
fluctuation of flow, such as itchiness, eye irritation and stomach ache after bathing and drinking. 
In contrast to this view, a Vietnamese official asserts that “such problems could be caused by lack 
of sanitation on the part of local community” (Interview 3.1.3). 
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Dry season flow 
While the local community complains about unpredictable flow in the dry season, a Vietnamese 
official maintains that downstream communities will obtain more water during the dry season 
from dam release such that they can maximally use water for irrigation and navigation (Interview 
3.1.3). However, it should be noticed that most of the riverbank villagers’ livelihoods are fully 
based on nature. Presently, no canal or irrigation system exists in their region. Fluctuation of flow 
in the dry season has also increasingly caused destruction of riverine vegetables and plants that 
they used to harvest along the riverbank. They reported in interviews that many of plant species 
have already disappeared and the next generation will not know those kinds of plants anymore. In 
this case, dam impacts result in the loss of local knowledge. 
4.2.3 Concluding remarks 
The foregoing discussion shows differences in viewpoints of different actors. Various important 
actors who had a direct engagement with dam issues can be identified, such as the affected 
riverbank communities, the NGOs, the Cambodian government officials, and the Vietnamese 
government officials. The view of affected riverbank communities is mainly based on their local 
knowledge, their observation of changing river condition, and their experiences. The view of 
NGOs such as NTFP and Oxfam America clearly represents the protection of social welfare of 
affected communities as well as the protection of water resources environment and ecology. In 
this regard, the actions taken by NGOs, which will also be discussed further in Section 4.4, could 
bring the voice of local communities to provincial, national and international agencies for 
resolution. By this way, affected communities are empowered through NGOs. Since Cambodian 
government agencies (from provincial to national levels) represent the important intervening 
bodies to address the issues, they are also a central victim of criticism. As we have seen above, 
the impacts were claimed by affected communities and NGOs to occur since 1996. Such a claim 
is difficult to assess by the Cambodian government agencies as these bodies did not possess the 
technical capacity to show whether or not the 1996 flood occurrences were the cause of dam 
construction. Technically, the Cambodian water resources agencies did not have the necessary 
facilities to monitor the river (such as water level and rainfall monitoring stations) prior to 1996. 
This is the gap where the Vietnamese government agencies responsible for dam development 
create their room for maneuver which steers the issues away from the claim of affected 
communities. However, we could not draw a solid conclusion on this technical capacity alone as 
there are many factors associated with the resolution of dam impacts. This will be discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 where I explain the interests at national level of both 
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countries and the institutional setting of the 1995 Mekong Agreement in which both countries 
affiliate to this international framework. 
As I have already discussed different views of different actors on the hydropower impacts, in the 
next section it is necessary to discuss the local coping capacity. This involves the knowledge used 
and problems encountered by affected communities in to the context of hydropower impacts 
mentioned above. 
4.3 Local coping capacity, knowledge and problems encountered 
This section aims to discuss local coping capacity, knowledge and problems encountered by 
affected communities. The reason for this discussion is to understand to what extent the affected 
communities have the ability to cope with the changing condition of the river system, what 
knowledge they have to cope with such changes, and what problems or threats they encounter. 
Six points will be discussed in this section, including coping capacity toward flood events (4.3.1), 
organizing cultural practices as a means for recovery (4.3.2), abandoning and relocating home 
(4.3.3), taking self-precaution measures (4.3.4), seeking other alternatives for livelihoods (4.3.5), 
and coping with the decline of water quality (4.3.6). These six points will be discussed to include 
three important cross cutting-themes, namely local coping capacity, knowledge and problems 
encountered. After discussion of the six points, a concluding remark to this section is made in 
4.3.7. 
4.3.1. Coping capacity toward flood events 
Rainy season floods were the highest in 1996 and 1999 (Fisheries Office, 2000). Floods occurred 
more frequently in low lying areas. For example, the community reported that high floods 
occurred three times in Veun Sai district whereas they occurred two times in Taveng district and 
one time in Andong Meas district in 1996. The community reported that flood levels ranged 
between two to three meters height in their village. 
During flood events local communities moved to hills or higher ground located approximately 
two to eight kilometers from their residential village for temporary shelter. Boat was the main 
transport facility with which the community used to evacuate their family and properties. Due to 
topographical floods, floods are typically longer in flat land areas. For instance, while the 1999 
floods in Andong Meas district lasted for only three days, they occurred for over a week in 
Taveng district and for over 20 days in some villages in western Veun Sai district (Fisheries 
Office, 2000). Therefore, the duration for which the communities had temporarily moved and set 
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up their shelter ranged between three days to three weeks for each high flood occurrence (Focus 
Group Discussion, August – October 2007) 
The community reported that they encountered shortage of food as their rice stock was washed 
away and their animals drowned. They also claim that lack of proper shelter, food and water had 
caused them serious fever, diarrhea and skin diseases. In response to such situation, village 
leaders and elders played a core role in calling for village meetings in order to compile 
information on losses and damages due to flood. The report was then sent to the provincial 
authority via the commune chief and district governor for emergency relief. The emergency relief 
was provided by the former Emergency Response Group (presently known as National 
Committee for Disaster Management - NCDM) and the Cambodian Red Cross (CRC). The 
assistance includes the provisions of tents, canned food, noodles, rice, towels, clothes and small 
amounts of cash. The provincial health center also provided health service to the victims. 
Some communities claim that the responses from the emergency response group were very late 
and not sufficient. Some communities confirmed that each family received 25 kg of rice, a tent 
and canned fish while other communities informed that they received more assistance in kind as 
well as in cash (Focus Group Discussion in Veun Sai district, October 2007). Nevertheless, as 
mentioned by most communities such assistances were delivered to them only three months after 
the floods. Therefore, they were starving during the flooding and during the interval period. 
There was also limitation in the responses regarding health services, which many affected 
communities did not receive. The provincial official asserts that it was difficult to deliver health 
services to the victims for two reasons (Interview 4.2.5). First, the affected areas were remote and 
could not be accessed by road in the wet season. Second, the provincial health center lacks staff 
and facilities for such assistance intervention. 
In spite of such provincial authority’s efforts, many villagers claim that they did not receive any 
emergency assistance or health services. Consequently, they experienced shortage of food, and 
confronted diarrhea and fever. Those who had lack of food borrowed rice from their neighbors, to 
be returned in the following year (Focus Group Discussion, August – October 2007). Therefore, 
many of them were in debt for a few years.  One of the reasons the community did not receive 
assistance, as elucidated by a provincial official, was the inaccessibility of the area (Interview 
4.2.5). Another reason was the fact that there was no report sent by the commune chief on the 
damages after the 1999 floods (Interview 4.3.5). 
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4.3.2. Organizing cultural practices as a means for recovery 
The majority of people living along the Se San River are animists who deeply believe in a 
spiritual world. They believe that their ancestral spirits are living in big trees, large rocks, the soil, 
and the river, and therefore, those natural resources are well protected by the spirits. 
Traditionally, the community is obliged to perform a ritual ceremony before taking any action on 
extracting and making use of natural resources. For example, before clearing forest and starting 
crop plantation the community holds a ceremony to worship forest and soil spirits so that the 
spirits will permit them to cultivate the crop peacefully and will also provide them high yield. 
However, if there is no such ritual respect or when there is misconduct they believe that at least 
one of their family members will go deadly sick as the result of spirits’ reaction. In response to 
this critical situation, the affected family is required to organize a ritual ceremony to beg pardon 
from the spirits by sacrificing a chicken or pig or buffalo and wine under the leadership of 
powerful village elders and the participation of the villagers. 
The same belief was mentioned by the community regarding the alteration of river flow and the 
destruction of forest to make way for hydropower dam building which led to critical disaster 
imposed by spirits. As quoted in Fisheries Office report (2000: 35-36), an old Tampuan woman 
from Kachon Kroam Village in Veun Sai district expressed her opinion that “…I think the spirits 
of the water and the spirits of the trees are angry with the humans. Now Vietnamese has blocked 
the path of the spirits of the water, and the dam has caused many big trees in the reservoir area to 
be flooded. Therefore, both the spirits of the water and the spirits of the big trees are angry. Then 
when the Vietnamese release the water from the reservoir, it is like releasing the angry spirits 
upon us, and the spirits make us sick and causes us to die a lot.” 
Indeed, many villagers held a ritual ceremony to worship river water spirits in response to the 
1996 floods. For instance, Jarai communities in Oyadao and Andong Meas districts had 
immediately performed the ritual called “Kab Krobei Pheuk Sra” (meaning slaughtering buffalo 
and drinking wine). This ritual is obligatory in their cultural practice in response to the disaster, 
which they believed to be caused naturally that imposed by an angry water spirit. They mentioned 
that the ceremony aims to call the water spirit and beg pardon if their community had done 
anything wrong and also aims to request the spirit to bring the situation to the normal. The 
ceremony was usually led by three to five village elders who were considered to be powerful and 
respected by the villagers in their society. Fund raising was done among villagers to buy a buffalo 
and wine for this collective ritual. However, they claimed that their cultural response to such 
disaster had not produced any positive result as more floods occurred one after another. The 
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reason for such negative result, they claimed, was due to man-made disaster caused by the 
construction of the Yali-Falls dam. As a response to the disasters the two upstream communities 
had stopped holding the ceremony after the 1996 floods. 
Similar practice was done by the communities living downstream in Taveng and Veun Sai 
districts. Many families had sacrificed a buffalo, pig and chicken for the water spirits. Some 
villagers conducted ceremonies dedicated to rice and animal spirits that were lost due to floods in 
order to call those spirits back home. They mentioned that such ritual practices were very 
powerful in the past but the practices had no longer been effective after the 1996 floods. 
Consequently, the communities had abandoned their cultural rituals by claiming that the floods 
were not caused by spirits but were man-made by blocking the river upstream. 
4.3.3. Abandoning and relocating home 
After experiencing the 1996 floods the villagers always expressed fear in living adjacent to the Se 
San River as they cannot predict when flood would occur. The first response was the 
abandonment and relocation of home by riverbank villagers in Talao and Ngang communes in 
Andong Meas district to live uphill in 1997 (Interview 4.4.8; 3SPN, 2007a). Talao commune 
leader reported that villagers had decided to abandon their home to live uphill due to the 
following reasons. Firstly, they knew that there was Yali-Fall dam construction upstream and this 
construction caused serious floods in 1996. Further, they feared future unforeseen floods. 
Secondly, the river’s water quality had been degraded which caused them diarrhea and skin rash 
after drinking and bathing. Thirdly, fish and other natural resources which they used to collect 
from the river and from the bank were depleted. And fourthly, the villagers were fearful of being 
dead if the dam would break. 
A senior district official in Andong Meas said that the community usually relocates their home to 
new areas if the natural resources in their area are depleted, or their area become prone to 
disaster. Other villagers may also move their home to be near urban center so that they can easily 
access health center, school and market. However, the official asserted that, many villagers in 
Andong Meas district had been moving out from river to hill and mountain due to fear of dam 
break and floods (Interview 4.3.5). 
Some villagers also express the concern of unpredictable flood and move their traditional 
property to keep with their fellow villagers who live on the hill such as gongs and musical 
instruments, copper pots, and traditional jars. Village elders in Talao commune told that some 
newly married families establish their new home on the hill approximately eight kilometers from 
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their village as they express fear of living near the river (Focus Group Discussion in Talao 
commune, August 2007) 
Table 4.2 Population of the abandoned villages by district and commune 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Source: 3SPN, 2007a 
 
In 1999 and 2000 there were more villagers from Talao and Ngang communes of Andong Meas 
district who had abandoned and moved their home to mountain area as response to floods, surges 
and erratic water level fluctuation caused by Yali-Falls dam (Interview 4.4.8; 3SPN, 2007a). For 
the same reasons, other communities living in Oyadao, Taveng and Veun Sai districts were also 
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abandoned and relocated their home away from the river between 2000 and 2006 but the numbers 
were significantly less than those who had abandoned their home in Andong Meas district. 
According to a study conducted by 3SPN there were approximately 3,545 people (722 families) 
who had moved away from the river between 1997 and 2006 (3SPN, 2007a) (see table 4.2). This 
outgoing number of villagers stood almost 15% as compared to the total population of 23,738 
people who reside along the Se San River in Ratanakiri province. 
Though the new location provides the community fertile soil for crop cultivation through their 
traditional slash and burn practice, a senior district official argued that a great number of people 
who had been abandoning the river and moving to live in mountain area poses a number of 
problems both socially and ecologically (Interview 4.3.5). Firstly, the new area is far away from 
existing road, well and school which the government had established. The new area can only be 
accessed by foot, requires one to two hours walk. Therefore, the communities are isolated. 
Secondly, there was not enough water during the dry season as their home is far away from water 
source. Thirdly, the children cannot go to school as their home is far away. Fourthly, relocation 
for new home poses a threat to ecology because of deforestation for new settlement and farming. 
Therefore, the abandonment of home and relocation to new area of local communities creates 
difficulty for development agency in extending public infrastructures and services to those areas 
such as road, health center, school, and clean water. 
4.3.4. Taking self-precaution measure 
The riverbank villagers mentioned that erratic water level fluctuations remain one of the 
problems which caused loss of their boat and damage to their fishing net. The communities 
reported that the magnitude of water level fluctuations was particularly great in the evening. They 
observed that the river water sometimes goes very high in evening and drops very low in the 
morning. If the boat was tied to a small trunk of the tree, the evening wave could break the trunk 
and bring the boat away from the bank to downstream. 
For instance, a villager in Pangkit village of Taveng district reported that he had tied his boat to a 
small trunk before he went to bed, when he woke up in the morning his boat disappeared from the 
bank. He was shocked with the loss of his boat. Later he observed that the tree had left a broken 
mark of the trunk which he had tied his boat in the evening. He, then, concluded that his boat was 
brought away by water level fluctuations. After a week he heard that his boat was found by 
downstream communities in Veun Sai district. He went to take back his boat but he had to pay 
40,000 Riels (approximately ten US dollars) for the redemption of the boat. After such an 
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experience he always reminded himself to tie his boat strongly to a tree (Interview 4.5.10). In 
2006, the communities in this village mentioned that there were three boats that were lost due to 
water level fluctuations. The villagers said that the value of the boats ranges from 200,000 to 
400,000 Riels (approximately US$ 50 to US$ 100) whiles the motor boat costs from 600,000 
Riels to 1,000,000 Riels (approximately US$ 150 to US$ 250) (Focus Group Discussion, 7 
September 2007). 
According to an economic evaluation study conducted by Oxfam America (2001), 1,173 dugout 
boats (paddle) and 18 motor boats were lost due to water surge and water level fluctuations on Se 
San River in Ratanakiri province from 1996 to 2000. With the great number of losses the 
riverbank communities expressed that they have no mean to solve the problem of losing the boat 
except warning themselves to take self-precaution by tying their boat strongly to the big tree on 
the bank. 
The same self-precautions were made to avoid their fishing net from being damaged by erratic 
water level fluctuation. The communities mentioned that in the past their fishing net had never 
been damaged by the flows but after 1999 their fishing nets have often been damaged due to 
water level fluctuations if they were deployed over night. A villager in Taveng district 
complained that “not only fish has been drastically declining over the past ten year but water 
level fluctuation has also made our fishing net broken if it was deployed over night. Therefore, 
many fishers have been taking measure not to leave their fishing nets in the water over night.” 
4.3.5. Seeking other alternatives of livelihoods 
As described in Chapter 1, the Se San community is largely dependent on river for fishing, 
collecting riverine vegetables, and growing fruit trees as well as vegetable and paddy rice along 
the riverbank for their everyday livelihoods. As claimed by the communities, such activities are 
fully dependent on river system. If the river system is changed or damaged, such activities can no 
longer be fully implemented. 
Certainly, the local communities asserted that over the past ten years the Se San River has been 
abnormal in its nature. Erratic water level fluctuations and poor water quality were often reported 
by local communities to be caused by the operation of Yali-Falls dam.  Abnormal water level in 
the wet and dry seasons was also mentioned. According to a senior district official in Veun Sai, 
he complained that “in the dry season of 2006, I witnessed that the water level was very low, and 
even some deep pools were also dried up, such that people could walk across the Se San River, 
which we had never experienced in the past. Though I understand that this kind of disaster may 
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be cause by nature but the dam has also contributed to this disaster as well.” (Vice district 
governor of Veun Sai informed the Vietnamese delegates in the EIA workshop on 5 July 2007 – 
Author’s field note). 
Due to frequent low water level in the dry season, the community complained that many fish 
species had disappeared as the community had no longer caught them from the deep pools of the 
Se San River and therefore fish catch had steadily decreased. For instance, a fisher in Veun Sai 
district told that “nowadays, it is difficult to get fish from the Se San River. At most I can catch 
two to three small fishes a day and some days I do not catch even one fish (Interview 4.4.2).” In 
response to this some fishers often go for fishing in lake or small streams of the Se San River’s 
tributaries. They mentioned that even though they can catch a small number of fish but they are 
considerably getting more fish than catching from the Se San River. However, many fishers 
mentioned that they have not access to those streams or lakes because their village is located far 
away from the source. 
Besides fishing, riverbank villagers also complained that erratic water level fluctuations and 
unpredictable floods during the wet season caused severe bank erosion and inundation of lowland 
farm along the riverbank. Consequently, some farmers have abandoned their farmland along the 
riverbank because they fear that bank erosion and frequent inundation will destroy their crops and 
vegetable. A senior district official informed that about 60 hectares of farmland along the 
riverbank in Veun Sai district were abandoned due to frequent inundations in the wet season 
(Vice district governor of Veun Sai told the Vietnamese delegation during EIA Workshop on 5 
July 2007 – Author’s field note). Moreover, he claimed that river water level fluctuation also 
causes depletion of natural vegetable from the riverbank and the community can no longer collect 
them. In response to such situation, many farmers have chosen to clear forestland to grow rice, 
bean and corn. Though forestland encroachment for farming is on the increase, the productivity 
remains low and in most case insufficient for their year round consumption. 
Some villagers have chosen to work outside their district for additional income. Some villagers 
migrate temporarily to more well-off neighboring district to do work such as clearing land, 
growing peanut and cashew, and planting rubber tree. The income is usually used to buy 
additional rice sufficient for year round consumption. They mentioned that the reasons for 
seeking job outside district were because they can no longer rely on the river for fishing and 
harvesting natural vegetable along the bank. For example, a Jarai villager in Andong Meas 
district said that “nowadays I can no longer depend on the Se San River for fishing and 
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gardening. My upland rice cultivation does not provide enough food for my family year round so 
I have chosen to get extra job in Bokeo district during the dry season” (Interview 4.5.11). 
4.3.6. Coping with the decline of water quality 
The villagers of Rieng Vinh village in Taveng district said that “water quality of the Se San River 
had been deteriorating since 1996. In the past the water was clear and tasted good but these days 
the water is always brownish and sometimes smell badly” (Focus Group Discussion, 11 
September 2007). They said that in the past villagers drew water directly from the Se San River 
for drinking and cooking but nowadays the water is not clean for consumption. They said that the 
water is brownish year round and sometimes harmful to their health such as causing diarrhea after 
drinking it. They mentioned that the water is not as pure as before. 
In response to such changes, some riverbank villagers purify water by digging the sandbank 
about half meter in order to allow water to be filtered by sand before withdrawing it for drinking 
and cooking. However, this method is not always applicable for all villagers as sandbank is not 
available. Other villagers have chosen to dig their own well but sometimes do not find enough 
water in the dry season. 
Figure 4.3 Jarai women are sitting and waiting to get water from forest based water hole 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: 3SPN, 2007a 
Others have used borehole or pump well which have recently been installed in the village along 
the river by commune council and NGOs in 2004 and 2005. However, they informed that some 
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wells can not be used in the dry season as there is no water. Besides this, some villagers have also 
turned to use water from streams and creeks of the Se San River’s tributaries but they mentioned 
that they need to spend at least 30 minutes or one hour to get water. 
For the people who had abandoned and relocated their home to mountainous area and who live 
far away from the stream, they use water from forest based water holes (see figure 4.3), which are 
shallow dug holes in the ground (3SPN, 2007a). However, villagers spend a lot of time and labor 
to get water as the sources are located far away from their home; and according to indigenous 
tradition, the women are responsible for collecting water for their families. Women from the 
villages of Tang Chi, Dal Pok, Tang Lom and Tang Mlou in Gnang commune, Andong Meas 
district said that villagers now face difficulty in collecting water, especially during the dry season 
since water is located around one to two kilometers from their homes and once they are at the 
water source, they must wait for water as well (see figure 4.3) (ibid.). 
4.3.7 Concluding remarks 
The foregoing discussion shows that hydropower impacts pose several threats and problems on 
local livelihoods beyond their local coping capacity and knowledge. The coping capacity toward 
flood events by the local communities proved to be insufficient since there were lack of proper 
shelter, food and drinking water. Serious fever, diarrhea and skin diseases were common through 
out the past flooding events. Stopping holding their cultural practice in worship of water spirit 
means losing cultural sense of problem sharing within the community. Abandoning and 
relocating home to new areas of some affected communities causes destruction of forest, health 
risk due to shortage of water in the dry season, and isolation from other communities and 
facilities such as school and health center. Taking self-precaution measure due to erratic water 
level fluctuation limits local community from fishing activities and therefore reduces their fish 
catch. Some communities chose the other options to go for a job outside their district for 
additional incomes since they can no longer rely on their fishing activity. And another problem 
concerns with the decline of water quality which posts health risk for local community and their 
animals, particularly in the dry season. During the past years, some communities withdraw water 
from the river through the process of filtering on the sandbank and boiling before drinking. 
However, sandbanks are not always available spatially for all communities. 
Although local community processes their social experiences and new knowledge in order to 
cope with the changing condition of river system, their coping capacity remains largely limited. 
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In addition, the outcomes resulting from their coping activities may affect social and ecological 
problems in the future, such as increasing tendency of land conflict and deforestation. 
4.4 The emerging response in to dam impacts 
The foregoing discussions in sections 4.2 and 4.3 presented an important background on how 
different actors perceive dam impacts and to what extent local community can cope to such 
impacts. They provide a first hand conceptual idea to this section on how dam impact shapes the 
responses of various actors at local level. Although local community believes that dam caused a 
series of floods since 1996, the real action and response came into play only after the dry-season 
flooding at the end of February 2000. The actors that came into play in this response include local 
and international NGOs and government agencies at provincial level, and government agencies at 
national level. The latter will be discussed in Chapter 5. The following discusses the emerging 
response to dam impacts at local level. 
In response to the February 2000 flood event, an initial Ratanakiri province Se San Working 
Group, consisting of individuals from local and international NGOs working in Ratanakiri 
province including NTFP, Health Unlimited, and the government SEILA22 Program, had been 
established to investigate, hold meetings and create consensus at the local level on the need for an 
investigative study of dam impacts (Hirsch and Wyatt, 2004. p. 59). At the same time, NTFP also 
sought collaboration with the Centre d’ Etude et de Dévelopment Agricole Cambodgien 
(CEDAC) in order to support and provide training in the field of agricultural production to the 
affected communities living along the Se San River with the aim that the provision would 
promote the livelihoods of the communities (Interview 1.5.1). Oxfam America and NGO Forum 
of Cambodia (NGOF)23 had also been paying a visit to Ratanakiri province and made 
collaboration with NTFP concerning the investigation of dam related impact. Later, NTFP 
together with Oxfam America, NGOF and CEDAC established so-called Se San Working Group 
(SWG) to investigate the flood impacts which were believed to have been caused by the 
construction of the Yali-Falls dam (Hirsch and Wyatt, 2004. p.55). The three latter NGOs were 
based in Phnom Penh. The SWG together with the Ratanakiri Province Se San Working Group 
                                                 
22 The government sponsored SEILA Program is an experimental national decentralization process that began in 
1996. It has provided provincial and district governments with a platform to work together with local communities 
and in cooperation with NGOs, in developing village, commune and district development plans addressing issues 
such as resource mapping, collective land ownership, protection of economic, social and cultural rights, and co-
management (Ojendal et al., 2002 quoted in Hirsch and Wyatt, 2004) 
23 NGOF is a key umbrella NGO representing a network of over 60 active Cambodian and international NGOs, and 
working to advocate on issues of concern to the Cambodian people and NGOs working in Cambodia (Hirsch and 
Wyatt, 2004) 
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had been working together to form a survey team in order to conduct a comprehensive impact 
study aimed at documenting losses which caused by the construction of the Yali-Falls dam. 
In order to proceed, the study required human and financial resources. The groups identified that 
human resources should be mobilized locally with the technical assistance from international 
experts while the fund can be sought from Oxfam America through NTFP. With the availability 
of financial resources, the survey team was then established with the lead of international 
consultant through NTFP by taking into account the involvement of individuals from provincial 
government departments such as Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Department; Environment 
Department; and Rural Development Department. Beside this, indigenous peoples originating 
from the Se San River in Ranakiri Province were also engaged in the survey. 
Though NTFP took the lead, the survey was primarily conducted through Fisheries Office of the 
provincial government right after the Fisheries Office of Ratanakiri formally requested assistance 
in conducting a village-level survey of all the communities situated along the Se San River. As a 
result, on 24 April 2000, a pre-planning workshop was conducted at the Ratanakiri Department of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries with the participation of senior officials from the department 
(Fisheries Office, 2000). On 25 April 2000, the principal study team of 12 people including three 
women and four indigenous peoples originating from the Se San River in Ranakiri Province 
traveled to the field for the survey (ibid.). 
The survey was carried out using Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA) conducted in all villages located 
along the Se San River in Ratanakiri Province in Cambodia from April to May 2000. 
Consequently, at the end of May 2000, a 43-page report entitled “A Study of the Downstream 
Impacts of the Yali-Falls Dam in the Se San River Basin in Ratanakiri Province, Northeast 
Cambodia” was produced and distributed to government agencies and NGOs in Ratanakiri 
province and Phnom Penh. The report documented the impacts of Yali-Falls dam construction 
which caused serious problems on livelihoods of downstream communities in Cambodia since 
late 1996 and called upon the Cambodian government to begin addressing the issue and negotiate 
with Vietnam. Through this report the affected communities living along the Se San River made 
several appeals that: 
i. It is important that the serious ecological and socio-economic problems of local people be 
addressed as soon as possible, as local people have already suffered for over four years and 
their patience and constitutions are running short; 
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ii. The Vietnam Government, and those international organizations, foreign countries and 
companies who have supported them in building the Yali-Falls dam should take 
responsibility for the losses that local people have already experienced, including the loss of 
life and the loss of livelihoods. Compensation will need to be provided on a continual basis 
if the impacts from the dam are not alleviated; 
iii. The Villagers living along the Se San River would like to see the Yali-Falls dam 
decommissioned, and the Se San River returned to its natural state. However, if this is not 
immediately possible, strong measures need to be adopted to mitigate the downstream 
impacts in Cambodia, including releasing water from the dam in a way that replicates 
natural flows; 
iv. Local people living along the Se San River in Ratanakiri Province are not in favor of 
regulating the Se San River so that the dry season river flows are higher than natural flows, 
and rainy season flows are reduced from natural levels. River regulation will seriously 
affect a number of important livelihood activities and cause serious ecological problems. 
They want the old Se San River back! 
v. Villagers living along the Se San River in Ratanakiri Province are adamant that they do not 
want the Se San 3 dam built 20 km downstream from the Yali-Falls dam in Vietnam. They 
are adamant that the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and other foreign bodies should 
withdraw all support for the Se San 3 dam and other dams planned in the Se San River 
Basin in Vietnam. 
(Fisheries Office 2000: 38) 
With the findings of the impact study the SWG and Ratanakiri Se San Working Group had been 
moving more strategically for a long term advocacy body by requesting to form a local 
organization called Se San Protection Network (SPN) in order to support affected communities 
beyond the above completed studies. The following section discusses the formation of this local 
organization and its network building. 
4.5 The formation of Se San Protection Network and network building 
As an outcome of the above impact study by SWG, a local NGO namely Se San Protection 
Network (SPN) was established in Ratanakiri province in December 2001. According to SPN 
(2005a), there were three factors that influenced the creation of SPN. The first factor was the 
significant findings of the dam impact studies conducted by Fisheries Office after the February 
2000 flood event caused by Yali-Falls dam. The second factor was the occurrence of significant 
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information exchange between the dam-affected communities and NGOs, the Cambodian and 
Vietnamese Governments, the MRC and the donor community after the flood event. And the 
third factor was the call of affected communities for help to assist with the mitigation of the 
impacts, recovery of livelihoods, compensation, water release warning, and stopping further dams 
building on the Se San River. This section discusses the establishment process of SPN including 
its roles, structures and transformational process. Its strategies and choices, and outcomes and 
challenges are discussed separately in section 4.6 and 4.7, respectively. 
In order to move forward to establish SPN, a proposal was prepared by NTFP and the Global 
Association for People and Environment (GAPE) for submission to Oxfam America for funding 
in July 2001 (Hirsch and Wyatt, 2004). After its approval, Oxfam America recruited a project 
coordinator from Phnom Penh to run the Se San project called “Se San Protection Network 
(SPN)” in Ratanakiri Province. After recruiting the project coordinator, SPN project was formally 
launched under the umbrella of NTFP in December 2001. 
Taking advantage of sharing office, SPN had utilized existing admin and financial system of 
NTFP in such a way that funds from Oxfam America could be channeled through NTFP’s 
account for which SPN could withdraw its budget for daily operation. In addition to that, SPN 
could also make use of human resources from NTFP for which many of whom had long been 
involved in Se San issues. For instance, a Se San Steering Committee was established along with 
the SPN project consisting of senior indigenous members associated with NTFP in order to assist 
and advise the project (Hirsch and Wyatt, 2004; Interview 4.1.7). Likewise, three NTFP staff 
members had also contributed on a part time basis to assist SPN during its inception period while 
at that time there were only four SPN staff including a project coordinator, an information 
assistant, a field assistant and a district field worker (SPN, 2005a). 
From the inception, the SPN was formed with the working mandate in four areas including 
research and documentation; information sharing; dialogue and negotiation promotion; and 
capacity building, network and advocacy (ibid.). In order to succeed its working mandate, the 
prime task of SPN to implement its work program at local level requires that the local based 
community network shall first be established. With such mechanism SPN believes that the local 
community network could be able to drive, coordinate and legitimize various consultations, 
planning and representational processes related to further studies and negotiations (Hirsch and 
Wyatt, 2004) through team building and long term capacity strengthening provided by SPN 
aiming toward promoting advocacy, dialogue and negotiation. 
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Initially, SPN started a project called Community Support Network which aimed to establish Se 
San Community Networks (SCN) at local level by electing focal persons and respected elder 
groups from district and village levels. The respective focal persons and elder groups were 
elected by the affected communities through village and district meetings with the participation 
of local authorities spanning district governor, commune chief and village chief.  
At the beginning, SPN initially set up SCN in seven focal villages along the Se San River 
encompassing one village in Oyadao district, two villages in Andong Meas district, two villages 
in Taveng district and two villages in Veun Sai district (Interview 4.1.7). During the building 
process of local structure, SPN organized a number of district meetings with the participation of 
district governors, commune chiefs, village chiefs, village elders, village focal persons, and a 
number of local officials representing education, health and agriculture offices of the district 
government (Hirsch and Wyatt, 2004). The discussions were focused on how SCN shall be 
strengthened with a firm network structure along the expansion of the network, particularly after 
the arrival of more field staff at SPN in August 2002 (Interview 4.1.7). One of the issues which 
were discussed was related to the representational members of Commune Council of local 
government in the Se San Commune Level Committee of SCN (see structure of SCN in figure 
4.5). The idea was that the SCN would make use of existing local government system by 
engaging Commune Council in its system (Interview 4.1.7). However, this was vetoed at the 
meetings, held in October 2002, by a majority of villagers who felt that their Commune Council 
duties might not allow enough time for them to work on Se San issues (Hirsch and Wyatt, 2004). 
Finally, it was decided that the village chief would represent and play a facilitation role in the Se 
San Commune Level Committee (Interview 4.1.7). This is due to the fact that village chief is 
close to the affected villagers and he or she is seen as having less political influence from the 
central government than the commune council. Though the task has been devolved to village 
chief, SCN has also been keeping commune chief informed and engaged in its network activities 
such as participation in Se San annual celebration event, meetings and workshop. The idea of 
keeping commune chief/or commune council informed is twofold. Firstly, the work of 
community network pays a respect to the commune council who has the authority to govern the 
commune and the village. And secondly is to let this body well aware of the SPN’s activities and 
gain support in its advocacy work. 
Taking into consideration of consultation during district meetings, SPN started extending its local 
network beyond the seven focal villages with a clear structure from district down to village level. 
By early 2003, SPN expanded its local network to almost all affected villages along the Se San 
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River in Ratanakiri Province and subsequently, by early 2004, SCN were established in all 60 
affected villages (Interview 4.1.7). 
The main representational members of SCN consist of focal persons and elder groups at district 
and village levels. While district focal person takes the lead of SCN, district elder groups assist 
district focal person in strengthening its network at village level such as dissemination and 
collection of information on dam issues, and mobilization of community supports for advocacy. 
With the help of village elder groups, however, village focal person disseminate information 
received from district focal person on dam issues and on progress that SPN and SCN have made 
to the communities living along the Se San River. On the other hand, village focal person also 
monitors and collects information on unusual condition of river and its impact on local 
livelihoods for reporting to district focal person. 
Figure 4.4 Organizational structure of 3 S Rivers Protection Network (3SPN) 
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As such the main structure of SCN consists of district focal person (two person per district) 
assisted by district elder groups (six to seven persons per districts) and village focal person (two 
persons per village) assisted by village elder groups (six to seven persons per village) (see SCN 
structure in figure 4.5). In addition, between the district and village levels, a Se San Commune 
Level Committee was also established in the view that the work conducted by SCN members is 
acknowledged and recognized by Commune Council of local government. Presently, the local 
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network structure of SPN consists of eight district focal persons, four district elder groups, 15 
commune level committees, 60 village elder groups, and 120 village focal persons. 
Figure 4.5 Structure of Se San Community Network (SCN) indicated in shade box 
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Source: Author’s compilation from fieldwork 
After the coverage of SCN had been expanded to all villages along the Se San River, SPN moved 
to be independent from NTFP and registered as a local NGO approved by the Ministry of Interior 
on 27 October 2005 under a new name “3 S Rivers Protection Network (with the abbreviation of 
3SPN).” 3S is synonymous to Se San, Srepok and Sekong Rivers. According to 3SPN official, 
there were two reasons which influenced the move from SPN to 3SPN (Interview 4.1.7). The first 
reason was to respond to the growing hydropower development on the other two rivers (Sre Pok 
and Se Kong), which converge with the Se San River above ten kilometers before merging with 
the Mekong’s mainstream in Stung Treng Province of Cambodia. The second reason was in 
 104
response to the continuous requests from the communities living along the two rivers who made a 
similar complaint to the changing Se San River system. 
With such move, 3SPN established its own secretariat with staff taking charge of admin and 
financial system. Furthermore, three other projects including dialogue support project, local-
based research support project, and fisheries protection community support project were 
established in addition to the existing community support network project. Figure 4.4 shows the 
organization structure of 3SPN. 
Funding the network 
From the inception Oxfam America plays an important role in taking the lead to coordinate and 
resource the SWG (Hirsch and Wyatt, 2004) and supporting the group with finance to investigate 
floods which occurred in February 2000. Relatively, the comprehensive study conducted by 
NTFP through Fisheries Office in Ratanakiri was mainly financed by Oxfam America. After this 
study, Oxfam America continues to finance SPN project from late 2001 with an estimated budget 
of about US$ 65,000 annually. The budget was mainly financed to establish, strengthen and 
promote local community network, capacity building and advocacy. After formal establishment 
of 3SPN with the recognition of Ministry of Interior in September 2005, 3SPN has been moving 
to seek fund from other donor agencies to expand its fields of working. Since then three other 
donors have been providing fund including Broederlijk Delen (Belgium), McKnight Foundation 
(USA), and Oxfam Australia. The funds are mainly directed to support local based community 
research, dialogue and advocacy, and community network for fisheries protection respectively. 
Presently, 3SPN mobilizes about US$ 110,000 annually for its operation from the above four 
donor agencies. Therefore, without such fund 3SPN would not be able to move its activities 
forward. The commitment of increased funding from donors shows that 3SPN has considerably 
gained support internationally and globally. This result can be interpreted that the issues which 
occurred at local level are being heard and addressed at international and global levels. The 
following section discusses strategies and choices that 3SPN used in its advocacy work to 
influence river basin development policy at national, international and global levels. 
4.6 Strategies and choices of Se San Protection Network 
This section discusses strategies and choices which employed by 3SPN to influence the river 
basin development policy at national, international and international levels. The strategies and 
choices include propagation of Se San issues for transboundary dialogue (4.6.1), formation of 
river coalition network (4.6.2), capacity building of the network (4.6.3), community meeting and 
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petition preparation (4.6.4), research and documentation (4.6.5), political support (4.6.6), and 
restoration of local livelihoods through partners (4.6.7). 
4.6.1 Propagation of Se San issues for transboundary dialogue 
3SPN realized that the first step of action to be taken was to hold the first national Se San 
workshop in order to bring attention to government, donors and the MRC about Se San issues by 
presenting the finding of impact study, and providing opportunity for affected communities to 
speak and request for resolutions. The workshop was organized, after SPN had already 
established its local networks SCN in seven focal villages along the Se San River, in a way that 
affected communities can be mobilized to participate and speak to audients in their own words. 
The workshop took place in Phnom Penh on 27 November 2002. 
In the first place central to SPN’s strategy was to invite key stakeholders including Cambodian 
government officials from CNMC and MOWRAM, representative from MRC Secretariat, and 
representative from VNMC. However, a late decision by SPN’s Se San Steering Committee was 
that the VNMC invitation would be withdrawn with the view that engaging only the Cambodian 
government and the MRC would build and gain initial support from within the Cambodian 
national government (Hirsch and Wyatt, 2004). Nevertheless, none of the representatives had 
attended the workshop. While Cambodian officials from CNMC and MOWRAM declined to 
attend by citing other commitment, absence was also the MRC Secretariat who declined to 
participate lest it be seen to be partisan since Vietnam had not been invited (ibid.). The absence of 
CNMC and the MRC Secretariat, therefore, tends to show that there was no or perhaps less 
commitment in listening and answering to complains made by the community networks. 
Though representative of CNMC did not join the workshop, the governor of Ratanakiri province 
had attended the workshop. The workshop had opened the floor for the affected communities to 
raise their concerns on the changing river system caused by hydropower dam development and 
operation. At the end of the workshop the communities living along the Se San River in 
Ratanakiri released a joint statement citing the impacts of Yali-Falls dam on their livelihoods and 
requested assistance in five areas as following: 
1. We request that the government along with organizations (international) help stop the 
construction of hydropower dams on the Se San River, particularly Se San 3 and Se San 
4; 
2. We request that the natural flow of the river be restored; 
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3. We request that the dam builders and stakeholders who have funded the construction of 
the dam compensate villagers for all lost and destroyed property and equipment; 
4. We request that the government of Cambodia negotiate with the government of Vietnam 
to find a solution; 
5. We request that the MRC and stakeholders come to the provinces to study the impacts in 
consultation with the people along the Se San River. 
(Ratanakiri Se San Communities, 2002 quoted in Hirsch and Wyatt, 2004) 
In supporting the communities’ joint statement, SPN had also organized a press conference aimed 
at propagating the consequence of Yali-Fall dam development to a wider audience and 
stakeholders to raise awareness and support for further actions and resolutions. In a press 
conference, a senior official of SPN called the attention of the MRC and its member countries to 
respect the rights of local communities not just only the dam developers. The senior official of 
SPN raised the concern that “we aim to send a strong message to the MRC and its member 
countries that all river users in this region have rights, not just hydropower developers, and that 
those rights must be enshrined in a clear set of rules and procedures for dam building, which 
takes local people into account” (SPN, 2002a: 1). 
Prior to the first national Se San workshop mentioned above, SPN together with partners 
including Oxfam America, Probe International, NGOF, CEPA and NTFP had organized a 
meeting with senior officials of CNMC at the CNMC Secretariat in Phnom Penh on 25 
November 2002. Participants were also senior officials from Ratanakiri departments including 
Water Resources and Meteorology, and Rural Development. The meeting discussed the concerns 
of Se San River. SPN and partners presented the negative effects of hydropower dam in the Se 
San River. The team requested CNMC to act a number of fields as follows. 
 Conduct water quality analysis more frequently particularly in the dry season; 
 Strengthen communication system such as provision of telephone and fax to affected area 
for smooth information delivery on warning of water release from dam; 
 Request Vietnam to conduct proper environmental and socio-economic assessments prior 
to dam construction; 
 Request CNMC to visit project site and conduct geological survey of Se San River and 
request Vietnam to inform downstream communities at least 15 days prior to releasing 
water from dam; 
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  Request to install hydrological and meteorological stations along the Se San River in 
order to distinguish whether floods are caused by water release or rain fall; 
 Suggest that CNMC request members of the MRC to discuss and respect international 
law; 
 Request that concerned stakeholders would receive benefit from the river particularly the 
affected communities; 
 Request Cambodian authority to promote agricultural and public health support and 
construct road infrastructure along the river; and 
 Request participation of senior officials or representative of CNMC in the first national Se 
San workshop in order to strengthen cooperation between concerned stakeholders. 
(CNMC, 2002) 
Responding to the above request, a senior official of CNMC asserted that “the above requests are 
out of my authority. I will raise the issues to the top level of CNMC and to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affair for further intervention (ibid.).” Such response reveals that the Se San issue is 
highly influenced by high level decision-makers. 
4.6.2 Formation of rivers coalition network: linking local actions to national, international 
and global arenas and vice-versa 
Se San River was the first to captured strong attention of many non-governmental organizations 
in Cambodia in responding to the February 2000 flood event caused by water release from Yali-
Falls dam. As described above, the flood event led to an immediate response of local and 
international NGOs in Ratanakiri Province and Phnom Penh to conduct impact study in early 
2000 and the establishment of SPN in December 2001. 
Hence, SPN was the first local NGO which was created in response to hydropower dam impact in 
Cambodia. While SPN has been working to form a strong network at local level, an idea to form 
a new coalition group called Se San Work Group (SWG) was initiated by a coalition of three 
Cambodian NGOs including SPN, NGOF and CEPA in 2003. The main aim of this coalition 
group is to strengthen solidarity and to advocate for policy reform of cross-border hydropower 
development in response to the dam-related negative effects on local communities living 
downstream of Se San River in Cambodia. While the role of SPN was to establish and strengthen 
SCN at local level in Ratanakiri Province and CEPA performed similar tasks in Stung Treng 
province, NGOF took a major responsibility to support and coordinate advocacy works at 
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national level. This means that advocacy activity from local to national took place via NGOF. For 
instance, NGOF had been assisting local communities in sending their statement to Cambodian 
Prime Minister demanding resolutions and compensation. Presently, six statements have been 
sent since 2003. 
Supporting this coalition group were the international NGOs and distant advisory group including 
Oxfam America, Probe International (Canada), International Rivers (IR) in USA, Australia 
Mekong Resource Center (AMRC) in Australia, Mekong Watch (MW) in Japan, Towards 
Ecological Recovery and Regional Alliance (TERRA) in Thailand, and Global Alliance for the 
Preservation of the Environment (GAPE) in Canada. This advisory group plays an important role 
in supporting SWG to move forward its advocacy activities. Many members of this group had 
been involved in Se San issues as early as 2000 in response to dam-related flood event in 
February 2000. While some organizations had been writing letters to the MRC Secretariat for 
clarification of MRC’s role in solving Se San issues, others had been addressing the issues to 
concerned agencies particularly to dam supporting donors such as ADB and WB to take a major 
step to stop financing further dam building on Se San River and to press EVN to compensate and 
mitigate the impacts according to international law (see chapter 6 for discussion of international 
and global arenas). 
Due to the fact that dam building grew significantly on Sre Pok and Se Kong Rivers which merge 
with the Se San River before flowing into the Mekong’s mainstream in Stung Treng province, the 
coalition had been transformed into 3S Working Group in 2005.  By 2007, this coalition was 
reformed again under a new coalition network called Rivers Coalition in Cambodia (RCC) in 
response to the growing dam related issues in the entire territory of Cambodia. As a senior 
official of NGOF puts it, 
“Although we have urged the government and those who support dam building to stop 
financing and building the dam, dam construction continues to grow more rapidly over the 
past few years. Since dam construction cannot be stopped, we have moved to establish 
and strengthen RCC aiming at the project implementers to take into account the 
participation of local people in planning and decision making process in order to make 
sure that the interests, needs and benefits of affected people are addressed. In addition, we 
would like to request that dam development must abide national and international EIA 
guidelines which are stipulated and promoted by the World Commission on Dams (WCD) 
(Interview 1.5.1).” 
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Taking into account of more memberships from other national and international NGOs, the RCC 
had been restructured into two major distinguished categories of membership including the core 
and the supporting. The core member comprises eight national and international NGOs in 
Cambodia including 3SPN, NGOF, CEPA, Oxfam America (OA), Oxfam Australia (OAus), 
Fisheries Action Coalition Team (FACT), Cambodian Volunteers for Society (CVS), and 
Conservation and Development on Cambodia (CDCam). This core member meets monthly to 
report on progress and discuss the issues and strategies to be copped and implemented. 
However, the supporting member consists of a number of organizations mainly based abroad 
such as AMRC, IR, Probe International, Mekong Watch, TERRA, GAPE, Bank Information 
Center (BIC), and Center for Biodiversity and Development (CBD) (RCC, undated). This 
supporting member is also called distant advisory group who back-up the activities of RCC with 
technical, political and legal supports (SPN, 2005a). The role of distant actors is discussed further 
in chapter 6 on international and global arenas. 
4.6.3 Capacity building of the network 
While a structural mechanism at local level has been established, 3SPN believes that the next step 
is to strengthen and build the capacity of local network in order to enable local members of SCN 
to understand and gain knowledge on dam issues and to act upon their knowledge for demanding 
rights in using shared water resources. 
Central to this strategy, 3SPN has started developing opportunity for local network members to 
access trainings, workshops, study tours, and meetings which has significantly improved their 
ability to learn, express their opinions, organize communities, do advocacy work, identify the 
cause of the problem and how the dam has impacted their lives, and strengthened their planning, 
documentation and reporting skills. 
In relation to the improvement of knowledge and skills, the local network members had received 
a number of trainings such as advocacy strategy; networking and community organizing; 
activities planning, reporting and minutes writing; information management; communication and 
coordination; preparation of workshop and meeting (ibid.); community resources; community-
based research; and EIA training workshop (3SPN, 2006a). With the access to capacity building 
program, the local network members are more confident to voice out in public forums and write 
their concerns, needs, and complaints to their elected representatives at all levels, especially top 
government officials (SPN, 2005a). For instance, since 2003 a statement had been drafted 
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annually by the representatives of SCN and sent to Prime Minister informing about upstream dam 
impacts and seeking solutions. 
Even though there has been acknowledgement from the local network members that they have 
been better equipped with knowledge on dam related issues and advocacy due to their 
engagement in 3SPN activities for the last seven years. However, they suggest that further 
training on public speaking and negotiation methods shall be promoted so that they are confident 
to talk when holding meetings with different stakeholders and especially senior government 
officials. They also suggest that further training on research and report writing is essential as it 
promotes their capacity to be better equipped with knowledge and skills to document the impacts 
more scientifically for the evidence. They also suggest that attending workshop, conference and 
study tour outside their province and country could broaden their understanding on dam issues 
and good advocacy methods that practiced elsewhere, and communication with other dam-
affected communities to build a stronger network. 
4.6.4 Community network meeting and petition preparation 
One of the advocacy approaches which 3SPN has been adopted is to organize a regular annual Se 
San celebration to bring together the affected communities along the Se San River to meet and 
share their concerns regarding negative impacts caused by hydropower dam development and to 
discuss how cooperation and work can be strengthened in order to protect the river and their 
livelihoods. 
Since 2003, 3SPN has organized six annual Se San celebrations for which some 250 local 
network members have been participating each year. These celebrations provide villagers the 
opportunity to build solidarity and cooperation amongst affected communities and also for 
villagers to share and learn from each other on issues, such as experiences, needs, natural 
resource management and advocacy work (SPN, 2005a). At the same time, they provide villagers 
a chance to appeal to governments, international organizations, and donor agencies regarding on 
how dams have been affecting their livelihoods and demanding for intervention and resolution. 
For instance, an affected villager living in Andong Meas district appealed to government during 
the fifth celebration in June 2007 through local mass media that “on behalf of affected 
communities living along the Se San River, I would like to request the government to find 
solution to solve the dam impacts and that dam construction shall be stopped, and compensation 
on dam negative effects shall be urgently made to affected communities” (Author’s field note 
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when attending Se San celebration workshop in Lumphat district, Ratanakiri Province on 15 June 
2007). 
Some villagers made an appeal for their participation to be included in decision making processes 
of development so that they are informed and discussed, and their rights are respected. A villager 
in Taveng district made a call that “we request that the affected communities shall participate in 
the development processes. We want to participate in decision making of development programs 
so that we can inform what is going wrong and what is going right during the processes of those 
developments. In this regard, we urge the government to find solution to the problems that we are 
currently facing due to upstream dams’ impact” (ibid.). 
Other villagers appealled that the benefit of using natural resources from the river shall be equally 
shared between upstream and downstream. A villager in Veun Sai district complained that “we 
are all affected by hydropower development in Vietnam. We do not benefit from the dam but 
Vietnam does. Therefore, we urge that the benefit of sharing natural resources shall be made 
equally to our downstream communities” (ibid.). 
A part from large participation of affected communities, a number of stakeholders from partner 
NGOs such as NGOF, Oxfam America, Mekong Watch, CEPA and FACT, and representatives of 
SPN donor agencies have also attended the celebration. More importantly, provincial and local 
authorities including provincial governor, district governors, and commune and village chiefs had 
also been attending the celebration. While such gathering celebration had gained strong support 
from local and provincial authorities, it had also provided opportunities for affected villagers to 
address the issues directly to their elected officials hoping that the issues will be brought to talk at 
national level. 
For example, at the 4th Se San celebration in May 2006, Vice-governor of Ratanakiri province 
supported the communities’ claim with his statement that “dam-associated impact on the Se San 
River has been affecting fish habitat, and threatening wildlife and forest along the Se San River 
for which the communities must find new ways of living (3SPN, 2006b).” He then promised that 
he will raise the issues to central government for resolution since the Se San issue is 
transboundary which required bilateral talks between the two countries (ibid.). Although there has 
been such commitment, it was not clear whether the issues have been raised to central 
government. As an official from 3SPN puts it, “we are not sure whether the provincial authority 
has raised the Se San issues to central government because we have not received any feedback 
from the authority (Interview 4.1.5).” 
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Box 4.1. Example of petition prepared by Se San Community Network 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kingdom of Cambodia 
Nation, Religion, King 
Sesan Protection Network, Ratanakiri and Stung Treng 
Respect to: 
Samdach Hun Sen, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Cambodia 
We, together over 55,000 ethnic minority people living along the Se San River from Ratanakiri and 
Stung Treng Provinces have been affected from the Yali hydropower dam construction in Vietnam. We 
would like to send you this petition describing the real situation. From 1996 to present, we have faced 
the following problems: 
1. Several times flooding has occurred 
2. The river dried during construction 
3. There have been irregular water fluctuations 
4. Water quality has changed 
5. There has been a loss of fish species and fish habitations (an increase in sand has filled the 
water pools) 
6. It has impacted the people’s cultural and traditional system 
7. Social infrastructure has been destroyed 
8. There has been a loss of river biodiversity in the basin 
9. A number of people have abandoned their villages because they can no longer rely on the river
10. Agriculatural production has become difficult because of water fluctuations 
11. During the dam’s construction, rice fields and farm fields were flooded 
12. There has been a loss of fishing, gold panning and vegetation activities along the river 
13. During dam construction, human and animal lives were lost 
14. There has been a gradual loss of wild vegetables living along the river 
15. Property, equipment, materials, houses, livestock, etc. were lost 
16. There has been a loss of animal species that rely on the river 
17. The nature of the river has changed 
In regards to the problems mentioned above, we together would like to request the following solutions: 
1. Your help in restoring the natural flow of the river 
2. Please have the government help stop further dam construction 
3. We want the river’s benefit to be shared between affected communities and dam builders 
4. Please have the government find appropriate measures to solve the problem for the Se San 
communities for the past, present and future times 
5. Request to dam builders to provide life insurance to the people living downstream of the 
hydropower dam 
6. Before decision making on projects, a public consultation process must be done with 
participation from local people in the region 
7. We request that the government respond to all of our past and present requests 
According to the issues mentioned above, we hope that you, Samdach Hun Sen, will help to find 
solutions. We together would like to bless you with success and happiness. 
Ratanakiri, 05 May 2005 
Signed by representatives of dam affected ethnic communities 
CC: Ratanakiri Provincial Governor; Stung Treng Provincial Governors; MOWRAM; CNMC; Minister 
of Environment; Minister of Industry, Mines and Energy; all government administration offices along 
the Sesan River; all commune councils along the Se San River; the Standing Committee on Dams and 
Canals along the borders. 
Source: SPN, 2005b 
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During the Se San celebration, 3SPN invited local media including newspapers, televisions and 
radios to interview affected communities and the members of the networks in order to raise 
awareness to a broad mass of audients through public broadcasting system. At the end of this 
celebration, the community network members have also been preparing statement and sending to 
the Cambodian Prime Minister for intervention. A sample of communities’ statement dated 5 
May 2005 is shown in box 4.1. Up to 2007, six statements had been sent to the Premier. The 
statements had also been forwarded to parliamentary; Cabinet Minister; CNMC; Minister of 
Environment (MoE); Minister of Water Resources Management (MOWRAM); Minister of 
Industry, Mines and Energy (MIME), and Ratanakiri provincial governor. 
4.6.5 Research and documentation 
Since inception of SPN in 2001, there were many national and international non-governmental 
organizations, academia and research institutes in Cambodia and abroad supporting local 
communities in demanding their rights to be respected, and that the past, present and future loss 
caused by Yali dam be compensated. Realizing the importance that Se San issue is international, 
cooperation with national and international stakeholders is importantly required by SPN in order 
to acquire technical, political, and legal supports nationally and internationally. As described 
earlier, RCC serves as a communication web where SPN moves to seeks assistance and 
intervention from its members. Through this cooperation, there were a number of studies/reports 
that have been conducted to document a wide-range of impacts including negative effect on 
social and cultural aspects, economic losses, and legal aspect (see box 4.2). So far, these studies 
have served as a basis of increasing public and stakeholder awareness and creating space for 
dialogue with Vietnam through concerned Cambodia government agencies. The first public 
awareness occurred through the first impact study which was jointly conducted by Ratanakiri 
Fisheries Office and NTFP from April to May 2000. Through this participatory study process, 
most of the population living along the Se San River was aware of the effects of the dam only in 
2000 while the actual impacts were claimed to have occurred since mid 1996. While these studies 
serve as public awareness they also create space for communities to press Cambodian 
government to negotiate with Vietnam. 
A part from this, 3SPN has also been moving forward to strengthen the capacity of local network 
members by promoting local community based research conducted by SCN teams. In order to 
enable them the capacity to do research, 3SPN provides training on research, data collection 
method, analysis, reporting and assists in structuring and editing the report and finally helps in 
printing and publication. While the research conducted by local communities could build and 
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strengthen their capacity, the report also serves as their evidence on dam impacts as well as 
serves as a basis for initiating dialogue and increasing public and stakeholder awareness 
(Trandem, 2008). 
Box 4.2 Reports prepared by 3SPN’s partners 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Fisheries Office in Cooperation with Non-Timber Forest Product Project, May 2000. A study of the 
Downstream Impacts of the Yali Falls Dam in the Se San River basin in Ratanakiri Province, Northeast 
Cambodia. 
- Se San Protection Network, Partner for Development, Non-Timber Forest Product Project, Stung 
Treng Province Fisheries and Forestry Office, March 2002. A Community-based Study of the 
Downstream Impacts of the Yali-Falls Dam along the Se San, Sre Pok, and Se Kong Rivers in Stung 
Treng Province, Northeast Cambodia. 
- Oxfam America, January 2001. Economic Valuation of Livelihood Income Losses and other Tangible 
Downstream Impacts from the Yali Falls dam to the Se San River basin in Ratanakiri Province, 
Cambodia. 
- Oxfam America, December 2003. Dangerous Waters: Violations of International Law and 
Hydropower Development along the Se San River (draft). 
- NGO Forum on Cambodia, December 2005. Down River: the Consequences of Vietnam’s Se San 
River Dams on life in Cambodia and their Meaning in International Law. 
Source: Author’s compilation 
 
One of the recent achievements is the research on “abandoned villages along the Se San River in 
Ratanakiri Province, Northeastern Cambodia” which was conducted by 17 local researchers from 
SCN teams from May to July 2006. With technical and financial assistance from 3SPN 
Secretariat the report was published in August 2007. The report documents a number of 
households that have been abandoned and moved away from the river to be resettled on uphill 
and higher ground due to depletion of fisheries, degradation of water quality and fear of dam 
break. The research found that 722 households composed of 3,545 people from 17 villages and 
eight communes located along the Se San River have abandoned the Se San River in order to live 
in upland mountainous areas (3SPN, 2007a). 
The 68 page published report which was printed in color picture in Khmer and English languages 
shows that the local community network members have built up their capacity by moving from 
verbal expression to written document which could be used as their advocacy tool as well as their 
propaganda to reach a much wider audience for demanding their rights to be respected. The 
published report also serves as an incentive as the local researcher teams are proud of what they 
have produced. Moreover, the report was also used by SCN teams to disseminate their research 
findings to the affected communities along the Se San River for building awareness and raising 
the level of advocacy support at grass-root level. 
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4.6.6 Political support 
Political support has been identified by 3SPN and its allies as an important strategy to negotiate 
outcome with Vietnam for reform. So far, 3SPN has engaged local and provincial authorities in 
its activities such as involving them in meeting, workshop and conference. During the first few 
years after the 2000 floods, there seems to be strong support from provincial authorities. During 
the first Se San National Workshop in November 2002, Ratanakiri provincial governor fully 
supported and encouraged NGOs to work in cooperation with government to find out real impacts 
in order to bring the issue to discuss with Vietnam. He asserted that “Oxfam should continue to 
support the Se San Project in order to find out the real problems of the Se San River. We will 
help this organization” (SPN, 2002b). Similarly, deputy governor of Ranakiri province supported 
the statement which was prepared by the affected communities during the Third Annual 
Celebration of Se San Protection Networks organized on 5 May 2005 that “I completely agree 
with and support the Se San issue mentioned in the statement along with the requests to Prime 
Minister Hun Sen” (SPN, 2005b). 
At national level, 3SPN has also been working through concerned agencies in Cambodia such as 
organizing meetings with senior officials of CNMC, MOWRAM, and Parliamentarian members. 
The meetings provide venue for 3SPN and its allies to present the Se San problems, study 
findings, and request for strong political support and intervention from top decision-makers. 
Since 2002 there were three meetings that 3SPN and its partners had organized with CNMC. The 
first was conducted on 25 November 2002. The second was on 5 August 2003. And the third was 
on 8 May 2008. 
One meeting had been organized to meet senior officials of MOWRAM on 20 May 2005 to 
discuss the role of Standing Committee on the Coordination of Dam-Canal along the borders of 
Cambodia – Vietnam – Laos and Thailand who takes charge in a bilateral talk with Vietnam for 
resolution of Se San issues. The meeting also updated on what action has been taken so far from 
the committee and its constraints. A senior official of this committee supported the work of SPN 
by mentioning that “because the Cambodian people have suffered since 2000, we should continue 
to insist Vietnam to pay compensation, though I am not sure how compensation can be delivered” 
(SPN, 2005b). However, since 2004 this committee has been lacking financial means to organize 
a meeting with Vietnam. Three meetings had been organized from 2001 to 2003 and were halt 
from 2004 to 2007 due to lack of financial resources. The fourth meeting, however, was 
organized in March 2008 with a financial assistance from Vietnam. With such circumstance, the 
official from this committee also complained that “how can we speak out (for compensation), 
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while our committee’s officials were financed by Vietnam to the meeting” (ibid.). The above 
committee is an inter-ministerial committee which is overseen by the Cabinet Minister. 
Therefore, all expenditure related to this committee has to be borne by the Cabinet of Ministers. 
Realizing this issue, SPN and its allies had identified that meeting with the Cabinet Minister is a 
next step action in order to report on Se San issues, on actions that have been taken, constraints 
that the above standing committee has faced, and request for intervention. However, the meeting 
has yet to be pushed through. This reveals that there seems to be limited political support at 
higher level. 
Another meeting was organized between 3SPN and its allies with the Third Commission of 
National Assembly who takes charge on planning, investment, agriculture, rural development, 
environment and water resources. The meeting was held at the National Assembly Office on 16 
August 2005. Similar to the above meeting, SPN and its allies briefed on the Se San issues, 
actions taken, constraints to date, and request for intervention. At the end of the meeting the 
National Assembly had committed to take the following actions: 
- National Assembly will invite representatives from concerned agencies including 
MOWRAM, MoE, CNMC, and Standing Committee on the Coordination of Dam-Canal 
along the borders of Cambodia – Vietnam – Laos and Thailand to answer in front of all 
parliamentarians at the National Assembly about the Se San River issues 
- National Assembly will make a statement to national and international stakeholders about 
this issue in November 2005 
- National Assembly will organize one investigating committee to monitor and observe the 
issues 
- National Assembly will bring these issues to Ministry of Foreign Affair in order to find 
solution for the affected communities 
- National Assembly plans to cooperate with 3S Working Group (former name of RCC) to 
organize a workshop involving stakeholders at national, regional and international level to 
find the solution. The workshop shall be planned to hold in February or March 2006 
- National Assembly will make a plan to meet with concerned officials at MRC Secretariat 
to discuss and find solution 
- National Assembly will discuss on Se San issues during the Asian Assembly meeting 
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- National Assembly will organize Parliamentarians study tour to Vietnam and discuss 
about the Se San issues. 
(3 S Working Group, 2005b) 
Though 3SPN and its allies had pushed through to meet key persons from government officials as 
well as from National Assembly, the political support seems to be weak as Standing Committee 
on the Coordination of Dam-Canal along the borders of Cambodia – Vietnam – Laos and 
Thailand continues to have no budget for organizing meetings with Vietnam to discuss and solve 
Se San issues. On the other hand, workshop on Se San issues at national and international levels 
which was promised by National Assembly has yet to be organized. This result shows that the 
work of 3SPN and its allies in seeking political support seems less successful. 
4.6.7 Restoration of local livelihoods through partners 
3SPN believes that rehabilitation, restoration and strengthening local livelihoods can be done 
through cooperation and partnership with other provincial development NGOs. 3SPN has been 
lobbying provincial development NGOs to provide assistance to affected communities some of 
which were related to food security, improving access to safe drinking water, health care, and 
road infrastructure. However, a few projects had been done to restore the local livelihoods. There 
were two projects which were significantly related to the restoration of local livelihoods living 
along the Se San River. First was related to food security project which was initiated by 
NTFP/SPN in cooperation with CEDAC in 2002. Second was related to the improvement of 
clean water provided by Welt Hunger Hilfe (German Agro Action – GAA) in 2005. Below are 
details of the two projects. 
Food security project 
As mentioned earlier, NTFP had initially discussed and cooperated with CEDAC to provide food 
security project to affected communities living along the Se San River through a provision of 
training in the field of agriculture. It aimed to rehabilitate the communities’ livelihoods and the 
project began in 2002. While NTFP/SPN provided funding and office space CEDAC provided 
one technical assistant from Phnom Penh to work with communities along the Se San River. The 
project focused on training in raising chicken, farming, compost making, and dry season 
vegetable growing. Since the budget was limited, only five villages of Veun Sai district were 
involved. Therefore, the coverage area of the project was very small compared to the total of 60 
villages located along the river. During the training period, the communities were offered the 
opportunity to learn and test the technique using available local resources. However, according to 
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CEDAC official, the project was not successfully sustained (Interview 4.1.3). After the project 
ended in 2004, CEDAC handed over the responsibility to NTFP/SPN to continue monitoring the 
project but it was constrained because the NTFP/SPN did not possess technical personnel to take 
over. 
During the cooperation, CEDAC proposed a Re-Se San project aiming to restore and improve 
livelihoods of affected communities through provision of income generation activities. This 
initiative was seen by SPN as contradicting to its advocacy strategy and therefore the project was 
not succeeded (ibid.). A 3SPN official told that the strategy of SPN was to show the dam 
builders, national and international development agencies that its advocacy activity purely 
emerged from the earnest effort of affected communities which did not relate to financial 
assistance, for instance, through the provision of income generation project (Interview 4.1.7). The 
official further stated that “We want the communities to initiate their own effort. The dynamic of 
force for demanding rights and justice must come from the communities. We do not want to 
produce the image that participation of local communities in advocacy activity is an exchange of 
income earning through SPN’s project. In Ratanakiri province, there are many NGOs providing 
income generation projects. Therefore, our strategy is to cooperate with those NGOs and lobby 
them to provide the services” (ibid.). 
This strategy reveals that the success of improving local livelihoods is greatly dependent on the 
capacity of partner NGOs, many of which do not only focus on the improvement of livelihoods of 
population along the Se San River but outside the basin as well. 
Improvement of clean water 
Another significant response from NGO sector is the provision of clean water services to the 
affected communities living along the Se San River. An official of GAA told that “the project 
came after there were many reports on unusual water quality of Se San River which reported that 
the river water was polluted causing communities living along the river to suffer from itchiness 
and diarrhea after bathing and drinking the water (Interview 4.1.2).” In response to this situation 
an assessment on water related issues along the Se San River was conducted by GAA team. The 
assessment revealed that the communities face serious problem in using river water for bathing, 
drinking and cooking. A two-year project for clean water services was then initiated by GAA and 
began in January 2005. Up to the time the project ended in March 2007, 42 wells had been 
installed in three districts of Andong Meas, Taveng and Veun Sai. The well was installed in the 
middle of the village so that every one could easily have access. For project ownership and 
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maintenance, it was required that the community contributed their own labor to collect sand for 
the construction while the rests were the responsibility of GAA. After installation, water from 
well is tested for coliform bacteria, iron, arsenic and mineral. According to GAA official, the test 
shows that water is clean for drinking without boiling because the well was dug seven meters 
down the earth (ibid.). The community formed a committee within their village to monitor and 
maintain the well. In order to insure that the well is sustainable, each household pays a 
contribution of 500 Riels (US$ 0.12) a month to the committee’s cash saving box to reserve for 
repairing and purchasing spare parts when needed. This saving cash can also be used as a loan in 
the community for which the member can borrow and return. After completion of this project, 
GAA transferred its task to Ratanakiri provincial department of rural development to oversee 
particularly as an agent that community could communicate to buy spare parts for repairing and 
maintenance. This department also promises to help communities in buying spare parts from 
Phnom Penh if they are not available at provincial town (ibid.). 
Beside well construction, water filter tank had also been distributed to the community living in 
the village where GAA did not install well. The lifespan of this filter tank is about two years. 
Therefore this filter tank was only for temporary use during the period when well was not yet 
installed. However the community had to pay a contribution of 4000 Riels (one US dollar). 
4.7. Outcomes and challenges 
This section discusses the outcomes and challenges resulting from the advocacy work of 3SPN. 
Two important outcomes are identified including communities’ awareness and support in 
advocacy; and the acknowledgement of dam impacts by the Vietnamese and Cambodian 
governments. The two outcomes are discussed in 4.7.1 and 4.7.2, respectively. Sub-section 4.7.3 
discusses the challenges. 
4.7.1. Communities’ awareness and support in advocacy 
Most of the population living along the Se San River became aware about the effects of Yali-
Falls dam only when the first comprehensive impact study was carried out by international expert 
through Ratanakiri Fisheries Office from April to May 2000 while the impacts had been 
discovered to have occurred since mid 1996. Even though some upstream communities were 
aware about the dam earlier than this study, the information about the dam prior 2000 was not 
clearly understood by the communities. Therefore, most of communities did not have knowledge 
about the dam until 2000. During the process of Rural Rapid Assessment (RRA) of the study, the 
study team informed the communities about the reasons why the river has been changing. 
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Through this study the communities were informed about the effects of Yali-Falls dam and 
through this study, too, the communities made appeals to government, national and international 
agencies to take full effort to restore their livelihoods and to help stop dam building on the Se San 
River. After a year of this study, a proposal to set up SPN was prepared by the above 
international expert with consultation and participation of local communities. Through this 
mechanism processes, the communities fully support and request further actions to be taken by 
NGO and that their participation can be mobilized when required. Following the establishment of 
SPN Project in December 2001, local community took full effort to participate in this network 
activity in order to advocate for change and that past, present and future losses need to be 
compensated. Since late 2001, at least 500 members from grass-root level have been involved in 
this network. Presently, there are eight district focal persons, 120 village focal persons, four 
district elder groups (approximately 30 district elders), 60 village elder groups (approximately 
300 village elders), and 16 commune level committee (approximately 60 members). Among 
these, about 150 (including district focal persons, district elders, and village focal persons) are 
full members of Se San Community Network while the rests are supporting members. Since the 
formation of this network, the affected communities receive information on dam and participate 
in meeting, workshop, forum and other events which provide them with knowledge and facilitate 
the opportunity for them to raise their concerns to government and relevant agencies for 
interventions. To date, six statements/petitions drafted by local community representatives had 
been sent to Prime Minister for intervention. 
4.7.2 Acknowledgement on dam impacts 
Through the community network’s advocacy efforts Vietnamese and Cambodian government 
acknowledge that the Yali Falls dam has caused negative impacts downstream (Trandem, 2008). 
According to Trandem (2008, p. 111-112) “the first recognition came in the form of a verbal 
apology at a November 2002 conference, when a representative of Vietnam’s Ministry of 
Industry stated ‘we are very sorry for the losses of the people living downstream on the Se San 
River caused, of course, by releasing water from Yali Falls dam’s reservoir in February 2000’ 
(SPN, 2003). The second acknowledgement came in August 2003, when, at the recommendation 
of SPN, the CNMC sent a facsimile to VNMC, stating the concerns of the Se San villagers and 
requesting that Vietnam respond accordingly.” 
The above acknowledgement of dam impacts had led to two significant responses by Vietnam. 
First, the construction of Se San 4A re-regulatory reservoir located about one kilometer from 
Cambodia border began in November 2004. As mentioned by Vietnam, the rational of this 
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reservoir is to provide re-regulation of the intermittent outflow from the upstream hydropower 
projects and thus provide a steady flow without daily variations into Cambodia (SWECO, 2007). 
This means that daily erratic water level fluctuation which often complained by downstream 
communities would be solved even though water quality remains unsolved. Second, a study of 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) was conducted in November 2005. The study assesses 
the likelihoods of past, present and future impacts on social, economic, culture and environment, 
and proposes mitigation measures. The outputs of this report were presented to the Cambodian 
government on 5 July 2007. While there were about a hundred participants from Cambodian 
government agencies and local authorities from affected areas attended the workshop, SPN and 
its allies boycotted the meeting due to the fact that the EIA report was delivered to them only one 
week before the workshop began which they had no enough time to review, and that the affected 
communities were not invited. 
4.7.3 Challenges facing communities and Se San Protection Network 
Even though there were acknowledgements from Cambodian and Vietnamese governments on 
the impacts of Yali-Falls dam on the Se San River, there has yet to be any mitigation or 
compensation for affected communities in downstream Cambodia, and Vietnam continues to 
build more dams on the river. On the other hand, access to information on these dams and the 
river’s hydrology remains restricted (Trandem, 2008). In preceding section, two significant 
successes which had been outlined as results from community network’s effort seem to be 
problematic. 
Firstly, while the construction of Se San 4A re-regulatory reservoir is used as a mean to regulate 
flow regime in downstream, there is no guarantee that water quality will be improved, and that 
Vietnam will increase its power to control water flows. Moreover, it is likely that Vietnam would 
turn this reservoir into hydropower dam. Even though Vietnam had confirmed Cambodia that this 
reservoir will only be used to stabilize water flow downstream, a source from Vietnam news 
indicates that Se San 4A will become another hydropower dam with the capacity of 60MW, 
which is scheduled to complete at the end of 2010 (Than Nien News, 2008). 
Secondly, even though environmental impact assessment study on the part of Se San River in 
Cambodia due to hydropower development in Vietnam had been conducted and shows that Yali 
operations have significantly disrupted the Se San River’s flow in downstream Cambodia, there 
were concerns on how Vietnam will translate compensation and mitigation measures outlined in 
the report into real actions such as setting up aquaculture program, developing alternatives in 
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livestock and crop program, introducing electricity supply, establishment of drinking water and 
sanitation systems, improving health care system, and measures against erosion. 
4.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed and analyzed social arenas in which struggles over resources and 
meaning are fought out at local level. The analysis focused on a series of situations in which 
contests over the issues of hydropower dam impacts take place and how interventions and 
outcomes take shape at local level. 
The chapter began with the discussion of hydropower dam impacts from different actors’ 
viewpoints in order to discover discrepancies of social interests and cultural interpretation 
(Section 4.2). The views of various important actors involved in dam issues were examined 
including the views of affected river bank communities and the NGOs, the Cambodian 
government officials, and the Vietnamese government officials. The analysis shows that the 
affected communities and NGOs on one side, and the Vietnamese government officials on the 
other continued to have different perceptions, while the views of the Cambodian government 
officials stood somewhere in between. While the views of affected communities and NGOs put a 
strong message that the Yali-Falls dam has a great impact on the affected communities’ 
livelihoods, the views of Vietnamese government officials tend to steer the issues away from the 
communities and NGOs’ claim by citing inappropriate study findings.  
As far as the arena of struggle at local level focus of this chapter is concerned, the discussion also 
focused on local coping capacity, knowledge and problems encountered (section 4.3). The 
analysis examined to what extent the affected community can cope with the changing condition 
of the river system, what knowledge they have processed in order to cope with the changing 
condition, and what problems they have encountered. Scott argues that the ethically 
understandable assumption is that people in ‘crisis’, ‘disaster’ or extreme ‘hazard’ situations need 
external assistance, and there are often very clear views as to what form this assistance should 
take (Scott 1998, cited in Ellen, 2007: 19). The analysis of the cases in section 4.3 shows that 
external assistance to restore and improve livelihoods of affected communities was limited as 
there were lack of funds and lack of government personnel by which intervention should follow. 
This has left the responsibility to affected communities to find ways to cope with prolonged dam-
related disaster. 
In section 4.3 therefore I have described how people respond to their perturbation. Ellen (2007: 
30) argues that “the same perturbation may elicit different responses from different social groups, 
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and different perturbations may elicit the same response from the same group. Whereas the 
cultural values and social relationships of some populations can be generalized as ‘risk-averse’, 
some exhibit strategies that are in some sense more risk-prone.” Similarly, affected communities 
along the Se San River have been adopting different coping strategies for their own survival 
according to their culture and the resources that they can mobilize. While many ethnic groups in 
Andong Meas district abandoned the Se San River banks to settle uphill due to fear of dam break 
and flooding, others had sought other alternatives to work outside their district for an extra 
income to buy food in order to supplement the losses of fish and water-based natural resources. 
Whereas relocation of home from river to hill may improve livelihoods, there are some threats 
and risks associated with this relocation. First, there is shortage of water in the dry season. As the 
new location is far away from the water source, the relocated communities especially women 
spend a lot of time to bring water for the family. Second, access to school and health center is 
difficult as their new location is isolated from these existing infrastructures. Ultimately, an 
increase in illiteracy rate and health threats is likely to occur. Since government’s poverty 
reduction strategy aims to improve literacy and to reduce risk and threat to women’s health, the 
problems faced by affected communities are also the problems faced by policy-makers. Here the 
implication for policy development is that basic needs including housing, food, water, education, 
and health care for all people shall be addressed. This means that housing, foods, water, 
education, health care and road systems should be in place for the affected communities. 
Since hydropower impact is considered as a man-made disaster, a group of local and international 
NGOs have been taking full efforts since 2000 to demand that compensation and restoration of 
the river system and local livelihoods shall be undertaken by the dam owner. Despite local 
communities mobilization to advocate for such demands there has been no compensation or any 
assistance from the dam owner to rehabilitate the livelihoods of affected communities. This has 
left the effort to restore the living condition of affected communities to NGOs in Ratanakiri 
Province. For instance, as we have seen in section 4.6.7, there have been some interventions from 
NGOs in providing clean water through installation of pump wells in many villages due to un-
reliable water quality of Se San River. Other forms of assistance by NGOs such as income 
generation through vocational training as described above have not been so significant due to lack 
of human capacity and finance to support riverbank villagers with skills and knowledge to start 
small-scale farms or enterprises. One of the problems could be that many of the riverbank 
villages are isolated and cannot be easily approached in either the wet or dry season. 
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In response to hydropower dam impacts too, another effort by local and international NGOs is to 
establish the Se San community network aiming to advocate a policy reform for better river basin 
management in addressing the consequences of transboundary hydropower development. Since 
late 2001 this community network has been established and strengthened through provision of 
capacity building provided by SPN Secretariat. Over the past seven years of this network’s 
operation, affected communities are all now well aware about hydropower development and its 
consequences through information dissemination of the network’s members. Presently there are 
more than 500 members representing affected communities who participate in SPN’s activities, 
calling on the Cambodia government to negotiate with Vietnam to compensate and restore their 
livelihoods. This shows that the affected communities are fully supporting the advocacy activity. 
In order to make it successful, the SPN Secretariat helps establish linkages from local to national 
and international levels. While the role of local community network is to disseminate information 
on dam consequences to affected communities, and document the impacts, SPN helps local 
community network with capacity to do research and documentation and facilitates to send 
reports to concerned agencies at national and international levels as a strategic approach to press 
Vietnam for compensation and restoration of livelihoods of affected communities. 
Through SPN’ activities such as supporting community-based research, meetings, and 
workshops, local communities are able to speak to policy makers at national and international 
levels about dam impacts on local livelihoods and to call for actions from all political levels. For 
this purpose, RCC – NGOs coalition network – has been established to mobilize local and 
international NGOs in Cambodia and abroad to press for policy reform of river basin 
management so that social justice for affected communities is respected. 
Through the community network’s efforts, Vietnam has been accepting that the Yali-Falls dam 
has been impacting local livelihoods in downstream Cambodia, which has yielded some action to 
address the communities’ complaints, such as the constructing of the Se San 4A re-regulatory 
reservoir near the Cambodian border to stabilize water flow, and conducting an environmental 
impact assessment on the Cambodian part of the Se San River to assess and mitigate the social 
impacts. 
These successes, however, seems to be associated with other challenges and constraints such as 
compensation and restoration of local communities’ livelihood which have not yet been made. 
While affected communities have been receiving strong support from NGOs in the field of 
advocacy, most affected communities continue to face problems with water quality and food 
shortage as there is limitation of such services provided by NGOs. As this problem continues to 
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occur, the tendency of advocacy activity is weakening participation of affected communities. 
Some affected communities perceive that the local community network has not produced any 
tangible outputs as there is no compensation from Vietnam and their livelihoods continue to be 
impacted by the deteriorating river system. Therefore, the challenge here is to promote the living 
condition and livelihoods of local communities while ensuring that the advocacy activity is 
strengthened to push forward policy reform. 
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CHAPTER 5 
NATIONAL ARENA: SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF INTERVENTION? 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I attempt to explain how national government agencies responded to dam impact 
and what strategies shape their interest and the outcomes of their responses. This chapter contains 
nine sections. Section 5.2 begins with the state’s structure focusing on actors and politics related 
to water resources management in Cambodia. It provides first hand information on important 
actors who are involved in dealing with water related development, their interest and level of 
influence in decision-making from the national down to the provincial and local levels. Section 
5.3 discusses the Cambodian government’s interest in water related resources development. 
Section 5.4 examines the governmental response to the February 2000 flood caused by water 
release from Yali-Falls dam. The aim is to explore how responses have been organized by various 
governmental agencies in relation to this catastrophic event and what mechanisms have been 
established to mitigate impacts. Section 5.5 provides deeper analysis of how mitigation measures 
have been implemented and to what extent they were successful. Section 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8 discuss 
issues related to water quality, impact assessment and compensation, respectively. These three 
sections explore processes of intervention, strategies and tactics of various actors in dealing with 
the above respective issue. Finally, section 5.9 provides the conclusion of the chapter. 
5.2 State’s structure: actors and politics related to water resources management 
Cambodia is a constitutional monarchy with the King as a head of the State. The King reigns as a 
symbol of unity but does not govern the nation. Governing power falls within three branches of 
the state’s structure including legislative, executive and judiciary (see figure 5.1). While the 
National Assembly and Supreme Court hold legislative and judiciary powers respectively, the 
Council of Ministers exercises a vast executive power and enjoys the status of Royal Government 
of Cambodia (ADB, 2000). In this analysis, the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) is 
identified to hold a great role in exercising water resources development and engaging in the 
management of the Se San River. In so doing, in this section I attempt to explain the structure of 
the government so that the concerned actors across the state and their political power will be 
revealed. The structure of the government consists of national and sub-national governments as 
described in the following two sub-sections. 
 
 
  
The King 
Executive Legislative Judiciary 
Council of Ministers 
Prime Minister 
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1- Interior 
2- Parliamentary Relations and Inspection 
3- Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation 
4- Industry, Mines and Energy 
5- Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
6- Environment 
7- Social Affairs, Labour, Vocational Training 
and Youth Rehabilitation 
8- Post, Telecommunication 
9- Tourism 
10- Land Management, Urbanization and Construction 
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11- National Defense 
12- Economy and Finance 
13- Information 
14- Health 
15- Planning 
16- Education, Youth and Sports 
17- Culture and Fine Arts 
18- Rural Development 
19- Cults and Religious Affairs 
20- Women’s and Veteran’s Affairs 
21- Public Works and Transport 
22- Justice 
23- Water Resources and Meteorology 
Military Court 
Source: ADB, 2000 
Figure 5.1: Governance Structure of the Public Sector in Cambodia, 1999 
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5.2.1 National government: line ministries and inter-ministerial committee 
At national level, the structure of the central government follows the hierarchy of Prime Minister, 
Deputy Prime Ministers, Senior Ministers and Ministers (see figure 5.1). While the Council of 
Ministers is led by the Prime Minister, the Office of the Council of Ministers – which is led by a 
Senior Minister – is established to assist the Prime Minister. This Office is the highest 
administrative unit that guides and controls the agenda of the government for purposes of 
political coordination and administrative monitoring (ADB, 2000; United Nations, 2004). For 
instance, all draft laws, decrees and sub-decrees prepared by line ministries must be submitted to 
the Office of the Council of Ministers for review before discussion at a plenary session of the 
Council of Ministers (ADB, 2000). Twenty four line ministries are under the Office of the 
Council of Ministers (ibid.). 
Line ministries are the state’s actors whose responsibilities are authorized according to their 
sectoral technical capacity. In the water sector, the Ministry of Water Resources and Meteorology 
(MOWRAM) is empowered to manage water resources in the entire country. As Article 5 of Law 
for Water Resources Management puts it “the MOWRAM is mandated to manage, lead and 
supervise the implementation of the present law (RGC, 2007).” In addition, Article 10 of this law 
also stipulates that “the MOWRAM is mandated to manage the river basin, sub-basins, watershed 
run-off, groundwater and aquifers…” (ibid.). Since water is a crosscutting issue which falls within 
other sectors, several other ministries also tend to share some responsibility in the water sector. They 
include Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy (MIME); Ministry of Rural Development 
(MRD); Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MPWT); Ministry of Environment (MoE); 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF); Ministry of Health (MoH); and Ministry 
of Economics and Finance (MEF) (Hirsch et al., 2006; ADB, 2007; Öjendal, 2000). 
Unlike the MOWRAM which is responsible for overall water resources planning and 
management, the responsibility of the other ministries falls within their individual sectoral 
jurisdiction. For example, while the MPWT is responsible for improvement of waterways and 
ensures safe navigation via dredging and navigation aids; the MIME is taking care of industrial 
water uses and hydropower development (see table 5.1). Some water resources responsibility is 
split between ministries. For instance, responsibility for the provision of drinking water is split 
between MIME, responsible for urban and provincial area as well as the regulation of the private 
sector involved in pipe water systems, and the MRD, responsible for the provision of drinking 
water in rural area (ADB, 2007), particularly the installation of well for groundwater use (Pang 
and Khoun, 2000). 
Hirsch et al., (2006) argue that the governance arrangements between these ministries do not 
appear to be well coordinated. Öjendal (2000: 200-201) points out the issue to be a result from 
poor communication and unwillingness to share information between the ministries. One of the 
arguments is that a water-related development project is perceived as a pool for money earning 
within a jurisdiction of an individual sectoral agency. For example an official told that “recently, 
hydropower development becomes a good investment in energy sector in Cambodia and it is 
good for MIME because it is the only technical agency where many foreign private investors 
have flocked in for requesting, bidding and contracting for this infrastructure’s study as well as 
construction (Interview 1.3.3).” 
Beside the many sectoral ministries described above, an inter-ministerial committee namely the 
Cambodia National Mekong Committee (CNMC) exists to coordinate all water related activities 
in Cambodia and to discharge Cambodia’s obligation arising from the 1995 Mekong Agreement, 
which signed with other three riparian countries, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam (see chapter 3). 
The establishment of CNMC dates back to the time of the creation of the Mekong Committee in 
1957. However, CNMC was dissolved during the Khmer Rouge Regime in 1976. Although 
CNMC resumed its tasks in October 1980, CNMC was not part of the MC until April 1995. 
During that period, CNMC was affiliated within the MAFF with only one permanent official in-
charge (Interview 1.1.2). CNMC was operated without its own secretariat until its first 
organizational restructuring to account more staff and responsibilities at the end of 1989. 
After signing the 1995 Mekong Agreement, CNMC began its second organizational reform in 
February 1999. From this history, we can draw the conclusion that CNMC was under-staffed and 
operated without clear responsibility throughout the period. After the second major restructuring, 
CNMC carries an important advisory and coordination task in relation to the regional Mekong 
cooperation. Under the 1999 Government Sub-decree (RGC, 1999), CNMC became a new 
national inter-ministerial agency comprising ten line-ministries including: MPWT; MOWRAM; 
MoE; MAFF; Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (MoFAIC); MIME; 
Ministry of Planning (MoP); Ministry of Land Management, Urban and Construction 
(MoLMUC); MRD; and Ministry of Tourism (MoT). 
Like the sectoral ministries, the CNMC is directly operated under the Office of the Council of 
Ministers. As Article 2 of the 1999 Government Sub-decree on Organizational Structure and 
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Functioning of the CNMC puts it, “the CNMC is a national institution accountable directly to the 
RGC (ibid.)”. Article 2 stipulates the mission of CNMC as follows (ibid.). 
“to assist and advise the latter [the RGC] in all matter relating to the formulation of water 
policy and strategy, management, preservation, investigation, planning, restoration and 
development of the water and related natural resources of the Mekong River Basin in the 
country, to contribute to the sustainable development of national economy and 
infrastructure for the benefit of the country and people.” 
To achieve this mission the CNMC is entrusted with the following functions (ibid.). 
- To study and advise the government on all matters related to the planning, formulation of 
strategy for development, management and preservation of the Mekong River water and 
related resources; 
- To cooperate with and follow up other institutions concerned, including line agencies, 
provincial and municipal authorities in implementing all relevant decisions of the 
government relating to the Mekong River; and 
- To promote cooperation with other member States’ National Mekong Committees and 
donor community in the investigation, development, management and preservation of the 
Mekong water and related resources, in conformity with the principle of equitable and 
reasonable benefit for all member-states. 
Presently, the CNMC is headed by one chairman, and assisted by two vice-chairmen. Taking into 
account the increasing role of MOWRAM in water resources management, the Minister of 
MOWRAM became the chairman of CNMC in 2003 replacing Minister of MPWT who chaired 
since 1957 (Muukkonen, 2007). The two vice-chairmen are the Minister of MoE, and the ex-
Director General of the MAFF. The latter oversees day-to-day work of the CNMC Secretariat. 
The CNMC Secretariat is assisted by the Secretariat General whose main mandate is to render 
technical and administrative services to the CNMC and its Executive Commission (Pech, 1999). 
Under the sub-decree of 10 February 1999, the Secretariat General is entrusted with the following 
responsibilities (ibid: 18-19). 
- To coordinate with the MRC Secretariat and NMCs of the member-states in all matters 
and activities relating to the Mekong River Basin; 
- To provide advice and regularly report to the CNMC chairman; 
- To coordinate all activities and work of the CNMC; 
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- To propose Work Program to the MRC in conformity with the projected plan of the 
CNMC management, to seek for assistance; 
- To monitor, advise and evaluate the result of the implementation of the works undertaken 
by the entities within the CNMC Secretariat and those of the line-ministries; 
- To prepare progress reports on all activities and the status of the works within the scope of 
the CNMC’s mandates. 
Although the CNMC is the only cross-sectoral body capable of an overall water coordination and 
responsibility in the country, it is often described as a “weak body because it only plays a 
secondary role in water resources management as compared to the regular line ministries 
(Öjendal, 2000: 201).” According to a finding of an evaluation study, Pech (1999: 23) concluded 
the claims from respondents that, “certain officials make a complaint that the CNMC Secretariat 
most of the time reduces itself to the role of mail box and fulfilling only the logistic functions.” 
This source also claims that the CNMC is sometimes unaware of projects related to water 
resources development in the Mekong basin which have received funds from bilateral or 
multilateral donors, or private sector channels. In some cases, Cambodia fails to inform the MRC 
Secretariat and subsequently has difficulties in giving notice or consultation with the MRC 
member-states as required by Article 5 of the Agreement. For example, a senior official of the 
CNMC complained that “recently, we have not been informed about the pre-feasibility study of 
Sambo hydropower dam on the Mekong’s mainstream which has been granted to a Chinese firm 
by the MIME. We were confronted with the VNMC’s question about this study during a meeting. 
Fortunately, we were able to answer about this planned study which we just knew it through 
newspaper before coming to the meeting (Interview 1.1.2).” 
Table 5.1: State’s actors involved in water resources management in Cambodia 
No. State actor Responsibility  
1 Ministry of Water 
Resources and 
Meteorology (MOWRAM) 
- Overall water resources development planning and management 
- Research and investigations of water resources 
- Data and information gathering and management on surface 
water, groundwater, and meteorology 
- Irrigation planning, water use management, hydrological and 
meteorological and monitoring networks, ground water 
monitoring and mapping, water supply and multi-purpose 
projects 
- Administer international collaboration, including that within the 
Mekong River Basin 
2 Ministry of Industry, Mine 
and Energy (MIME) 
- Industrial water uses and hydropower planning 
- Provision of drinking water in urban and provincial areas 
3 Ministry of Rural - Provision of drinking water in rural areas (ground water) 
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Development (MRD) - Education of community in safe water supply practices 
4 Ministry of Public Works 
and Transport (MPWT) 
- improvement waterway planning, and ensures safe navigation via 
dredging and navigation aids 
5 Ministry of Environment 
(MoE) 
- Protection of natural resources and environmental quality 
- Disseminate water related information 
- Water quality monitoring and pollution control, including 
monitoring wastewater discharges and issuing permits 
6 Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries 
(MAFF) 
- Improvement of fisheries management practices by incorporating 
into planning of water management project 
- Forest and watershed management 
7 Ministry of Economics and 
Finance (MEF) 
- Compiling the government’s Socio Economic Development 
Program and Public Investment Program. To the extent that 
water related investments are proposed in a number of different 
components of the programs, MEF has the role of harmonizing 
proposals, and matching them for investment priorities. 
8 Ministry of Health (MoH) - Controlling the quality of surface and ground water used for 
public water supply, as well as for health education and other 
matters related to public health 
9 Cambodia National 
Mekong Committee 
(CNMC) 
- Advise the Cambodian representative to the MRC Council on all 
matters relating to activities within the Mekong River Basin that 
could affect Cambodia interests 
- Review proposals prepared by RGC agencies in the light of the 
Mekong Agreement 
- Provide coordination between MRC and concerned ministries 
Source: Adapted from An and Mao, 2002; and Pang and Khoun, 2000 
5.2.2 Sub-national government: province, district, commune and village 
Beside the national level of formal organization, the state administration also constitutes a sub-
national government which follows the hierarchy of province, district, commune, and village. The 
province represents an important administrative and political arm of central government. The 
provincial governor is appointed by the Prime Minister. By sub-decree, the Ministry of the 
Interior is in charge of administering provinces. Therefore, the provincial governor is accountable 
to the Minister of the Interior. With regard to the Se San issue which has an international 
implication, solution toward this issue cannot be done by the provincial authority alone but in 
consultation with or by the national government. 
Apart from provincial authority, line departments are present but are not directly under the 
control of the provincial governor but they are accountable to their respective ministry at national 
level. However, their decisions have to pass through the provincial governor before heading to 
their respective ministry. Since line departments are not directly under the provincial authority, 
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they are vertically influenced by their respective ministry. For example, in regard to the effects of 
hydropower dams on the Se San River a senior official told that, “in the past, NGO requested our 
department to comment on one of the Se San Reports, but we refused such request because we 
were not involved in the research. If the report is exaggerated we will be fired by our ministry 
(Interview 4.2.10).” It should be noticed that a line department is usually operated with limited 
human and financial resources, particularly in a remote northern region like Ratanakiri province. 
During my fieldwork, I heard about complaints regarding limited budget received from the 
central government which was not even sufficient to run daily operational costs of the office, not 
to mention sufficient budget for development or research. Sometimes there is a need to reallocate 
or shift some portions of development budget into operational budget in an adjustable manner, 
thereby resulting in reduction of development activities (ibid.). 
The district is the lowest administrative and political arm of the central government under the 
supervision of the provincial governor. At the district level some crucial district office are present 
such as office of agriculture, health center and schools. In the past, the district took a main 
responsibility to ensure security but since the country is at peace the district authority has shifted 
its role towards development in recent years. Shifting from security to development has created 
difficulties for the district authority in some ways. Firstly, the district has low capacity in term of 
formulating its own district development plan and executing project implementation. During the 
past ten years, the districts have been receiving support from central and provincial governments 
but little has been improved, such as data collection and reporting systems are not properly 
recorded or in place. This is even more severe for the four remote districts, where I have visited, 
with high illiteracy rate in the country. Secondly, the district has limited budget to run its 
development activities as the budget is small. 
Below the district level is the commune where the state government has devolved power to the 
commune to represent a lowest level of the state in the name of local government. This local 
government is elected by the local community every five years. The first election was held in 
2002 and the second election in 2007. The local government receives budget directly from the 
central government via the provincial government and it is under the supervision of the Ministry 
of the Interior. However, the local governments are more accountable to the local community as 
they are close to them. Though they are under the supervision of the Ministry of the Interior, they 
tend to have less political influence by their superiors than the provincial and district authorities. 
This is, perhaps, due to the distance of relationship of influence between the state and the local 
community, particularly in the poor remote areas along the Se San River. For instance, during my 
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fieldwork, I observed that most of local governments are anti-hydropower dam building and they 
take full effort against dam building. This is due to the fact that they are living along the Se San 
River and therefore they are also directly affected by the dam which causes harm to their 
livelihoods. 
Down to the lowest level of the local government system is the village. The village is led by a 
village council headed by a village chief. The duty of the village chief is to assist the commune 
council on matters relating to security, public order, and social and economic development in the 
village. Since the village chief is appointed by the commune council, the village chief is 
accountable to the commune council. 
5.3 Cambodia interest in water resources development 
Cambodia is a country rich in water resources and natural fisheries. One of the most significant 
sources of this resource is the Mekong as almost 86 percent of Cambodia’s territory lies within 
this basin. This proportion is correspondent to an area of the Mekong basin located in Cambodia 
which represents 155,000 km2 as compare to 181,035 km2 of total land area of Cambodia (MRC, 
2003). According to MRC (2005), the Mekong basin provides about 85 percent of Cambodia’s 
labor force in agriculture and fisheries, contributing about half of the country’s GDP. 
Regarding the agriculture sector, there is no doubt that Cambodia is interested in increasing 
agricultural production for its own food security and export since Cambodia is an agricultural 
country and remains one of the poorest countries in the world. Till now, the practice of 
agricultural cultivation depends on seasonal rainfall which is irregular and prone to drought and 
floods in many parts of Cambodia. In most part of Cambodia, only one rice crop a year is 
normally cultivated – compared to two, or even three, in many parts of Southeast Asia. The rice 
yield per hectare is frustratingly low in Cambodia, approximately 1.97 ton in 2005 (RGC, 2006). 
The National Strategic Development Plan 2006-2010 envisaged the need to enhance restoration 
and expansion of the irrigation system and network as well as improving the cropping method 
and increasing the number of crops per year. However, Se San seems to be the least priority area 
since one may hardly find the existence of an irrigation scheme. One of the reasons, perhaps, is 
the fact that Se San region is hilly and not densely populated as compared to other lowland 
regions in the country. 
The fishery sector is an essential contributor to the Cambodia economy, both as direct subsistence 
and as an important source of income. The MRC report shows that the annual Cambodia’s inland 
fish catch is estimated at 400,000 tones and worth over US$300 million (MRC, 2003). Although 
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a large proportion of this catch is said to come from the Tonle Sap Lake (Great Lake) which is 
the largest body of freshwater in Southeast Asia (ibid.), the other Mekong’s tributaries also 
influence this catch through the fish migration system. Indeed, the MRC (2002a: 32-34) has 
identified that the rise in water levels at the beginning of the flood season triggers many 
migrating fishes to move from dry season habitats in the northern tributaries (such as Se San) 
towards the floodplain habitats in the Tonle Sap Lake. And vice versa, many species extend their 
migration routes into the Se San tributary system for deep pool habitats in the dry season (ibid.). 
Such movement provides reproduction and distribution of fish, which is the primary source for 
protein intake of most rural livelihoods. Prahok, a fermented fish usually harvested during peak 
fish season, provides a culturally important diet for most of the Cambodian population.  It is also 
a very essential source for remote population in the Se San region as it is cheap and can be stored 
a long period. However, ecological degradation, newly arrived fish diseases, unsustainable 
fishing methods, negative impact from fertilizer and pesticide use, siltation of the Tonle Sap, over 
fishing and eradication of wetland have resulted in reduction of fish catches (Öjendal, 2000). As 
fisheries play an important role in Cambodian economy, Cambodia is largely interested in 
protecting natural fish as well as  promoting aquaculture in the country. However, there is 
currently a critical debate arising from civil society regarding planned hydropower cascade 
construction in the Mekong’s mainstream and tributaries by the government. The civil society 
perceives that construction of medium and large-scale hydropower infrastructures will cause 
major destruction to river ecology and fisheries as they manipulate natural flow and interrupt fish 
migration between the Mekong and the Tonle Sap Lake. 
In regard to hydropower development MIME (2006) indicated that Cambodia has potential to 
generate hydroelectricity approximately 10,000 MW, 55 percent of which is to be found in the 
Mekong River Basin, both on the Mekong mainstream and its tributaries. However, up until 2006 
less than 15 MW has been taped from the Mekong’s tributaries (ibid.). The development strategy 
of the Cambodian government is articulated in the “Rectangular Strategy for Growth, 
Employment, Equity and Efficiency,” which covers the period 2003 to 2008. Emphasizing the 
need for low-cost electricity to sustain Cambodia’s economic growth, the development of energy 
sector and electricity network constitutes once side of the strategy stressing on “Growth”. 
According to the strategy, the Cambodian government will promote private sector participation in 
electricity production and distribution, and support power transmission grids that facilitate 
electricity imports from its neighboring countries (International Rivers and RCC, 2008). 
 136
Electricity demand in Cambodia is forecast to increase more than fivefold from 284MW in 2005 
to 1,539MW in 2020 (MIME, 2006). To meet the demand, MIME has prioritized nine large 
hydropower projects with the total capacity from 1,983MW to 4,133MW for development 
between 2010 and 2020 (Ryder, 2009) (see table 5.2). According to table 5.2, the largest 
proposed generation project is the Sambor hydropower dam on the Mekong mainstream near 
Kratie province. China Southern Power Grid Company is conducting a feasibility study for 
Sambor, which could have an installed capacity of 450MW or 2,600MW depending upon its final 
configuration (ibid.). The second largest proposed hydropower project is the lower Se San 2 
project with an installed capacity of 420MW. The project is located about one kilometer upstream 
from the confluence of Se San and Sre Pok Rivers. 
Table 5.2 Hydropower Development Plan 2010-2020 Generation Projects in Cambodia 
No. Project name Installed generating capacity Year operation 
1 Kirirom 3 18 2010 
2 Kamchay 193 2010 
3 Atay 120 2012 
4 Lower Stung Russey Chhrum 338 2013 
5 Tatay 246 2015 
6 Lower Se San 2 420 2016 
7 Lower Se San 1 90 2015 
8 Stung Chhay Areng 108 2017 
9 Sambor 450/2600 2019 
Total 1983/4133  
Source: Adapted from Ryder, 2009 
5.4 Governmental response to February 2000 flood event caused by water release from 
Yali-Falls dam 
5.4.1 Immediate response of national agencies 
Two important events took place in response to flood event caused by water release from the 
Yali-Falls dam at the end of February 2000. First is the fact-finding mission by officials of 
MOWRAM, conducted a few days after the flood took place. Second is the reaction of the 
CNMC in notifying its VNMC counterpart through the MRC Secretariat on the effects of water 
release and to seek solution in accordance with the 1995 Mekong Agreement. 
After receiving a report from Ratanakiri Department of Water Resources and Meteorology, 
officials of MOWRAM immediately fielded a fact-finding mission to the affected area. The 
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mission studied the effects of flood in three downstream districts in Ratanakiri province from 5 to 
8 March 2000. The report of the mission, which was addressed to the Minister of MOWRAM, 
provides brief preliminary information on the flood situation serving as a basis for informing and 
recommending decision-maker to take further actions. The mission made several conclusions as 
follows (MOWRAM, 2000): 
i. In the last five years there has been remarkable change in the Se San flow regime for 
example increase in number of flash floods in the wet season and abnormal fluctuation 
of the water level in the dry season; 
ii. The impact could be caused by construction of the Yali hydropower dam in Vietnam; 
iii. There is severe impact on the Se San fisheries due to low level of water; 
iv. There are three affected districts along the Se San River; Veun Sai district is the most 
affected. 
With the above findings, the mission suggested three recommendations as follows: 
i. Study on flow regime at Veun Sai district and at the Cambodia/Vietnam border; 
ii. Enter into discussion with the Vietnamese authorities to find out solutions; 
iii. Through the CNMC, it is necessary to bring this matter to the MRC Secretariat. 
According to the last point of recommendation, the mission took note the important role of the 
CNMC whose responsibility is to coordinate water use across sectoral ministries to abide the 
1995 Mekong Agreement and who has the mandate to undertake a communication role beyond 
national jurisdiction to inform, question or clarify the other member states when the effects of 
water resources use by those states harms its people. This is to comply with what Pech (1999:16) 
wrote in his assessment that “in an international arena, the CNMC has to look after and defend 
the legal rights and legitimate interest of Cambodia that may be affected by development 
activities in the Mekong Basin outside Cambodia.” 
In this regard, the CNMC undertook its role to inform and request the MRC Secretariat to clarify 
the issue with the VNMC regarding water release from the Yali-Falls dam. As a senior official at 
the CNMC puts it, “after we had received information about flood event in early 2000, the 
CNMC immediately notified and questioned the VNMC through the MRC Secretariat on the 
effects of water release from the Yali-Falls dam (Interview 1.1.5).” According to the MRC 
(2000a), the CNMC notified the MRC Secretariat on 6 March 2000 that “… according to the 
officials of the Ratanakiri Province of Cambodia, flows released from the Yali reservoir in the 
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Central Highlands of Vietnam has caused flooding and damages to some lowland areas along the 
Se San River in that province.” Being an administrative and technical arm of the MRC, the MRC 
Secretariat immediately conveyed the message to the VNMC requesting related information for 
clarification with the CNMC and proposing field visit for discussion on the matter (ibid.). Since 
the VNMC performs only a coordinating task between line ministries in Vietnam, the question 
was therefore forwarded to the responsible ministry. On 15 March 2000, the VNMC conveyed 
the message from the Ministry of Industry that: 
“…from 28-29 February 2000, because of technical problems, some components of the 
dam had to be improved before official date of operation. Therefore, a discharge of about 
500-600m3/s released downstream caused inundation of some lowland areas along the 
river (VNMC, 2000).” 
As a way forward, the VNMC suggested and informed the MRC Secretariat that: 
 “We were informed that the Secretariat have sent a mission to the Ratanakiri province for 
assessment of the actual damages. We would highly appreciate the Secretariat efforts to 
provide us with related information such as the time when inundation occurred in 
Cambodia, water level, population and cultivation situation in the past year and at present 
and etc. 
VNMC has committed to cooperate with other NMCs for the sustainable development of 
the Mekong River Basin. We are very willing to welcome the mission from the Secretariat 
and CNMC to discuss about the issue (ibid.).” 
Action taken by the CNMC through the MRC Secretariat yields other outcomes. With the 
CNMC’s request, the MRC Secretariat sent a team of three personnel for a fact finding mission to 
the affected area in Ratanakiri province from 16 to 19 March 2000. The team visited three 
downstream districts (Andong Meas, Taveng and Veun Sai) which were considered to be heavily 
affected. The team met and interviewed a number of key persons including provincial deputy 
governor, director of provincial department of water resources and meteorology, district chiefs, 
and a nurse at the Catholic Office for Emergency Relief and Refugees (MRC, 2000b). 
The fact finding mission made several conclusions but the concrete one stresses that “there were 
some negative effects, including some incidents of death by drowning, losses of fishing 
equipment and reduction in fish catches and in crop production due to abrupt water released from 
the Yali reservoir (ibid.).” Although fact finding mission concludes that there were negative 
effects from water release from Yali dam, it failed to assess the magnitude of the impacts and the 
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damages caused by water release from the dam. In turn, it recommended the provincial and 
district authorities, who were constrained with finance and capacity, to compile information on 
the damage for reference. As a way forward, the team also made other four crucial points of 
recommendation as follows (ibid.). 
- A visit to the Yali hydropower project should be arranged soonest for discussion on 
appropriate mechanism related to the reservoir operation and warning system, as well as 
provision of adequate information in a timely manner. Participants should include 
provincial and district officials, CNMC, VNMC, MRC Secretariat as well as other direct 
parties concerned, such as hydropower authorities; 
- MRC Secretariat should specify procedures for information exchange for projects with 
potentially adverse effects during project construction and operation periods; 
- The envisaged equipment to measure water level and discharge at Andong Meas and Veun 
Sai hydrologic stations should be put in place by MRC Secretariat for monitoring purpose; 
- The National Mekong Committees of both Cambodia and Vietnam, as well as the Joint 
Committee, should be informed about the fact finding and related recommendations on 
further actions. 
The report of the MRC fact-finding mission was ready in time before the 11th MRC Joint 
Committee meeting which took place in Ho Chi Minh city from 28 to 29 March 2000. It serves as 
the basis for discussion and negotiation between the two parties to find further actions for 
solution. For such purpose, an informal meeting between the MRC Joint Committee Members of 
Cambodia and Vietnam was held right after adjourning the first day of the 11th MRC Joint 
Committee Meeting. Participants from Cambodia side include the CNMC’s Vice-chairman, 
Director General and Department Director. Participants from Vietnam side are the VNMC’s 
Vice-chairman and Secretary General. The MRC Secretariat’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
and his assistant facilitated the meeting. While the VNMC’s Vice-chairman expressed his regret 
over the damages and losses caused by the released water, the CNMC’s Vice-chairman 
emphasized the importance of in-time information (MRC, 2000d). As he suggested, “the 
authorities in Cambodia needs at least some days in advance to inform local people who live in 
very scattered settlements without telecommunication facilities (ibid.).” As a way forward, both 
parties agreed that a visit to the Yali hydropower project shall be arranged soonest to discuss the 
issue with the participation of the MRC Secretariat, the CNMC, the provincial authorities, the 
VNMC, the hydropower authorities, and other concerned agencies in Cambodia and Vietnam. 
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Beside a number of actions taken by national agencies through the framework of the MRC, 
responses taken by border provincial authorities, which will be discussed in the following section, 
were also important. 
5.4.2 Responses of border provincial authorities 
Ratanakiri is a border province in which provincial authority enjoys the right to hold a direct 
communication with its counterparts, Gia Lai and Kontum provinces in Vietnam to settle cross-
border issues (Interview 1.1.1). The issue of February 2000 flood caused by water release from 
the Yali-Falls dam in Vietnam was not exceptional. According to Raksmey Kampuchea 
Newspaper issued on 25 March 2000, the Minister of Public Works and Transport, whose 
position was also the CNMC chairman until 2003, told the news that “we have advised Ratanakiri 
provincial authority to directly discuss the issues with the Vietnamese provincial authorities to 
find immediate solution (Raksmey Kampuchea Newspaper, 2000).” Consequently, the meeting 
between the provincial authorities from Ratanakiri, Gia Lai and Kon Tum provinces took place in 
early April 2000 (MRC, 2000c). The Management Board of the Yali Hydropower Project 
(MBHIP) was also present in the meeting (ibid.). In the meeting between the two parties, 
Ratanakiri provincial authority urged the Vietnamese authorities and the MBHIP not to repeat the 
discharge of water without warning (Phnom Penh Post, 2000a). In response, the Vietnamese 
provincial authorities apologized for the incident and assured no more water will be released 
without adequate warning to Cambodian residents along the Se San River (ibid.). As an 
immediate solution to the issue, the two parties agree that “initial arrangements for gradual water 
release and information exchange shall be made between the provincial authorities concerned 
(MRC, 2000c).” 
During the meeting, the provincial authority of Ratanakiri province did not ask for compensation 
of losses and damages caused by water release from the Yali-Falls dam. In an interview with 
Phnom Penh Post in April 2000 the provincial governor told that “the physical damage had not 
been too great and the Vietnamese authorities had just provided ten tones of rice seed to 
Ratanakiri province (Phnom Penh Post, 2000a).” 
The statement by the Ratanakiri province seems to show that cooperation among border 
provinces of Ratanakiri, Gia Lai and Kon Tum is favorable in term of personal, political and 
economic development ties. According to the report of fact-finding mission, the deputy governor 
of Ratanakiri province told the MRC Secretariat mission team that “the cooperation between 
Ratanakiri and Gia Lai – Kon Tum provinces are very good in all aspects. Ratanakiri authority 
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knew very well about the progress of the Yali hydropower project construction. The deputy 
governor and other provincials of Ratanakiri have frequently visited the project during its 
construction in the past few years (MRC, 2000b).” As part of development cooperation, Gia Lai 
province of Vietnam has also financed Ratanakiri province to build a provincial dormitory, a 
market and three schools near the border amounting to more than three million U.S. dollars 
during the past years (Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005). One of the schools was 
constructed in Phi Village of Oyadao district along the Se San River.  This financial assistance 
shows that the Vietnamese provincial authorities have a dominant power over its Cambodian 
counterpart in the discussion of the Yali-Falls dam issue. 
5.4.3 Establishing mechanism for negotiating mitigation measure 
In pursuance of the decision at the informal meeting between the MRC Joint Committee 
Members of Cambodia and Vietnam in March 2000, a visit to the Yali project site by Cambodia 
officials for discussion and negotiation took place from 20 to 22 April 2000. Two important 
members from Ratanakiri province were engaged including provincial governor and provincial 
department of water resources and meteorology. At the national level, key persons from 
concerned agencies and ministries were involved including the CNMC, MOWRAM, MIME, and 
MoE. 
The host country consists of key personnel and experts from the VNMC, EVN and MBHIP. A 
team of three senior personnel from the MRC Secretariat who were involved in the earlier MRC 
fact-finding mission were tasked to facilitate the meeting between the two negotiating parties. 
While the MRC Secretariat financed related expenses for Cambodia delegates such as travel and 
accommodation, EVN was responsible for the costs related to the meeting, field visit, and the 
Vietnamese representatives. 
The negotiation between the two parties was mainly centered on finding an appropriate 
mechanism for information exchange to minimize adverse downstream effects in relation to 
reservoir operation. At the final decision the two parties agreed on five measures on information 
sharing and management of reservoir operation. The five measures read as follows (MRC, 
2000c): 
1. Information on reservoir operation, in particular water release, under normal and extreme 
conditions, be exchanged sufficiently in advance through appropriate channels. Similarly, 
information on river situation in Cambodia be transmitted in the same manner; 
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2. Water release from the Yali reservoir be gradually varied, so that people along the Se San 
River can recognize changes in water level and take precautions accordingly; 
3. Under normal circumstances, about 15 days advance notice on changes should apply, 
through NMCs, relevant provincial authorities and the MRC Secretariat; 
4. Under emergencies and extreme flood situations, warning be immediately dispatched 
directly to relevant levels; and 
5. The environmental mitigation studies, if needed, will be discussed later, with the 
participation of the MRC. 
To have the five measures formalized, the meeting requested MRC Secretariat to arrange a 
follow-up action by submitting the preliminary agreement on the five measures for approval by 
higher authorities within the framework of the MRC. Subsequently, the five measures were 
approved by VNMC’s and CNMC’s chairmen in early June and July 2000, respectively. 
In order to implement, monitor and follow-up the progress made in regard to the five measures, a 
mechanism called the Cambodia-Vietnam Joint Committee for the Management of the Se San 
River was established for information exchange on the Yali reservoir operation between 
Cambodia and Vietnam. 
On the Cambodian side, Cambodian Committee for Management of the Se San Water Utilization 
was established on 11 August 2000. The Cambodian Committee was composed of six members 
including representatives from MOWRAM (including its provincial department in Ratanakiri), 
MIME, MoE, MAFF, and the CNMC Secretariat. While CNMC is the secretariat of the 
Cambodian Committee, MOWRAM and Ratanakiri Department of Water Resources 
Management and Meteorology are chairman and vice-chairman, respectively (SPN, 2002c). 
In Vietnam side, Vietnamese Advisory Committee for Operation of Hydropower Schemes of Se 
San River was established on 26 December 2000. The Vietnamese Committee consists of 
representatives from Ministry of Industry (MoI), MARD, EVN, VNMC, the People’s Committee 
of Gia Lai and Kon Tom Provinces. 
The two committees agreed that the meeting of Cambodia-Vietnam Joint Committee shall be held 
annually with a host rotation between the two countries (interview 1.1.3). While the expenditure 
for travelling and accommodation by the committee’s members is born by each side, the host 
country takes responsibility for logistic arrangements of the meeting and covers the costs thereof. 
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Subsequently, the two committees met annually in 2001, 2002 and 2003. The three meetings 
mainly focused on establishing and strengthening notification system of water release warning, 
conducting water quality analysis, and drafting Terms of Reference (TORs) on Hydrodynamic 
Modeling and on Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) of Se San River. The outcomes of the 
meetings are discussed in sections 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7. 
The meeting of Cambodia-Vietnam Joint Committee came to a halt when the Cambodian 
Committee for Management of the Se San Water Utilization was dissolved and transferred its 
responsibilities to Cambodian Standing Committee for Coordination of Dams and Canals along 
the Cambodian-Laos-Vietnam-Thailand Borders on 23 January 2004, due to the fact that the later 
did not have budget to organize the meeting. 
The fourth meeting however was held with financial support from Vietnam in 2008. The meeting 
discussed on the implementation of five measures agreed in April 2000, and the result of 
Hydrodynamic Modeling and EIA of Se San River. The lack of budget on the Cambodian side 
shows that the Se San issue has not been given a high priority by the central government. 
 Through meetings between Cambodia and Vietnam Committees, a number of outcomes will be 
discussed in the following sections. 
5.5 Mitigation measures 
5.5.1 Failure of notification system 
As seen in the previous section, the urgent measure is to have a notification system in place to 
mitigate losses from water fluctuations by informing villagers when releases will occur. 
According to a senior official of CNMC, two mechanisms of water released notification have 
been established (Interview 1.1.1). Firstly, the notification mechanism is done between provinces, 
meaning that flow release information is directly transmitted from the Yali-Falls hydropower 
plant to Ratanakiri provincial governor office and then to the provincial department of water 
resources and meteorology. The later interprets the technical information on flow release in local 
terms, for instance the duration of high water level fluctuation, and dispatches it to district for 
further distribution to commune and to villagers living along the Se San River for advanced 
warning. The second form of notification scheme is done at country to country level within the 
MRC framework, meaning that information on water release is sent from Vietnam to Cambodia 
through the MRC Secretariat. That is, the information flow follows a long procedural line from 
the Yali hydropower plant to the VNMC, to the MRC Secretariat, to the CNMC, to the provincial 
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governor office, and to provincial department of water resources and meteorology who then 
follows the same procedure of information distribution to local level as specified above. 
The delivery of notification is done through the existing facility from the dam site to local 
community. While fax is a means for information delivery from the dam site up to the Ratanakiri 
provincial governor office, telegraph is used to convey the message further to district via district 
police military office who owns the facility. From district to commune and village level, letter 
and the words of mouth are the means to reach villagers living along the Se San River. 
During my field work, I was informed that communication facility in Ratanakiri province is very 
bad. At a time when a fax machine at the provincial governor office did not function or broke 
down, the message has been transmitted through the provincial treasury department or Cambodia 
national bank in the province, which further delayed the process of delivery. The same is true at 
the district level where most of district police military offices own very old and poor telegraph 
machines. When the telegraph machine breaks down, a letter is sent from provincial level to local 
level through whichever district authorities are visiting the provincial office for a meeting 
(Interview 4.3.5). As such, the procedure of this communication adds more delay to the already 
late delivery in the province. 
The issue of poor communication system on Cambodia side was immediately reported during the 
first meeting of Cambodia-Vietnam Joint Committee which took place in Nha Trang, Vietnam on 
26 July 2001. To strengthen the communication facility, the two committees requested the MRC 
Secretariat to extend assistance in providing necessary communication facilities and equipments 
to the Cambodia side (Cambodia-Vietnam Joint Committee, 2001). However, such request has 
not been realized since the MRC Secretariat has no such budget to cover. Eventually, the 
communication still remains an issue to be addressed again and again in the second, third, and 
fourth meetings between the two committees on 9 April 2002, from 4-7 November 2003, and 
from 4-5 March 2008, respectively. 
Some examples of failure of notification system were discussed extensively by a team of Harvard 
Law School who were invited by NGO Forum on Cambodia in Phnom Penh to conduct a study, 
in 2005, entitled “Down River: The Consequences of Vietnam’s Se San River Dams on Life in 
Cambodia and their Meaning in International Law.” The study found that the level of notice 
received by villagers is getting through on an erratic basis and late and does not spatially 
distribute to all villagers (NGO Forum, 2005). According to this study, many villagers informed 
the team that they have received some notifications but not all. They pointed out that sometimes 
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the rise of water level had occurred without warning. Sometimes the information did not 
accurately predict when water surges would occur – sometimes occurring two days after the 
notified date – and in other instances warned them too late, causing not enough time for them to 
prepare for the surge (ibid. p. 54-55). While some villagers receive notification, others said that 
they have never receives warning from the government about surges. A village doctor in Patang 
village in Oyadao district told the team that “he had never been contacted about water releases 
(ibid: 55).” 
While there are poor communications at local level, notification seems to have been occasionally 
interrupted at the main source. The provincial department of water resources and meteorology 
informed that during the first half of 2007, there were no notifications on water release from 
Vietnam (Interview 4.2.4). The reason for such interruption was unknown (ibid.). Further, the 
notification from Vietnam was also interrupted during the first quarter of 2008. For instance, 
during the fourth Cambodia-Vietnam Joint Committee meeting which took place in Pleiku 
(Vietnam) from 4 to 5 March 2008, the Secretary General of CNMC informed its VNMC 
counterpart that “for some last months Cambodia side did not receive information on water 
release from the operation of Yali Hydropower Plant (Cambodia-Vietnam Joint Committee, 
2008).” Responding to the issue, the Vietnamese delegation said that “there may be a fax 
transaction matter between Yali Hydropower Company to the CNMC (ibid.). In this regard, the 
company provided to Cambodian delegation copies of faxes notifying water release since the last 
three months. As a word for suggestion, the Yali Hydropower Company suggested that “water 
release notification recipients should inform the Yali Hydropower Company of their updated fax 
addresses (ibid.).” 
The response from the Yali Hydropower Company regarding the interruption of notification 
sheds some lights on why there were no notifications during the first half of 2007. The prolonged 
interruption of water release notification in 2007 and 2008 shows poor communication and 
coordination between agencies across countries. With no notification for quite some time, the 
provincial department of water resources and meteorology should have questioned the Yali 
Hydropower Company via the CNMC, the MRC Secretariat and then the VNMC. The same for 
the Yali Hydropower Company, knowing that the water release notification has not reached its 
recipients due to undelivered fax message, the company should have sent the notification through 
the VNMC, the MRC Secretariat and then the CNMC. This also means that the second 
mechanism of notification system which follows the line from the Yali dam to the CNMC 
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through the MRC Secretariat was not properly implemented at least during the first quarter of 
2008. 
The above discussion shows that the implementation of water release notification which aims at 
mitigating adverse effects on local community was not fully and effectively implemented. With 
no proper communication facilities and equipment being available, the notification measure is 
hardly a success. For example, a vice-district chief of Taveng made a suggestion to the Yali 
Hydropower Company during an EIA workshop jointly organized by the VNMC and the CNMC 
in Phnom Penh in early July 2007 that “unless a telecom facility is installed from provincial down 
to village levels, the villagers are not able to receive notification and be prepared in time and 
therefore prevent them from being caught by unexpected surge (Author’s field note on 5 July 
2007).” 
5.5.2 Monitoring and mitigating water level fluctuation 
After the February 2000 flood event, installation of water level and rain recording stations was 
seen by the MOWRAM as an important water level monitoring system on the section of Se San 
River in Cambodia. On the request of the MOWRAM, the MRC Secretariat helped establish two 
water level monitoring stations – each in Andong Meas district and Veun Sai district – and one 
rainfall recording station in Andong Meas district in mid 2000. 
While an hourly automatic data logger was set up and started recording in Andong Meas district 
at the end of June 2000, water level manual reading board was installed in Veun Sai district and 
began recording at the end of April 2000. Since the record of water level in Veun Sai district is 
done manually, a staff from Veun Sai district office was trained and tasked to record water level 
two times a day, at 7am and 7pm. The monthly record is sent to Department of Hydrology and 
River Works of MOWRAM in Phnom Penh via Ratanakiri Department of Water Resources and 
Meteorology. The Department of River Works and Hydrology stores and processes the received 
data to analyze the relationship between the operational hydropower at upper Se San and the 
downstream. For example, when the Yali reservoir was being repaired and filled in 2001, the 
river was dry in the lowland parts in Cambodia (Interview 1.2.1; SWECO, 2007). Immediately, 
the MOWRAM lodged a complaint through the CNMC and MRC Secretariat by showing water 
level record and asked for improving water flow (Interview 1.2.1). Consequently, Vietnam gave 
an apology and said they were doing repairs at the dam and closed the gates from April to July 
2001 (SPN, 2002c). The hydrograph presented in figure 5.2 shows hourly water levels at Andong 
Meas Se San River from 2000 to 2002. 
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In chapter 4 we have already seen that water level fluctuation is one of the main issues. Half to 
one meter daily fall and rise of water level within a day is generally common (see section 4.2.2). 
The issue of water level fluctuation was raised by the Cambodian Committee during the third 
meeting of Cambodia-Vietnam Joint Committee in 2003. As a response, EVN constructed Se San 
4A re-regulation reservoir located one kilometer from the Cambodian border to stabilize water 
flow downstream in Cambodia. The CNMC appreciated the construction. The construction began 
in November 2004 (SWECO, 2007) and put into operation in the dry season of 2008 (Cambodia-
Vietnam Joint Committee, 2008). 
The minutes of the fourth Cambodia-Vietnam Joint Committee meeting in March 2008 stated that 
once the Se San 4A is put into operation the water flow of Se San River in the downstream 
Cambodia will be stable daily in the dry season. However, according to a recent press release by 
3SPN (2009), the water level remains erratic in the dry season. This source quoted reports from 
villagers at Kachon Krom village in Ratanakiri province which stated that “the Se San River 
began to rise at around 8am on Sunday, 8 February 2009. By 11am the river had risen by nearly 
one meter and peaked at a measured water level increase of 85cm.” This press release also stated 
that “the riverside villagers had no advance warning that an upstream water release would occur 
even though the Vietnamese authorities had notified their Cambodian counterparts on 22 January 
2009 that the Yali Falls dam would be releasing water downstream at the rate of 200 to 400 m3 
per second between 1 and 28 February 2009.” 
In this recent case, if the Se San 4A re-regulation reservoir were to put into operation since 2008, 
is it logical to only inform about flow release from the Yali Falls dam but not from the re-
regulation reservoir which serves as a mitigation mechanism of water level variation at the final 
end at the border? 
Although the EVN informed the Cambodian Committee during the fourth Cambodia-Vietnam 
Joint Committee meeting in early 2008 that the Se San 4A re-regulation reservoir is used to serve 
only for stabilizing water flow in downstream Cambodia, the functional status of this reservoir 
becomes unclear to Cambodians. A senior official asserted that “at the moment we are promised 
that Se San 4A is served to regulate and to stabilize water flow in downstream. However, we 
should know that such reservoir also has potential for electricity generation therefore the 
conversion can be made at any time (Interview 1.1.2).”  
Nonetheless, the CNMC believes that this dam is a first step towards solving the Se San issue as 
it will help make the water flow similar to the natural flow (3SPN, 2006c). 
 148
Figure 5.2 Hourly water levels at Andong Meas Se San River from 2000-2002 
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Source: Data set obtained from Department of Hydrology and River Works, MOWRAM 
5.6 The issue of water quality 
Se San River has been mentioned by local community and officials in Ratanakiri province to 
have been polluted by upstream hydropower dam development. During a speech at the National 
Se San River Protection Network Workshop organized by NGOs in Phnom Penh on 27 
November 2002, governor of Ratanakiri province complained of declining water quality of the Se 
San River as follows: 
“If you spend a few days in the Se San area you will understand the issues of rise and fall 
of river, sickness of animals from drinking the water. When we talk about it, we are told 
we have no basis to support our argument. Please go and look for yourselves. Show the 
public, MRC that people, animals affected by quality of water caused by upstream 
development. I have seen with my own eyes a lot of problems in my own province. 
Poison, toxicity in river, we need examine further. Need for more exact measurement and 
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select samples from the right places, especially still water. Some organizations did only 2 
day study, rushed back to Phnom Penh, could not get thorough results.” (SPN, 2002b) 
At the first Cambodia-Vietnam Joint Committee meeting held on 26 July 2001, Cambodia 
Committee immediately raised the issue of poor water quality and requested that water quality 
analysis shall be carried out in both countries through the support of the MRC Secretariat. 
Vietnam Committee agreed to the request. To that end, the meeting decided that “the two sides 
shall make proposal to the MRC Secretariat to extend assistance in … conducting water quality 
analyses for Se San River (Cambodia-Vietnam Joint Committee, 2001).” 
Following the request from the committee, the MRC Secretariat designed and funded a one-year 
water quality monitoring program for the Se San River to be conducted from May 2004 to May 
2005. Four sampling stations were chosen to collect water sample for analyses, one in Vietnam 
and three in Cambodia. In Vietnam, the selected site was at Pleiku district, located eight 
kilometers from Vietnam/Cambodia border. In Cambodia, a site close to the border located in Phi 
village of Oyadao district was selected. The other two sites were located further downstream at 
Andong Meas and Veun Sai districts. 
The work involved two teams of water quality experts, one from Vietnam side and another from 
Cambodia side. Vietnamese experts monitored at the Pleiku station and Cambodian experts 
monitored the three Cambodian stations. The work of the two teams was coordinated and 
supervised by a program officer at the MRC Secretariat. 
Water samples were taken from three sites across the river section – the left, the middle and the 
right side of the river and about 30cm under the surface. Left and right samples were taken 
approximately 20m from the bank to avoid still water and edge effects caused by land use nearby. 
The method of taking water samples contrasted with what the governor had stated earlier 
regarding sampling of still water. 
Water sampling was done once every two months in the rainy season and once every month in 
the dry season. The MRC (2006a) cited the limitation of this water sampling frequency that 
“because potential water quality impacts in the rainy season maybe less than in the dry season 
due to dilution by larger river flows, and also because access to the sampling sites is very difficult 
in the rainy season, the sampling frequency was every two months in the rainy season from May 
2004 to November 2004 and every month in the dry season from December 2004 to May 2005.” 
The report of this monitoring project, which was compiled and synthesized by the MRC 
Secretariat in April 2006, was presented to the provincial government officials and NGOs in 
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Ratanakiri province on 14 June 2006. Important participants to this meeting were also officials 
from the Vietnamese hydropower management board, VNMC, CNMC and concerned line 
ministries from Phnom Penh. 
The result of this monitoring project concluded that water quality of the Se San River is in good 
condition which can be used as a source of domestic water supply with appropriate treatment. 
This finding was disputed by NGOs who claimed that the report was useless as the parameters 
measured were far too general to measure the water quality and its impact on human health 
(3SPN, 2006d). According to the minutes of the meeting (MRC, 2006b), NGOs made several 
comments on the report. First, the monthly sampling was too long to monitor. This means that 
poor water quality can pass through the system between the sampling periods and the sampling 
result could not detect any short term changes to the water quality. In this regard, NGOs 
complained that water sampling should have been done weekly. The MRC Secretariat cited the 
limitation of sampling frequency due to remoteness of the areas where the samples were not 
easily taken. Second, parameters for water analysis did not take into account the health issues of 
local people which are attributed for water quality of the Se San River. The MRC Secretariat 
specified that some of the raised concerns related to skin rash and intestinal disease was not 
possible to address as the MRC Secretariat and cooperating laboratories does not have capacity to 
investigate microbiological or parasitological parameters. In the report, the MRC Secretariat 
recommended that “the CNMC should pursue this issue with the Cambodian Ministry of Health 
so that future complaints of water quality by villagers can be associated with specific clinical 
information as a basis for any next steps that might be taken to narrow the investigation to 
specific causal factors (MRC, 2006a).” Third, the monitoring project did not take samples in the 
reservoir to assess water quality. NGOs raised the issue that water release from reservoir contains 
toxic algae and this toxic algae has caused people sick and animal died. 
In 2007, Probe International (2007) released a statement on the water quality of the Yali reservoir 
that “according to an EIA prepared by the Norwegian Institute for Water Research and Nordic 
hydro consultants: the analyses confirmed that there are strains of toxin-producing blue-green 
algae present in [Yali] reservoir and that the algae produces ‘exactly the same symptoms’ 
reported by downstream Cambodians.” Testing done in the Yali reservoir and downstream at the 
end of 2005 rainy season found concentrations of algal toxins that were too low to pose an 
immediate health threat (ibid.). However, the report warns that algal blooms can spread within a 
few days and that higher concentrations are likely in the dry season. The report recommends 
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testing the Yali reservoir every 14 days in the dry season and warns that algal blooms could 
appear in new hydro reservoirs along the Se San River for five to ten years after filling (ibid.). 
The above discussion shows that water quality testing done by the MRC Secretariat is contrasting 
with the finding done by the Norwegian Institute for Water Research and Nordic hydro 
consultants. The study finding by the MRC Secretariat was disputed and rejected by the NGOs 
that supported affected communities. As a way forward, the Cambodian Committee requested the 
MRC Secretariat to further facilitate in monitoring water quality along the Se San River 
(Cambodia-Vietnam Joint Committee, 2008). 
5.7 Negotiating for an impact assessment 
During the visit of Cambodia delegates to the Yali-Falls dam in April 2000, a decision for impact 
assessment was reached that “the environmental mitigation studies, if needed, will be discussed 
later, with the participation of the MRC.” This decision was interpreted by EVN to mean that 
MRC is satisfied with the situation as it now stands and that further studies are not required 
(Nielsen, 2000). In response to this, the MRC Secretariat replied that “we have … informed both 
parties that the envisaged environmental mitigation strategy is critically important and should be 
commenced at the soonest, with support of ADB and MRC (Kristensen, 2000). A senior official 
of CNMC claimed that during the visit to the dam site he has urged Vietnam to extend EIA to 
downstream in Cambodia (Interview 1.1.1). 
Consequently, the issue of EIA was discussed during the first Cambodia-Vietnam Joint 
Committee meeting in Nha Trang (Vietnam) in 2001. Before the assessment could be carried out, 
a senior official of MOWRAM said that hydrodynamic modeling study should be initially 
undertaken for an input of EIA (Interview 1.2.3). To that end, EVN prepared term of references 
(TORs) of both studies for the purpose of discussion and agreement with its Cambodia 
counterpart before the implementation of the studies  
TORs were presented to Cambodia delegates during the first Cambodia-Vietnam Joint 
Committee meeting in 2001. At the meeting EVN reported that the TORs which were prepared 
by SWECO-Sweden and Statkraft Groner-Norway international consultants were tentative and 
not complete because the international consultants have not yet dispatched to Ratanakiri province 
for a preliminary survey. And therefore, EVN requested Cambodia committee to coordinate the 
followings (Cambodia-Vietnam Joint Committee, 2001): 
- to permit international consultants in collaboration with Cambodia authorities for 
conducting field investigations with an aim of completing the TORs; 
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- to provide the Vietnamese side with available data relevant to the project; 
- to give comments on TORs as soon as receiving the official letter from the Vietnamese 
side. 
The decision that EVN has chosen the above two international consultants for the studies was 
considered as lack of transparency. Upon receiving tentative TORs, the CNMC requested the 
MRC Secretariat to provide technical assistance in reviewing the TORs. The MRC Secretariat 
pointed out that SWECO and Statkraft Groner have been involved with EVN in previous studies 
related to hydropower developments on the Se San River; therefore, it is debatable whether both 
consultants would be viewed as independent by many commentators (MRC, 2001). Accordingly, 
the MRC Secretariat warned that: 
“Various sectors of the local and international communities have applied pressure to local 
and national governments over the impact of Yali Dam on downstream communities, and 
have criticized what they see as lack of action to mitigate the impacts. Governments are 
now responding, as evidence by the Nha Trang meeting and other arrangements between 
provincial governments. However, for these processes and studies to be accepted by all 
parties (local people, various levels of government, NGOs, local and international media), 
it is recommended that transparent procedures be followed at all stages. It is probable that 
acceptance of outputs from foreign teams working in Cambodia will be compromised if 
Cambodia nationals are not involved in the teams. Serious consideration should be given 
to the pros and cons of contracting companies with a history of involvement in the 
development of hydropower facilities on the Se San River, versus companies not 
associated with previous activities.” 
At the second Cambodia-Vietnam Joint Committee meeting held in Phnom Penh on 9 April 2002, 
the two committees continued to discuss the two TORs. The Cambodia Committee proposed the 
scope of EIA and hydrodynamic modeling studies, which were tentatively conducted from the 
border up to Veun Sai district in Ratanakiri province, to be extended to the whole Se San River, 
down to the junction with the Mekong River. In addition, fishery issues were also requested to 
include in the EIA study. The EVN agreed to the request. 
At this occasion, the MRC Secretariat’s representative informed the committee that the MRC 
Secretariat is ready to assist in carrying out EIA if requested. Referring to the comments made 
earlier by the MRC Secretariat regarding non-independent international consultants, EVN 
immediately declined this offer and responded that “the process to get a project funded by a 
 153
donor often takes a long time so that in order to implement the project in line with schedule 
approved in the Master Plan for Power Sector in Vietnam, the EVN fund for conducting study 
has been allocated (Cambodia-Vietnam Joint Committee, 2002).” Contrasting the view of the 
MRC Secretariat that independent international consultants would be required for the two studies, 
EVN informed the meeting that “SWECO and Statkraft Groner are the international consultants 
engaged in these studies and their activities are independently carried out which will be consulted 
with stakeholders concerned (ibid.).” 
The discussion on the TORs continued in the third Cambodia-Vietnam Joint Committee meeting 
in 2003. The Cambodia delegate suggested EVN to include a study of optimum floods to meet 
the aspirations of downstream farmers and fisheries in the hydrodynamic modeling and the EIA. 
On the request of Cambodia Committee, EVN agreed that hydrodynamic modeling study and 
EIA shall be conducted by independent international consultant firm recruited by both Vietnam 
and Cambodia sides. 
At the final decision, an agreement between Vietnam and Cambodia Committees was reached to 
have Danish Hydraulic Institute (DHI) international consultant conducting ‘hydrodynamic 
modeling’ study while SWECO carrying out the EIA. As stated above the later was considered 
not to be independent by the MRC Secretariat. Although such agreement has been reached 
between the two committees, a senior official from CNMC expressed his view during a meeting 
with NGOs in 2002 that “Vietnam has chosen a company to do the study – a Swedish company. 
But CNMC doubt about this. This company is not independent. Because they did study in 
Vietnam so may be biased to Vietnam interests (SPN, 2002c).” 
While hydrodynamic modeling of the Se San River was carried out in October 2004 and the final 
report was released in January 2006, the EIA study began in November 2005 and the first draft 
report was delivered in March 2006. Both of the study results were presented in a workshop, 
namely “stakeholder meeting on EIA report on Cambodian part of Se San River due to 
hydropower development in Vietnam”, jointly organized by VNMC and CNMC in Phnom Penh 
on 5 July 2007. As the title of the workshop is concerned, the meetings attempted to have the 
report being consulted with various levels of stakeholder participation from local to national. To 
that end, NGO sector declined to attend the meeting due to the fact that a copy of the EIA report 
and an invitation to the meeting was received only a week prior to meeting, the EIA document 
was only available in English language and was not translated into Khmer, and representatives of 
the Se San River were not invited to participate or attend the meeting (3SPN, 2007b). The 
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coalition of NGO sector namely Rivers Coalition in Cambodia (RCC) requested this stakeholder 
meeting to abide by the following conditions (RCC: 2007b): 
- a copy of the EIA report be made available in Khmer and English at least one month prior to the 
date of the meeting; 
- a Khmer version of the report summary be made available at least on month prior to the date of 
the meeting, in the event that a complete translation of the report is not ready; 
- professional translation in languages of the participants be provided during the meeting; 
- participation not be restricted and reflects all interests; 
- adequate time be allowed for stakeholders to assess the report and share information and views 
in the meeting; and 
- ensure that affected community members can fully participate in language and discussions they 
can understand and respond to. 
With the unsatisfactory result commented by officials and the absence of the NGOs and affected 
communities during the EIA workshop, at the fourth Cambodia-Vietnam Joint Committee 
meeting in 2008 the Cambodia delegation suggested an additional study to focus on social and 
economic impacts, especially in the dry season, the fluctuations of water level may, if more than 
30cm, impact on fisheries and biodiversity in downstream Cambodia (Cambodia-Vietnam Joint 
Committee, 2008). However, this request was not considered by EVN of Vietnam. In a response 
to Cambodia delegate, the PECC 1 of EVN explained that “in the scope of the cooperation of the 
two committees, PECC 1 has been assigned to work with SWECO international consulting 
company to carry out the EIA study of Se San River. The EIA had been completed and discussed 
in the workshop held last year in Phnom Penh (ibid.).” The statement by PECC 1 infers that 
further study is not necessary required. In this case I argue that EVN acts as a dominating power 
actor over the Cambodian negotiator. 
5.8 Compensation 
Compensation is a complex issue which requires commitment and intervention from decision-
makers at higher level. If there is no such political support compensation seems not to be realized. 
In this section I will show how compensation issue has been treated at national level. 
As we have seen above, the important actors involved directly in the issue are the provincial 
authority, the water resources agencies both at provincial and national levels, the CNMC, the 
Cambodian Committee, and the Cambodian Standing Committee. Outside of this box are the 
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indirect actors what Norman Long (2000) called ‘distant actors’ or what James Scott (1990) 
referred to as ‘hidden transcript’ who also play a dominant role over the visible ones in deciding 
whether there is a need for compensation. The February 2000 flood event caused by water release 
from the Yali-Falls dam is a case where a decision for compensation was influenced by these 
invisible actors. In this respect, compensation was decided by the Cambodia government not to 
be obtained from its Vietnamese counterpart. 
In an interview with a local English newspaper the governor of Ratanakiri province told that “the 
Cambodian government had not demanded compensation from the Vietnamese but it urged them 
not to repeat the discharge of water without warning (Phnom Penh Post, 2000a).” The statement 
by the governor was immediately transmitted and caught the attention of audients internationally, 
particularly the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the MRC Secretariat. In a letter to ADB, the 
CEO wrote that: 
“For your information, during the informal meeting between the Cambodia and Vietnam 
National Mekong Committees in Ho Chi Minh City in March in connection with the 11th 
MRC Joint Committee Meeting, as well as during the visits to Ratanakiri province and the 
Yali project, the question of compensation for past losses was not raised. Mechanisms for 
information exchange and avoidance of future incidents were the main issues discussed 
and agreed by the participants, as recorded in the MRC’s BTO [Back-To-Office] Report 
(20-21 April). Two of the participants in the Yali project visit, Secretary General of 
CNMC and Governor of Ratanakiri province, gave their interviews to the Phnom Penh 
Post (attached). These confirmed our understanding of the matter.” (Kristensen, 2000) 
The statement implies that the MRC Secretariat has no basis power to push forward for a 
compensation deal if there was no political support from the state government. According to the 
statement made by the governor above, the Cambodia government did not use the 1995 Mekong 
Agreement to claim for compensation. Article 8 (of this agreement) on State Responsibility for 
Damages stipulates that: 
“Where harmful effects cause substantial damage to one or more riparian from the use of 
and/or discharge to waters of the Mekong River by any riparian State, the party(ies) 
concerned shall determine all relative factors, the cause, extent of damage and 
responsibility for damages caused by that State in conformity with the principles of 
international law relating to state responsibility, and to address and resolve all issues, 
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differences and disputes in an amicable and timely manner by peaceful means …, and in 
conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.” 
Consequently, compensation has not been discussed between the Cambodia and Vietnam 
Committees during its joint committee’s meetings. Although compensation was not mentioned in 
any of the reports of the meetings, the issue seems to have been raised informally between the 
two committees. The Vice-chairman of CNMC told in an interview that “Vietnam did not reject 
compensation but Cambodia must provide scientific data on losses and damages caused by water 
release from the Yali-Falls dam (Interview 1.1.2).” Another view stressed that “compensation 
cannot be done unless there is assessment of losses and damages which is accepted by both 
parties (Interview 1.1.1). 
The issue of compensation was also related to the sentiment of the Cambodian negotiator with 
regard to the influence of the Vietnam committee in financing Cambodia delegates to come for 
the meeting. An official at the MOWRAM told a group of NGOs advocating Se San issue during 
a meeting that “people have suffered since 2000, therefore the Standing Committee has the 
mandate. We should continue to insist Vietnam to pay compensation, though I am not sure how 
compensation can be delivered. I can only speak on the technical basis. In the past three 
meetings, Vietnam covered the budget. When we are hosted by Vietnam, how can Cambodia 
speak out (3 S Working Group, 2005a).” 
Despite the lack of commitment from the Cambodia government, the MRC Secretariat urged that 
the compensation issue should be studied in the EIA. In a comment on TOR for EIA study the 
MRC Secretariat wrote that: 
“The Se San River is a resource shared by two countries. Currently, only Vietnam realizes 
the benefits of hydropower development, while Cambodia realizes only the impacts 
(social, economic and ecological). It is contrary to the spirit of the 1995 Mekong 
Agreement to have natural resources developed in one country at the expense of people in 
another country. Referring to the report of World Commission on Dams which 
highlighted that compensation to affected peoples is an integral and essential part of 
planning for dam development, the MRC Secretariat recommended that reassessment of 
or future planning for management of the Se San River water resources should include 
compensation for people already affected by the operation of the current dams.” (MRC, 
2001) 
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Consequently, the issue of compensation was discussed in the EIA report done by SWECO in 
2007. Considering that the most serious experienced changes to livelihoods of the riverside 
villagers are unexpected rapid changes in the water flows and reduced fish stocks, SWECO 
(2007: 168) recommended the following. 
“Compensation and mitigation measures should be focused on both the nutritional and 
economic consequences through developing aquaculture programs (fish ponds) and 
compensating for the lost protein source (fish breeding or meat production by animal 
breeding development). Agriculture programs should be developed to compensate for the 
reduced riverbank cultivation, and also include viable irrigation solutions. Cash 
compensation for any disturbed production conditions should never be considered to be an 
entire solution but be combined with livelihoods restoration and development programs in 
order to guarantee long term sustainability of livelihoods. However, if local people have 
lost any production tools like boats and fishing equipment due to unexpected water 
releases from the Yali dam, these should be compensated for their real value in cash or in 
kind. 
Given that it is impossible to estimate the actual losses of the affected people, it is 
recommended that EVN should consider negotiating with the Cambodian counterpart the 
electrification of the affected communities along the Se San River as a benefit sharing 
from the upstream hydropower development.” 
The above recommendations were considered by some of Cambodia officials as very general and 
did not have a clear work plan on how compensation shall be made. The director of department of 
river works and hydrology raised the issue during the stakeholder meeting of Se San EIA in July 
2007 that “the EIA is very general. It does not provide an assessment of impact in quantity term 
so we do not know the estimate value of losses that need to be compensated (Author’s field note 
on 5 July 2007).” The director of planning department of CNMC commented that “although I 
understand that this is a preliminary EIA report, I view that the content of the assessment is not 
clear and insufficient. In regard to strategy there shall be more detailed measures and a work plan 
to mitigate impact and restore local livelihood. As to restoration of local livelihood I am not clear 
how such program will work and who will take care in financing it. I suggest that detailing 
restoration program shall be made further (ibid.).” An official from EIA office of MoE suggested 
that “when the reservoir is operated and cause losses to property or related resources, Vietnam 
party who owns the dam shall compensate such losses. Therefore, I suggest that the report shall 
specify clearly on how such compensation shall be made (ibid.).” 
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The foregoing discussion shows that without political support from central government, 
compensation over losses claimed by affected communities is hardly achieved. Despite lack of 
political support from the central government, the negotiation for compensation dealt was 
handled and zigzagged by various Cambodian officials through the EIA study conducted by 
international consultant SWECO. As we have seen from the above presentation, participation of 
officials from various government departments in the EIA workshop provides a forum for them to 
support the communities’ claim through comments that urged EVN of Vietnam to prepare action 
plan for compensation. However, to date there is no any action plan with regard to compensation 
that has been prepared or put forward by EVN of Vietnam. 
5.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided insight into what exactly government intervention is about, and how 
intervention is structured in here-and-now situations across a multiplicity of spatial locations. 
This chapter has concentrated mainly on the intervention of the CNMC and MOWRAM officials 
concerning response to the February 2000 flood caused by the Yali-Falls dam and the post-
actions thereof. As we have seen from the above description and discussion, interventions by 
these national institutions cannot be analyzed without considering other processes of intervention 
at other spatial locations. For instance at the provincial level the provincial governor claimed that 
the central government did not ask for compensation from Vietnam. This statement, indeed, 
reflects a decision ordered from national level. The reason behind this decision to why 
compensation was not required is unknown. In this study, the influence of hidden transcripts 
(Scott, 1990) remains very strong. The Cambodia Standing Committee which is charged to 
discuss and negotiate with Vietnam Committee regarding Se San issues has constantly continued 
to have no budget to organize meetings with the Vietnam Committee since 2004. The fourth 
meeting in 2008, however, was fully financed by Vietnam. This shows that the Se San issue has 
not been given much attention or priority by the central government. 
Another form of intervention across spatial location is the interaction of CNMC with the MRC 
Secretariat as a link to negotiate a mitigation deal with its Vietnam counterpart. In this case, the 
MRC Secretariat served as an important intermediary between the two parties. The fact finding 
mission by the three MRC Secretariat’s staff to affected areas in Ratanakiri province to 
investigate the cause of the February 2000 flood gave a strong support to CNMC. As a result, the 
Cambodia-Vietnam Joint Committee for Management of Se San River was established and 
served as a forum for discussion and negotiation between the two parties. Through this forum, the 
Cambodia Committee was able to negotiate the outcomes with its counterpart such as setting up 
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an information system on water release warning, conducting water quality study, and carrying out 
impact assessment. Besides facilitating the meeting, MRC Secretariat assisted MOWRAM in 
setting up water level monitoring stations on Se San River in Cambodia in 2000, giving technical 
support on commenting TORs for impact assessment in 2001, and conducting water quality 
assessment in 2004. 
Although much has been realized, the outcomes of intervention were not really successful. As the 
above cases showed, the information system on water release warning has not fully been 
implemented as there were no proper communication facilities at provincial and local level. The 
water quality assessment by the MRC Secretariat seems not to be successful either because the 
probability of accuracy of sampling method was limited to only once every month during the dry 
season and once every two months during the wet season. With regard to compensation, the 
compensation deal claims by affected communities is unlikely to be a success since no action 
plan has been put forward to negotiate further between the Cambodia and Vietnam Joint 
Committee for Management of Se San River. 
To conclude this chapter I argue that without political support from central government the 
Cambodian negotiators have no power to negotiate with Vietnam over the issue of hydropower 
dam impacts in the Se San River. One of the important political supports identified in this study 
is to power the Cambodia Joint Committee with budget to continue organizing the meeting. 
As we have seen from the foregoing discussion, there are many aspects which related to the 
influence of Vietnam over Cambodia. In Ratanakiri province, the political and economic tie 
between the bordering provinces is strongly established and, as the case showed, the Vietnamese 
bordering provincial authorities have a strong influence on Ratanakiri provincial authority 
through providing financial supports such as constructing schools, roads, dormitory and general 
assistance. As far as the political structure of Cambodia is concerned (see section 5.2) this 
political and economic tie between the bordering provinces is enforced through a bilateral 
agreement between Cambodia and Vietnam (see also chapter 6 section 6.5). Representing the 
highest level of this bilateral agreement is the Ministries of the Interiors of Cambodia and of 
Vietnam. Any decision taken by Ratanakiri provincial authority has to be aligned with or subjects 
to approval by the Ministry of the Interior. This is particularly important in regard to the deal of 
the Se San issue as the matter has an international implication that needs to be engaged by the 
decision of the highest authority. The same is true with the Ministry of the Interior of Cambodia. 
As discussed in section 5.2 on the political structure of Cambodia, Ministry of the Interior is 
accountable to the Council of Ministers led by Prime Minister. Any decision taken by the 
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ministry has to be consulted with the Prime Minister. Again, since the Se San issue is an 
international issue therefore consultation and approval of decision from the highest authority is 
critically important. The statement by Ratanakiri provincial governor that compensation was not 
required by the Cambodia government reflects the decision ordered from the central government. 
Such decision was favor to Vietnam government perhaps due to close political relationship 
between present Cambodian government and the Vietnamese leadership who helped to liberate 
Cambodia from Khmer Rouge regime in 1979 (see also chapter 6 section 6.5 and section 6.6). 
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CHAPTER 6 
INTERNATIONAL AND GLOBAL ARENAS: MORE PROTESTS MORE DAMS 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses responses undertaken by various actors across global and international 
levels in relation to the Yali-Falls dam impacts and other issues related to hydropower 
development not only in the upper but also the lower stretch of Se San River in Cambodia. This 
chapter consists of six sections. Section 6.2 explores the role of distant actors whose working 
agenda is to help affected local communities to protest and fight against the Yali-Falls dam and 
other dams development on the Se San River. Section 6.3 discusses responses taken by ADB in 
withdrawing financial support for Se San 3 dam as a result of the Yali-Falls dam impacts. Section 
6.4 examines responses and the issue of power relations of the MRC Secretariat. Section 6.5 
studies the processes by which Electricity of Vietnam (EVN) negotiates for building dam in 
Cambodia’s stretch of Se San River. Section 6.6 provides conclusion of the chapter. 
6.2 Protesting and fighting against the Yali-Falls dam: the role of distant actors 
The February 2000 flood event caused by water release from the Yali-Falls dam induced various 
global and international activists and NGOs to protest against the dam. 
After the flood event, Oxfam America was the first important player in providing financial 
resources to document downstream impacts in Ratanakiri province. The most influential report 
produced under this financial support is “A study of the downstream impacts of the Yali-Falls 
dam in the Se San River Basin in Ratanakiri Province, Northeast Cambodia” conducted in April 
2000. The study was conducted by a Canadian researcher, Ian Baird, from Global Association for 
People and the Environment (GAPE) based in Canada. Ian Baird continued to support affected 
communities by helping design a local based community project called Se San Protection 
Network (SPN). 
SPN was established, with the financial support from Oxfam America, in Ratanakiri province in 
2001 (see chapter 4, section 4.5). To strengthen this network, a river coalition network was 
established in 2003 (see chapter 4, section 4.6.2). This river coalition network was transformed 
from Se San Working Group (SWG) in 2003 to 3S Working Group in 2005 and finally to Rivers 
Coalition in Cambodia (RCC) in 2007 (see chapter 4, section 4.6.2). 
While this river coalition network was built to involve concerned stakeholders from local to 
national levels, international actors play a vital role in supporting this network. These 
international actors include Oxfam America, Probe International in Canada, International Rivers 
(previously known as International Rivers Network – IRN) in America, Global Association for 
People and the Environment (GAPE) in Canada, Australian Mekong Resource Center (AMRC) in 
Australia, Mekong Watch in Japan, and Towards Ecological Recovery and Regional Alliance 
(TERRA) in Thailand.29 
Some members of this group had been involved in Se San issues as early as 2000 in response to 
February 2000 flood event caused by water release from Yali-Falls dam. Besides Oxfam America 
and GAPE, TERRA wrote a letter to MRC Secretariat, questioning about the extent of damage 
caused by the water release and clarifying the role of MRC Secretariat, on 8 March 2000 as 
follows: 
“…We have been made aware from the news report, ‘Error causes fatal floods,’ dated 5 
March 2000, in the Bangkok Post, that releases from the Yali Falls Hydroelectric Project 
have resulted in the deaths of three people in Ratanakiri province, Cambodia and further 
that hundreds of farms have been damaged. 
….As the Mekong River Commission is the institution with responsibility to coordinate 
implementation of this agreement, could you please advise us as to the following. 
 What actions or occurrences caused the tragedy identified in the report mentioned 
above? 
 What is the extent of damage to persons, the environment and peoples’ livelihoods in 
the affected provinces in Cambodia and Vietnam? 
 Which institutions, States or persons are responsible for this tragedy? 
 Will the Mekong River Commission be instigating an investigative mission to identify 
the causes and impacts of this tragic event?” 
(TERRA, 2000) 
As a result of complaints from international organizations in early 2000, MRC Secretariat 
prepared a fact finding mission to the affected area in Ratanakiri province from 16 to 19 March 
2000 (the outcomes of this fact finding mission are discussed in chapter 5). In a “Terms of 
Reference for Fact Finding Mission to Ratanakiri on Downstream Effect of Yali Reservoir 
Operation” the MRC Secretariat cited reference of enquiries from NGOs as follow: 
                                                 
29 http://www.oxfamamerica.org, http://www.probeinternational.org, http://www.internationalrivers.org, 
http://www.gapeinternational.org, http://www.mekong.es.usyd.edu.au, http://www.terraper.org  
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“…In the meantime, there are enquiries from some NGOs… on the issue addressed to the 
MRC Secretariat. In order to have first hand information on the situation in Ratanakiri, an 
MRC Secretariat mission of three members will be dispatched to the Ratanakiri province 
to gather necessary information on the matter” (MRC, 2000a). 
While some organizations had been writing letters to MRC Secretariat, others had been 
addressing the issues to funding agencies to take a major step to stop financing further dam 
building on Se San River and to press EVN to compensate and mitigate the impacts according to 
international law. Realizing that the World Bank had been involved in providing a loan to EVN 
to build the transmission line from the Yali-Falls dam to Ho Chi Minh City in 1998, Probe 
International and International Rivers jointly wrote a letter to the World Bank for intervention on 
10 October 2002 as follows. 
“I am writing to urge you to investigate the failure of the World Bank- financed utility, 
Electricity of Vietnam (EVN), to mitigate and compensate for economic and 
environmental damage caused to thousands of Cambodians living downstream of EVN’s 
Yali-Falls dam. Since 1998, the World Bank has provided loans to EVN worth US$575 
million for electricity transmission and distribution facilities, including transmission lines 
connecting the Yali-Falls dam to Ho Chi Minh City…. 
As a major donor to EVN, the World Bank has a responsibility to ensure that its client-
utility is held accountable for the environmental damages and economic losses incurred 
by downstream communities….. 
In June, EVN made matters even worse: The utility began construction of a second hydro 
dam, known as Se San 3, about 20 km downstream of the Yali-Falls dam. Not only has 
EVN failed to address problems caused by its first dam, it has failed to notify or consult 
downstream Cambodians about its second dam. 
By its actions, EVN has shown contempt for the rights of Cambodians who depend upon 
the Se San River for water, food, and income. The utility has sought to expropriate and 
monopolize the Se San River for hydropower production without paying the real costs of 
doing so, and by violating the rights of other river users. We therefore urge the World 
Bank to do the following: 
 Ensure that EVN halts construction of its second dam on the Se San River until an 
open and independent assessment of the environmental damages and economic losses, 
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 Ensure that EVN respects the rights of downstream Cambodians – including, but not 
limited to, the right to fair and timely compensation for economic losses, and the right 
to negotiate environmental mitigation measures to minimize the adverse effects of the 
dam’s operation on the riverine environment.” 
(Probe International and International Rivers Network, 2002) 
The above request for intervention did not yield a positive result. The World Bank considered its 
financial loan was just for building transmission lines connecting the dam site to Ho Chi Minh 
City but not the construction of the Yali-Falls dam per se and therefore it cannot dictate or 
impose pressure on EVN. In a reply letter to Probe International and International Rivers, the 
World Bank defended its position in relation to the Se San issue by explaining that: 
“We agree with you that projects should address and properly manage environmental and 
social impacts, including those impacts which occur beyond national borders as a result of 
the project. At the same time, we should note at the outset that the World Bank is not 
financing the Yali-Falls dam. Indeed, the dam’s construction began in 1992 and, to our 
knowledge, since then has been fully financed by the EVN with its own resources or those 
of the Government of Vietnam. We are also not involved with Se San 3, and have no 
plans for being involved in this project. 
The World Bank’s strategy in Vietnam’s energy sector has been focused on enhancing 
rural access, rehabilitation/expansion of the power systems and sector reform. As a part of 
this strategy, our involvement in the energy sector in Vietnam has thus focused also on 
strengthening the country’s transmission and distribution network, including the 500 kV 
Pleiku to Phulan and Pleiku to Danang transmission lines. These transmission lines will 
improve services to rural areas, optimize the overall efficiency of the system, and 
contribute to the overall reform of the sector, including mobilizing private sector 
financing for expansion. Environmental Assessments and Resettlement Action Plans were 
prepared for these transmission lines in accordance with World Bank policies and 
procedures.” 
(World Bank, 2003a) 
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Probe International and International Rivers were disappointed with the response of the World 
Bank. In fact, without transmission line the electricity production cannot be transmitted and 
therefore there is no point to have large scale hydropower dams on the Se San River. In their 
reaction, Probe International and International Rivers tried to clarify that the World Bank 
involvement in providing loans for transmission lines is equally important as the construction of 
Yali-Falls dam and therefore they insisted that the World Bank could press EVN to stop further 
dam construction on the Se San River until the issue of Yali-Falls dam impact was solved. As 
pointed out in their responding letter to the World Bank on 29 April 2003, Probe International 
and International Rivers wrote that: 
“In response we would like to clarify several points and request further action from the 
Bank. First, we understand that the World Bank did not finance Vietnam’s Yali-Falls dam 
nor did we claim this in our letter. Rather our point is that the Bank has provided US$575 
million worth of loans to the dam owner, Electricity of Vietnam Corporation (EVN), for 
transmission and distribution facilities including the transmission line from Yali-Falls 
dam to Ho Chi Minh City. Therefore, while the Bank is not financing the construction of 
Yali-Falls or other dams along the Se San River, Bank financing for EVN’s transmission 
lines is a subsidy to its hydro dam investments, without which EVN could not deliver its 
output from Yali-Falls to demand centers throughout the country. EVN will likely repay 
its World Bank transmission loans using revenues generated from Yali-Falls and other 
hydro projects, therefore the Bank has a clear interest in the viability and integrity of 
EVN. We therefore expect the Bank to ensure that EVN accounts for the cost-side of its 
dam operations in an honest, timely, and accountable manner. 
We are pleased that the Bank intends to discuss the concerns raised by affected 
communities and citizens groups with its clients, the Government of Vietnam and 
Cambodia, and the Phnom Penh-based Mekong River Commission. During these 
discussions, we urge you to press EVN to do the following: 
 Halt construction of all further dams on the Se San River, including Se San 3, until an 
open and independent assessment of the environmental damages and economic losses 
caused by the first dam, Yali-Falls, is completed and made public; 
 Respect the rights of people living downstream of Yali-Falls – this includes the right 
to fair and timely compensation for economic losses, and the right to negotiate with 
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(Probe International and International Rivers Network, 2003) 
In August 2003, a team from the World Bank, led by the World Bank’s country director for 
Cambodia Nisha Agrawal, visited Ratanakiri province. In a World Bank’s newsletter issued in 
September 2003 the World Bank clarified the purpose of the trip that “The Yali-Falls dam was 
not funded by the World Bank. But the Bank is interested in understanding the nature and causes 
of poverty in Cambodia, and in finding and supporting solutions for poverty reduction. In that 
context, the Bank seeks to understand how the Yali-Falls dam is affecting the lives of poor people 
in Ratanakiri and what efforts are being made by the communities themselves, as well as by 
provincial and national authorities to address these problems” (World Bank, 2003b). 
During the visit to Ratanakiri from 25 to 29 August, Agrawal told NGOs that “we are not 
involved in the Se San dams. We cannot do anything to stop these dams. This is an issue we can 
raise but the Bank is not more powerful than the government (3S Working Group, 2003).” 
Further, Agrawal continued her argument that “the World Bank could say they won’t fund the 
transmission line but they will fund schools. Vietnam will continue to construct the transmission 
line by relocating money allocated for schools. What we can do is to encourage Vietnam to 
follow laws and best practice… We can only change practice by pointing out that something is 
wrong and trying to persuade them to adopt better practices, not by withdrawing funds (ibid.).” 
Although the World Bank took an effort to visit affected communities in Ratanakiri province, the 
visit did not yield a satisfactory result as perceived by Probe International and International 
Rivers because the World Bank country director for Cambodia continued to convince the affected 
communities and the NGOs that it did not fund the Yali-Falls dam and the other dams on the Se 
San River and therefore could not press Vietnam to stop dam building as called by local 
communities and NGOs. In response to this visit Probe International and International Rivers 
made an unsatisfactorily remark in a letter to the World Bank on 12 March 2004 that “since…the 
August 2003 visit to affected communities by Nisha Agrawal, World Bank country director for 
Cambodia, we have reviewed the situation and find no evidence of progress in resolving 
Cambodians’ concerns about EVN’s hydro dams” (Probe International and International Rivers 
Network, 2004). Further the two organizations continued to ague that “your [last] letter assured 
that the World Bank is paying special attention to improving EVN’s performance, particularly its 
application of best practices and compliance with international norms of operation. Clearly, EVN 
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is not getting the message. Or perhaps EVN expects continued World Bank support regardless of 
its reckless operations and mistreatment of riparian communities” (ibid.). In the letter the two 
organizations continued to urge the World Bank to press EVN to take the following four actions 
(ibid.): 
a. Halt all dam construction on the Se San until EVN adjusts the Yali-Falls dam’s 
operating regime to mimic the Se San River’s natural flows and until an optimal 
operating  regime is developed to the satisfaction of all stakeholders, particularly 
communities living close to the river; 
b. Assess short term damages caused by spills from January 1999 to the time they are 
brought under control to the satisfaction of representatives of downstream residents in 
Vietnam and Cambodia; 
c. Compensate all persons who have suffered losses, injury, dislocation of activities, 
reduction of food production, inconvenience etc., and 
d. Set up a discharge warning system to prevent further tragedies. 
Despite the above struggle in explaining and urging by the two international organizations, the 
World Bank continued to keep the Se San issue away from its responsibility with the same 
argument that it was not involved in construction of dams in the Se San River and requested the 
two organizations to address the issue to the Vietnamese and Cambodian governments. As 
indicated in a letter to Probe International and International Rivers on 4 June 2004, the World 
Bank stated that: 
“… As you are aware, the World Bank is not involved in construction or operation of any 
dams in the Se San River. As part of our engagement with the energy sector in Vietnam, 
the World Bank will continue to support integration of environmental and social issues 
into the planning, development and operation of the energy sector in Vietnam through 
policy dialogue, technical studies and institutional strengthening. At the same time, the 
Bank cannot assume blanket responsibility for all projects in the energy sector when we 
have no direct involvement in them…. 
… since we are not financing these projects and therefore, do not have direct access to 
information on how the Vietnamese and Cambodian governments are progressing with 
this work, we suggest that requests for specific information about progress on Se San 
River developments are most appropriately addressed to the Government of Vietnam and 
to EVN….” (World Bank, 2004) 
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So far we have seen that the two parties (Probe International and International Rivers, and the 
World Bank) continued to have different argument in regard to hydropower dam issue on the Se 
San River. The differences of argument can be understood as having different interest of each 
party. While the interest of Probe International and International Rivers was to fight against dam 
construction and dam impacts to lift up the voice of local communities and their livelihoods in 
Cambodia, the interest of the World Bank was to support Vietnam in constructing national power 
grid to lift up the economic development in Vietnam through provision of electricity that 
connects the electricity producers to the consumers. In this case the power grid serves as a market 
gateway for electricity producer. Since hydropower development is one of the largest electricity 
producers in Vietnam therefore the construction of the power grid can be seen as promoting 
hydropower development behind the scenes. As such we can interpret that the relations between 
the construction of hydropower dam and the construction of national power grid are strongly 
linked. Since EVN is the owner of the Se San dams and the World Bank is the loan provider for 
the national power grid construction therefore both entities’ relationships are very strong. With 
this assumption, I argue that Probe International and International Rivers have chosen a 
convincingly strategic action to press EVN to stop further dam building on the Se San River 
through the intermediary, the World Bank. But why does the result of this response fail to enroll 
the World Bank? Why is that so? Does the Bank find dam development in Vietnam more 
important than the impacts occurred in Cambodia? Below I attempt to explain the reason behind 
the engagement of the World Bank in Vietnam. 
In this discussion I argue that the construction of national power grid supported by the World 
Bank is rooted in a larger sphere of the World Bank’s lending policy for Vietnam which began in 
1994. As explained in chapter 3 section 3.3, Vietnam began economic policies reform in the mid 
1980s and led to high economic growth in the early 1990s. The World Bank, along with other 
donors and observers of the “Asian miracle” saw Vietnam in the early 1990s as the next Asian 
Tiger (World Bank, 2001). After suspension of Vietnam’s membership in 1979 (Middleton et al., 
2009), the World Bank started to re-engage with Vietnam in 1988 with the mission to learn about 
the scope and impact of the Vietnamese economic reform, and subsequently the World Bank re-
enrolled Vietnam’s membership in 1993 (World Bank, 2001). The World Bank began providing 
loan and grant heavily to Vietnam in 1994. Between 1994 and 2001, the total lending amounted 
to US$3.2 billion, approximately US$ 450 million annually (ibid.). According to Middleton et al. 
(2009), Vietnam is now the World Bank largest borrower in the region. The lending was almost 
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double in 2007. In 2007, the World Bank provided over US$800 million a year in long-term 
interest free credits to support Vietnam over the next five year (World Bank, 2007). 
The loan and grant focused on infrastructure, structural reforms and poverty alleviation, among 
which energy sector played one of the core roles in supporting the development in Vietnam 
aiming to eradicate power shortage which was experienced in the early 1990s (see chapter 3 
section 3.3). In energy sector the fund was directed to improve transmission and distribution of 
electricity, particularly in the Southern part of the country; strengthened planning and 
management capacities of the power company; corporatized and strengthen the EVN; and 
assisted government introducing private power to Vietnam (World Bank, 2001). The support of 
transmission line from the Yali-Falls dam to Ho-Chi-Minh city is one of the examples. 
Given the immense demand of electricity, the power sector in Vietnam began restructuring in 
1995. The existence of EVN, which dates back to French colonial times and then under Soviet 
central planning model, was re-established as a State Corporation under the January 1995 
Government Decree No. 14.CP (Wyatt, 2002) (see chapter 3 section 3.3). According to Wyatt 
(2002), the World Bank was increasingly the driver of the reform process. By 1997, the World 
Bank was continuing its provision of technical assistance on further regulatory reform, for 
example, it disbursed US$480,000 between December 1997 and September 1999 in grants for 
‘Capacity Building for Power and Gas Sector Regulations’ (ibid.). A part from this the World 
Bank have been involved in various hydropower planning studies in Vietnam since the early 
1990s (Middleton et al., 2009). The World Bank conceived the preparation of Vietnams’ 
Hydropower Master Plan, completed in 2001 with funding by the Norwegian and Swedish 
development agencies (Lang, 2000, cited in Middleton et al., 2009). 
In its funding evaluation in 2001, the World Bank stated that “Electricity generation tripled over 
the decade and access to electricity grew from 48% of households to about 75%. Transmission 
and distribution losses have decreased over the decade, but remain high relative to comparator 
countries. To meet growing demand for electricity, which is expected to triple within the next 
decade, it is critical to attract private investors” (World Bank, 2001: 17-18). Although this 
statement pinpoints to promote power generation in general, it also implies that the World Bank 
encourages EVN to mobilize resources from private sector for hydropower development. 
Besides its funding, the World Bank assisted Vietnam in mobilizing funds from other donor 
agencies. As Lang (2000) puts it, “the World Bank wields an enormous influence in Hanoi, 
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influence gained not least because the Bank chairs the Donors’ Group meetings which every year 
offer Vietnam around US$ 2 billion in aid.” 
The foregoing discussion shows that the World Bank’s interest was very much favorable in 
supporting Vietnam dams rather than obstructing the construction as called by Probe International 
and International Rivers to favor local communities living along Se San River in Cambodia. 
 
6.3 Funding and withdrawing of support by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
Hydropower dam building in the Se San River involved a high investment cost which required 
financial support from a multiplicity of actors including investment banks, bilateral and 
multilateral donors, and national and international private companies. The Se San 3 dam, located 
15 km below the Yali Falls dam, was the second dam constructed in mid 2001 but before the 
construction started the funding for this dam was a controversial issue across international and 
global arenas. 
Prior to the February 2000 flood, which was reported to have been caused by water release from 
the Yali-Falls dam, a financial arrangement for the development of Se San 3 dam was made. The 
budget for this dam amounted to somewhat around US$ 320 million. Of the total, US$ 80 million 
was a loan by the ADB, agreed in mid 1999, while the remaining US$ 240 million was expected 
to come from international investors and dam builders such as Hydro-Quebec (Canada) or 
Statkraft (Norway) (White, 2000; Watershed, 2000b). Prior to providing the financial loan to the 
Vietnamese government, ADB offered a grant of US$ 1.8 million to EVN for a project 
preparatory technical assistance (White, 2000; Watershed, 1999). US$ 0.9 million of this fund 
was allocated for an environmental and social impact assessment. Consultants Worley 
International Ltd. of New Zealand was contracted for this purpose (Watershed, 2000b). 
According to Worley Ltd. report (2000a), the aim of the assessment was to achieve two 
objectives. The first objective was to assist ADB and the EVN in verifying that Se San 3 is a least 
cost development alternative. The second objective was to prepare the Se San 3 project as a 
model which would be managed commercially using internationally recommended operational, 
financial, environmental and social practices. 
The assessment was carried out from December 1999 to April 2000. The assessment coincided 
with the news from Cambodia that the catastrophic event caused by water release from the Yali-
Falls dam resulted in drowning and damage to property at the end of February 2000. In this 
regard, the consultants noted that assessment of Se San 3 alone was not enough and therefore 
considered to cover the impact of the Yali-Falls dam. In the report, the consultants wrote that: 
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“The accidental catastrophic damage caused by the Yali discharge pattern …, which has 
not yet been investigated or compensated, and which extends into Cambodia, has had to 
be taken into account, particularly as the ADB advised NGO’s that the technical assistant 
team would be working on rectifying the situation (Worley Ltd., 2000a: ES-2).” 
To that end, the scope of the assessment was changed to cover both the Yali and the Se San 3. 
The consultants continued their argument as follows: 
“To meet this perplexing and changing condition, the team had to make a decision in 
April to re-organize the report. The products now delivered, under the title of the Yali/Se 
San 3 Environmental and Social Impact Analysis Study (YESIAS) (ibid.).” 
A draft of this report was completed in April 2000 and delivered to EVN for approval but the 
draft was rejected and warned not to be publicly released because EVN has deemed it 
confidential (Wyatt & Baird, 2007). According to a letter from the ADB’s NGO Liaison Officer 
to a Cambodian NGO, it explains that: 
“In response to earlier requests for this report, ADB requested approval from the 
Government of Vietnam to release it. However, the Government has declined to provide 
such approval, and considered the report confidential … As a result, ADB does not have 
the authority to release the report (Edes, 2003, cited in Wyatt & Baird, 2007).” 
Following the finding of the study, the consultant recommended that downstream impact 
assessment in Cambodia shall be carried out including an assessment of the impacts from Yali-
Falls with the view to setting up negotiations over compensation for damages (Hirsch and Watt, 
2004). Noting this recommendation, ADB deferred its decision on financing Se San 3 project in 
June 2000 and suggested for further study (White, 2000; Watershed, 2000b). 
In July 2000, the Vietnamese government formally announced that it no longer needs ADB’s 
assistance to proceed with the Se San 3 hydropower project (Watershed, 2000b; Hirsch and 
Wyatt, 2004). According to the ADB (Nielsen, 2000b, cited in Hirsch and Wyatt, 2004), “ADB 
was not formally advised of the reason for this decision however we believe that it is due to 
concerns that further studies would result in further delays and there was still no guarantee that 
ADB would be in a position to finance Se San 3 once the downstream studies had been 
completed.” 
After withdrawal from the ADB financial assistance, EVN sought funds from other sources to 
finance the construction of Se San 3. Russia became an important source of finance for the Se 
San cascade. After funding Yali-Falls dam, Russia provided US$58 million in export credits for 
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Se San 3 plus another US$40 million for Pleikrong hydropower project (Waterpower Magazine, 
2002). The balance of around US$220 million for Se San 3 was met through a US$140 million 
syndicated loan among four Vietnamese banks plus US$80 million in EVN equity (ibid.). 
So far we have seen that the actions taken by EVN clearly shows the attitude toward avoiding 
compensation which called by the Worley’s report, eliminating unnecessary delay of the project’s 
construction, and pushing forward dam building without delay. In this case, EVN has 
successfully eliminated the debate at the international arena in relation to the issue of the Yali-
Falls and the Se San 3 dams. 
6.4 The Mekong River Commission Secretariat as an intermediary: responses and the issue 
of power relations 
Due to interrelation of intervention across local, national, international and global levels, much 
has been discussed on responses undertaken by the MRC Secretariat in Chapter 5. Responses of 
the MRC Secretariat are summarized in Table 6.1. This section aims to discuss power relations in 
which the MRC Secretariat has been engaged since the occurrence of the February 2000 flood 
event caused by water release from the Yali-Falls dam. 
In this section I argue that the power of the MRC Secretariat rests on political influence of the 
concerned member countries. This means that the MRC Secretariat has no mandate to impose or 
dictate pressure on any member country when a problem has occurred such as the effects of Yali-
Falls dam. This is due to the fact that the hierarchy of the MRC follows the line of political 
structures of Council, Joint Committee and Secretariat (see Chapter 3 Section 3.1.4). The 
decision taken by the Secretariat is therefore largely influenced by the Joint Committee and the 
Council of respective member countries. According to the 1995 Mekong Agreement of the MRC, 
Article 30 stipulates the functions of the Secretariat with seven main duties30, none of which give 
the power to the Secretariat to preside over dispute resolution (MRC, 1995). The resolution of 
differences and disputes is subject to the decision of the Council and the Joint Committee of the 
                                                 
30 Article 30 of the 1995 Mekong Agreement stipulates the functions and duties of the MRC Secretariat as follows 
(MRC, 1995): 
a. Carry out the decisions and tasks assigned by the Council and Joint Committee under the direction of and 
directly responsible to the Joint Committee; 
b. Provide technical services and financial administration and advise as requested by the Council and Joint 
Committee; 
c. Formulate the annual work program, and prepare all other plans, project and program documents, studies 
and assessments as may be required; 
d. Assist the Joint Committee in the implementation and management of projects and programs as requested; 
e. Maintain databases of information as directed; 
f. Make preparations for sessions of the Council and Joint Committee; and 
g. Carry out all other assignments as may be requested. 
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respective member country which are stipulated in Article 34, Article 18.C, and Article 24.F of 
the 1995 Mekong Agreement (ibid.). 
With this limitation of this functionality, the MRC Secretariat assisted CNMC and VNMC to 
form a Joint Committee for Management of Se San River of Cambodia and Vietnam to negotiate 
over the issues of the Yali-Falls dam. The agenda of negotiation was set by both CNMC and 
VNMC with the facilitation of the MRC Secretariat. The direction of negotiation is therefore 
based on the decision of both negotiating parties. As indicated in a letter to Phnom Penh Post in 
mid 2002, Chief Executive Officer of the MRC Secretariat clarified the role and the actions that 
have been undertaken by the Secretariat that: 
 “With regard to the Yali-Falls dam, MRC at the request of the governments of Cambodia 
and Vietnam, facilitated the establishment of a joint committee to discuss the 
environmental impact, management, adverse effects, the dam’s water release and future 
construction. MRC continues to facilitate meetings of this committee through the 
provision of expert advice from the MRC Secretariat. The meetings are coordinated by the 
governments of Vietnam and Cambodia. MRC cannot dictate the direction or decisions 
that the committee makes. That is the responsibility of the two governments concerned.” 
(Phnom Penh Post, 2002c) 
The above statement also showed that the MRC Secretariat can only intervene upon request from 
the member country, and in this case the MRC Secretariat can only play as an intermediary role 
to facilitate negotiation between the two countries. In 2002, the MRC Secretariat issued a similar 
statement explaining its role regarding issues related to Yali-Falls dam and other hydropower 
development projects on the Se San River. The statement claims that: 
“The MRC is an intergovernmental organization created by the four member countries 
and subject to decisions of the members. It cannot force Vietnam to ‘cease all dam 
operations and construction on the Se San’ as called for by the NGOs. In the event that the 
other member countries would call for further negotiation regarding development on the 
Se San tributary, the MRC would be authorized to facilitate such negotiation.” (MRC, 
2002b) 
Although we have seen that the MRC Secretariat has no power to dictate the direction of 
negotiation and decision but it has power to “provide technical services… and advise as requested 
by the Council and Joint Committee (Article 30.b of the 1995 Mekong Agreement)” of the 
member country. In this regard, the MRC Secretariat must assist the two parties with technical 
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advice to come to a fair negotiation in resolving the dispute. In Chapter 5, I have touched upon 
some crucial points where the MRC Secretariat has played a key role to support CNMC in 
negotiating with Electricity of Vietnam (EVN) and VNMC to have fair Terms of Reference 
(TOR) for studying ‘hydrodynamic modeling of Se San River’ and conducting ‘Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA) of Se San River from the border between Cambodia and Vietnam to 
the confluence of Se San and Sre Pok Rivers.’ 
After receiving both tentative TORs (designed by EVN) from CNMC in October 2001, the MRC 
Secretariat reviewed and provided a very comprehensive comment as a basis for CNMC to 
further negotiate with VNMC and EVN to ensure that the TORs addressed all concerns of 
negative effects resulting from hydropower development on the Se San River. Some of crucial 
comments include extending the study area for the whole stretch of Se San River in Cambodia, 
the issue of choosing independent consultants and representation on the work teams, the issue of 
compensation, and advising to use existing reports prepared by NGOs in Cambodia. These 
recommendations were very much favorable to Cambodia. An example in regard to the issue of 
‘compensation’ for EIA study, the MRC Secretariat wrote its comment as follows: 
“The Se San River is a resource shared by two countries. Currently, only Vietnam realizes 
the benefits of hydropower development, while Cambodia realizes only the impacts 
(social, economic and ecological). It is contrary to the spirit of the 1995 Mekong 
Agreement to have natural resources developed in one country at the expense of people in 
another country. Furthermore, the recent World Commission on Dams highlighted in its 
report that compensation to affected peoples is an integral and essential part of planning 
for dam development. MRC recommends that reassessment of or future planning for 
management of the Se San River water resources should include compensation for people 
already affected by the operation of the current dams.” (MRC, 2001) 
Another example, the MRC Secretariat made comment relate to ‘representation on the work 
teams’ for EIA study that: 
“The study is to be carried out by an international consulting company, assisted by 
Vietnamese nationals (as mentioned at the Nha Trang meeting). The impact of the altered 
flow regime in the Se San River on riparian peoples is a contentious issue in Cambodia – 
it has attracted the attention of international media, NGOs, and provincial and national 
governments. In view of this, it is likely that studies conducted on the impact of water 
management strategies, but not involving Cambodian personnel, will receive particular 
 175
scrutiny and criticism. The net effect could be that the study will be considered biased by 
many sectors of the community, perhaps leading to rejection of the report even though it 
may be rigorously derived.” (ibid.). 
With regard to advising to use ‘existing reports’ produced by NGOs in Cambodia, the MRC 
Secretariat stressed its following important comment: 
“In the scope of services, reference is made to the use of existing reports, and that these 
will be supplied to the consultant by EVN. To avoid criticism, the two following reports 
should be included: 
- ‘A study of the downstream impacts of the Yali-Falls dam in the Se San River Basin in 
Ratanakiri province, Northeast Cambodia’, prepared by the Fisheries Office, Ratanakiri 
Province, in cooperation with the Non-Timber Forest Products Project. Ratanakiri 
Province, 29 May 2000. 
- ‘Economic valuation of the livelihood income losses and other tangible downstream 
impacts from the Yali-Falls dam to the Se San River Basin in Ratanakiri province, 
Cambodia’, by Bruce McKenney, Oxfam America, January 2001” (ibid.). 
As far as the above MRC Secretariat’s comments are concerned, Electricity of Vietnam (EVN) 
might not be happy to have MRC Secretariat financing the EIA study for the whole stretch of Se 
San River in Cambodia which caused by hydropower development on the upper part in Vietnam 
since the MRC Secretariat seems to be supportive to the Cambodian side. With this reason, EVN 
has rejected financial assistance from the MRC Secretariat when the representative of the MRC 
Secretariat informed at the second meeting of Joint Committee for Management of Se San River 
on 9 April 2002 that “the MRC Secretariat would finance the study if the two parties (Cambodia 
and Vietnam) requested (Cambodia-Vietnam Joint Committee, 2002)”. At the meeting EVN 
informed that “the process to get a project funded by a donor often takes a long time so that in 
order to implement the project in line with the schedule approved in the Master Plan for Power 
Sector in Vietnam, the EVN fund for conducting study has been allocated (ibid.)”. Detail about 
EIA negotiation process is discussed in chapter 5 section 5.7. 
The foregoing discussion shows that with the limitation of the MRC functionality Vietnam has 
shifted the conflict from an international arena to a bilateral arena in which Vietnam can steer, 
drive and control the negotiation. 
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Table 6.1: Responses of MRC Secretariat after February 2000 flood event caused by water 
release from the Yali-Falls dam 
 
Date Event 
End of February 2000 Flush flood in Ratanakiri province caused by water release from the Yali-Falls 
dam 
06 March 2000 CNMC informed the MRC Secretariat about the cause of flush flood and 
requested for intervention 
07-15 March 2000 The MRC Secretariat communicated with VNMC for clarification and 
information. The MRC prepared Terms of Reference for fact-finding mission 
to Ratanakiri province 
16 to 19 March 2000 The MRC Secretariat conducted fact-finding mission to Ratanakiri province to 
document a brief impacts and to provide recommendations 
28 March 2000 The MRC Secretariat facilitated a meeting between the MRC Joint Committee 
members of Cambodia and Vietnam during the 11th MRC Joint Committee 
Meeting to discuss solution  
20-22 April 2000 The MRC Secretariat jointly conducted a visit with Cambodian delegates to 
the Yali project site. The MRC Secretariat facilitated the meeting to find 
solutions. Mechanism for information exchange to minimize downstream 
effects in relation to dam operation was established. 
April-June 2000 Upon request of CNMC, the MRC Secretariat set up water level monitoring 
stations and rainfall recording station on the stretch of Se San River in 
Ratanakiri province 
August-December 2000 The MRC Secretariat helped establishing Joint Committee for Management of 
the Se San River of Cambodia and Vietnam to implement mechanism for 
information exchange in regard to dam operation 
26 July 2001 The MRC Secretariat facilitated the first meeting of Joint Committee for 
Management of the Se San River 
October 2001 The MRC Secretariat provided comments on Terms of Reference for 
Hydrodynamic Modeling and Environmental Impact Assessment of the Se San 
River 
09 April 2002 The MRC Secretariat facilitated the second meeting of Joint Committee for 
Management of the Se San River. In the meeting, the MRC Secretariat offered 
funding for Environmental Impact Study for Se San River but EVN declined 
for such financial support 
04-07 November 2003 The MRC Secretariat facilitated the third meeting of Joint Committee for 
Management of the Se San River 
May 2004-May 2005 The MRC Secretariat funded a one year water quality monitoring program to 
be conducted on the Se San River by Cambodian and Vietnamese experts 
05 July 2007 Participation of the MRC Secretariat’s representative as an observer to a 
stakeholder consultation workshop on EIA report for Se San River organized 
by VNMC and CNMC 
04-05 March 2008 Participation of the MRC Secretariat’s representative as an observer to the 
fourth meeting of Joint Committee for Management of the Se San River 
Source: Author’s compilation 
 
 
 177
6.5 Negotiating Se San dams in Cambodia’s stretch 
Se San River is full of hydropower potential. In the upper part in Vietnam, six hydropower sites 
have been under construction and operational and one is being studied. The total generating 
capacity in this upper reach is about 1,800 MW (see chapter 3). All of these dams are owned by 
EVN. In the lower reach in Cambodia, five hydropower sites were identified with total estimate 
capacity of 888 MW (PECC 1, 2006). No hydropower has been developed on this lower stretch. 
Following the February 2000 flood event caused by water release from Yali-Falls dam, a Joint 
Committee for Management of Se San River was established at the end of 2000 and negotiations 
between Cambodia and Vietnam began in 2001. The idea behind the creation of this Joint 
Committee was aimed at solving downstream effect which caused by the operation of Yali-Falls 
dam. As we have seen in chapter 5 there were some crucial actions taken to minimize 
downstream impacts such as advance notification of water release, constructing re-regulatory 
dam, conducting water quality monitoring and downstream impact study. 
Other hidden outcomes resulting from this Joint Committee were also related to Vietnam’s 
negotiation to build dams on Cambodia’s stretch of Se San River. During the process of 
negotiation, EVN began to explain its intention to develop hydropower on Se San River in 
Cambodia. A senior official from CNMC told that “Vietnam has been encouraging us to build 
dams in the lower reach in Cambodia, and that, EVN is ready to provide technical and financial 
assistance to back the development projects (Interview 1.1.2). The intention of Vietnam to get 
involved in building dams in Cambodia began at least in 2003. During the third meeting of Joint 
Committee in November 2003, Cambodia party agreed with Vietnam’s request to conduct study 
in the lower reach in Cambodia. The minutes of this meeting stated that “Cambodia side 
requested that joint studies be carried out for Lower Se San 2… through cooperation with 
Cambodia and Vietnam (Cambodia-Vietnam Joint Committee, 2003).” 
Although it is not clear how negotiation process between the two parties has taken place but 
according to Cambodia officials’ argument, there were some crucial points which influenced the 
decision to involve Vietnam in studying and building Lower Se San 2. Firstly, EVN has 
developed a series of dams in upstream Se San therefore EVN will ensure enough flow for 
downstream dam (Interview 1.2.4). Secondly, EVN has both technical and financial capacity in 
building dam (interview 1.3.1). Thirdly, EVN understands well about the issues which caused by 
Yali-Falls dam (Interview 1.1.3). These arguments infer that the preference of dam building on 
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the lower reach of Se San River in Cambodia has been particularly allocated for EVN of Vietnam 
and therefore the whole stretch of Se San River will be monopolized by EVN of Vietnam. 
According to Ryder (2009: 104), project developers submit bids for contracts in accordance with 
terms and conditions determined by the government but this differs from the Cambodian energy 
ministry’s approach, where developers negotiate concession for projects selected by government. 
This argument is particularly true in relation to the negotiation of Se San dams in Cambodia by 
EVN of Vietnam. During the process of negotiation, formal and informal communication was 
established between members of the two committees. The key players that sit in the Joint 
Committee for Management of Se San River are the EVN of Vietnam and the Hydropower 
Department of Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy of Cambodia. Based on the request made 
during the third Cambodia-Vietnam Joint Committee meeting, EVN followed the formality of 
communication via Vietnam Ministry of Industry to request Cambodia Ministry of Industry, 
Mines and Energy to study and develop some hydropower projects on Se San River in Cambodia 
for electricity supply in Cambodia and export (PECC 1, 2006). Since the request is related to 
hydropower, therefore, the issue was directed to Hydropower Department for reviewing and 
commenting before making decision. Due to the fact that the issue has already been negotiated 
and known by the Hydropower Department, the decision to engage EVN was favorable. To that 
end, on 3 March 2004 Cambodia Minister of Industry, Mines and Energy formally informed its 
Vietnamese counterpart that “Vietnam is welcome to support a comprehensive study on 
hydropower development on Se San River of Cambodia territory to hasten hydropower 
exploitation of Se San River serving for economic development of Cambodia and export (ibid: 
9).” 
In May 2004, Vietnamese team including EVN, Ministry of Industry and VNMC met with its 
Cambodia counterpart to discuss about terms of reference of hydropower plan on Se San River in 
Cambodian territory. Minister of Industry, Mines and Energy assigned Hydropower Department 
to work with Vietnamese side to conduct comprehensive development study on hydropower in Se 
San River in Cambodia. 
In November 2005, EVN approved TOR for investigation of hydropower cascade plan for 
downstream of Se San River in Cambodia and assigned Power Engineering Consulting Company 
1 (PECC 1) to conduct the study from May 2005 to May 2006. 
Among five hydropower potentials, PECC 1 ranged two hydropower projects to be firstly 
developed. The first ranking project is Se San 1 located at the border between Cambodia and 
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Vietnam with the installed capacity of 90 MW. The second rank is Lower Se San 2 located just 
upstream of confluence of Se San and Sre Pok Rivers with the installed capacity of 420 MW. The 
other three projects were considered not to be viable including Lower Se San 3, Prek Liang 1 and 
Prek Liang 2. 
Base on the above study a decision was made to engage EVN to do feasibility study and to 
construct the two hydropower dams. A memorandum of understanding between EVN and 
Cambodia’s Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy was signed on 15 June 2007 (Baird, 2009). 
EVN appointed Vietnam PECC 1 to conduct the feasibility study for Lower Se San 2 dam and 
PECC 2 for Lower Se San 1 dam; and PECC 3 would study the transmission line for the two 
projects (ibid.). Following the completion of the feasibility study of the two hydropower projects 
in 2009, the two plants are expected to finish and put into operation in 2014 (Vietnam News, 
2007). 
The issue of how EVN is getting the projects done was not only related to the negotiation in the 
Cambodia-Vietnam Joint Committee meeting but also through a channel of bilateral cooperation 
meetings between Cambodia and Vietnam involving higher level of political decisions. During 
the ninth meeting of Cambodia-Vietnam Joint Commission for Economic, Cultural, Scientific 
and Technological Cooperation on 21 August 2007, the Cambodia and Vietnam Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs signed an agreement to affirm hydropower development cooperation as follows: 
- Intensify power cooperation including developing hydropower potential of their 
respective countries, encouraging Vietnam company to invest in power plants in 
Cambodia and to work out a power trade/exchange mechanism between the two countries. 
- EVN will invest in building two hydropower plans on Se San River, namely Lower Se 
San 1 and Lower Se San 2 in Cambodia after completion of the feasibility study by 
Vietnam electricity group in June 2009. 
(Cambodia-Vietnam Joint Commission for Economic, Cultural, Scientific and Technological 
Cooperation, 2007) 
Another channel which may influence the decision is also through cooperation between 
Cambodia and Vietnam Ministries of Interior. During the fourth meeting on ‘Development and 
Cooperation of Vietnam-Cambodia Border Province’ on 28 February 2008, the two ministers 
agreed “to encourage Vietnamese companies to invest in electricity plants in Cambodia and 
Cambodia side will facilitate Vietnamese companies to build two hydropower plants in Se San 
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River, namely Lower Se San 1 and Lower Se San 2 in Cambodia once the Vietnamese Electricity 
companies completes the feasibility studies in 2009” (Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affair, 2008). 
All in all, we cannot assume that the Joint Committee for Management of Se San River is fully 
the arena for negotiation between EVN of Vietnam and the Ministry of Industry, Mines and 
Energy of Cambodia to get the projects done by EVN. Other factors such as the Cambodia 
government’s interest in hydropower development and the political setting of the Cambodia 
government may strongly influence the decision for the engagement of EVN in the Se San too. 
In Cambodia, the cost of electricity is amongst the highest in the world (ADB, 2005). The 
Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy (MIME) reported the high cost of electricity due to small 
size of generation dependent on high cost imported oil, the lack of a high voltage transmission 
system and the big losses in distribution (MIME, 2006). Up until 2006, MIME (2006) reported 
that less than 15MW of the 10,000MW total hydropower potential in Cambodia has been 
exploited. Given the huge hydropower potential in Cambodia, Cambodia elites have expressed 
strong support for large-scale hydropower projects, citing the need to secure access to cheap 
electricity to supply Cambodia’s expanding economy (International Rivers and RCC, 2008, cited 
in Middleton et al., 2009). Over the past several years, hydropower development in Cambodia has 
attracted a number of foreign private investors, particularly from China. Middleton et al. (2009) 
argue that most of hydropower development projects in Cambodia have been contracted to 
Chinese companies in the favor of political and economic ties between Cambodia and Chinese 
governments which has been developed and strengthened over the past several years. The 
Chinese government has indicated high-level support for Cambodia’s hydropower plans. 
According to Middleton et al. (2009), four major hydropower projects with total capacity of about 
897MW have been contracted to Chinese companies. 
While the Chinese government takes a major role in hydropower development in Cambodia, a 
portion of the Mekong tributaries of Se San and Sre Pok Rivers which share the basin with 
Vietnam was contracted to EVN of Vietnam to develop hydropower. The reason behind the 
decision is more likely base on close political relationship between Cambodia Prime Minister and 
the Vietnamese leadership which helped to liberate from Khmer Rouge in 1979. As we have seen 
in chapter 5, the Cambodian committee assigned to the Joint Committee for the Management of 
Se San River to negotiate with Vietnam has been constrained with finance and could not 
independently organize a meeting since 2004. The fourth meeting in 2008 was fully financed 
under the EVN’s assistance (see chapter 5). To this end, I argue that lack of political support from 
the government made Cambodia committee paralyze in negotiating with its Vietnamese 
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counterpart, which is one of the reasons why EVN was given the opportunity to develop 
hydropower on the part of its territory while the issues raised by local communities and local, 
national and internal NGOs over compensation and mitigation impact remain unaddressed. 
6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed four different issues in relation to responses from various actors across 
global and international arenas. The chapter examined the protest by distant actors against dam 
building, the action taken by the ADB, the power relations of the MRC Secretariat in handling the 
Se San issues, and the negotiation over dam building on the Se San River in Cambodia. 
The aim of the discussion was to demonstrate that although there were strong supports and 
interventions from well-known dam advocating actors such as Probe International and 
International Rivers, dam issues remain the subject which is largely influenced by a web of inter-
related actors such as the banks, the private financial institutes, the bilateral donors, the 
individuals from government agencies of Cambodia and Vietnam and the EVN who influence 
political system of decision making surrounding hydropower development. The level of influence 
exhibits interest of actors, the financial power, the political power, the strategies and tactics 
played by actors to steer and control over the issues, claims and the resources. 
The main finding of this chapter is that despite there were multiplicity of actions and responses 
from international actors, the Electricity of Vietnam took control and steer the issues away from 
the international level to a bilateral level which was intended to simplify and narrow down the 
issue to only a particularly group of actors. This strategy is to reduce risk and increase probability 
to take control over negation not only to avoid compensation but also to expand further dam 
building in Cambodia for economic gain. 
In section 6.2 I examined the relations between Probe International/International Rivers and the 
World Bank. I found that the failure of the World Bank response to the dam impacts was related 
to the Bank’s interest in promoting energy development in Vietnam. As such both parties 
continued to hold different arguments and perspectives in which they stood. For instance, Probe 
International and International Rivers understood that without the World Bank’s fund for 
transmission line electricity produced by the Se San dams cannot be transmitted. On the contrary, 
the World Bank defended its position that it was not involved in dam construction. The 
discussion also shows that the World Bank’s argument was favorable to EVN than to the affected 
communities in Cambodia. This is due to the fact that the World Bank’s policy toward energy 
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development in Vietnam was strongly rooted within the larger sphere of the World Bank’s 
support to Vietnam in the early 1990s as well as present. 
In section 6.3 I presented a case of responses undertaken by ADB. I found that Worley Ltd. 
Company which was contracted by ADB to assess Se San 3 dam was supportive to the local 
communities’ claim over the effects of the Yali-Falls dam. However, the finding of this company 
was constrained by the strategies and tactics employed by EVN such as rejecting the report 
finding and requesting to keep the secrecy of the report not to be released, terminating request for 
fund from ADB and seeking funds from other sources. The strategies and tactics employed by 
EVN were to avoid the delay of the project and push forward dam building. 
In this analysis I argue that constructing as many dams as possible is an ultimate goal of EVN. As 
we have seen from section 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 every step EVN took is to speed up hydropower 
development as fast as possible. With regard to Se San 3 dam, EVN did not want the issue of the 
Yali-Falls dam to grow and delay the process of Se San 3 dam construction which was likely to 
go through a long process of study and verification required by ADB before releasing funds for 
this dam. Strategically, EVN just diverted its request to get funds from other sources and 
proceeded with construction as planned. With this strategy, EVN kills two birds with one stone. 
While the construction of Se San 3 dam went smoothly, EVN did not worry about the issue of 
compensation which was called by the Worley report of ADB funded study in regard to damages 
caused by water release from the Yali-Falls dam at the end of February 2000. Consequently, 
EVN has eliminated the issue raised at international level. 
Any support by the MRC Secretariat which deems to be unsure about the results, EVN treated it 
cautiously. For example, EVN has rejected financial assistance of the MRC Secretariat in 
supporting environmental and social impact study on the Se San River. The reason behind this 
declination was related to comments made by the MRC Secretariat on TORs of Environmental 
and Social Impact Study of Downstream Se San River which imposed various procedures and 
issues that needed to be followed such as recruitment of independent consultant, taking into 
account NGOs reports on Yali-Falls dam impacts, and inclusion of compensation in the study. 
With the limitation of the functionality of the MRC Secretariat in conflict resolution, the 
negotiation between Cambodia and Vietnam is done bilaterally leaving rooms for EVN to 
maneuver, steer and control the agenda of the meeting such as avoiding the discussion of 
compensation. Given the loose functionality of the MRC, EVN has shifted the debate from the 
international arena to a favorable arena at a bilateral one. 
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EVN tried to accommodate its Cambodia counterpart in regard to solving the issue of operation 
of the Yali-Falls dam such as establishing notification system of water release, funding the 
studies of hydrodynamic modeling and environmental impact assessment, and building Se San 4a 
re-regulation dam (see chapter 5). During the process of the meetings of Joint Committee for 
Management of Se San River, EVN moved forward to negotiate with its Cambodia counterpart to 
extend its ambitious plan to develop more hydropower dams on the Cambodia’s stretch of Se San 
River. 
Given the fact that hydropower development is subject to a decision at the highest level, 
relationships between country leaders were seen as essential by EVN. As the case showed, a 
number of bilateral agreements were signed in relation to the development of hydropower in the 
Se San River. One of the inferences is the close political tie in which Vietnam has liberated the 
present government from the Khmer Rough regime in 1979. 
To that end, local communities complain that “the more the protests, the more the dams grow 
(author’s field note from July to October 2007).” 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis set out to explore how various actors have responded to hydropower dam impact in 
the Se San river basin as a way to unpack how planning process for the river basin management 
works in practice. The theoretical conception for understanding responses was found in an actor-
oriented approach which denotes the study of conflict between and among various actors who 
involved in the development intervention. In this study the term conflict was used to represent 
what Norman Long (2001) called social interface where conflict of interest are fought on arenas. 
The February 2000 flood event caused by water release from the Yali-Falls dam was identified as 
a point of departure in which conflict of water resources use in the Se San basin began to take 
shape and emerge between the affected communities in Cambodia and the dam owner in 
Vietnam. This does not mean that conflict of interest was fought only between the two parties. 
The essence of actor-oriented approach lies on the concept of ‘agency’, which attributes to the 
individual actor the capacity to possess social relation and devise modes of coping with life 
(Long, 2001). Therefore, various actors with different interest took part in the conflict and act 
according to the capacity that each actor plays at different levels. This study identified three 
levels of arena in which conflict of interest were fought, that is local, national, and 
international/global. 
The first case to be examined in this study was responses at local arena. At this level responses 
began to emerge as a result of interaction between the affected communities and individuals from 
local and international NGOs working in Ratanakiri province. This means that social relation 
between the affected communities and the NGOs has been constructed at the soonest after the 
February 2000 flood event. An example of this social relation was the impact study conducted 
jointly by Ratanakiri Fisheries Office and Non-Timber Forest Product (NTFP) non-governmental 
organization in April 2000. Through this study, interaction between the study team, which also 
included international expert, and the affected communities of all 60 villages in Ratanakiri 
province was an important event in which local and expert knowledge had been exchanged. As 
the case showed in chapter 4, most of local communities started to know about the Yali-Falls dam 
only during the study in April 2000. While expert learnt and documented about the impact of the 
dam on local livelihoods, local communities began to know for the first time in their life about 
the dam and the effect they would face. 
The interaction between the local communities and the NGOs did not stop after the April 2000 
study but the relation between the two entities became more apparent and led to a construction of 
social network at local level to advocate the right of local communities to be respected. For 
instance the Se San Protection Network (SPN) was established to serve this purpose. In this case 
SPN was constructed to make space for affected communities to form a strong collective action 
against the dam builder. In this study I found that SPN was not directly constructed by the local 
communities but with a strong support of Oxfam America through the facilitation of local and 
international experts. In this case SPN does not stand alone at the local level but networks with 
one another at national and international levels. This network has grown strongly at national and 
international levels. For example a coalition of activists and experts was established and 
transformed from the Se San Working Group to 3 S Working Group and then River Coalition in 
Cambodia. The members of this coalition group consist of actors at national and international 
levels. While NGO Forum for Cambodia plays a major role to coordinate the advocacy activity of 
local communities with concerned governmental agencies at national level to press for 
negotiation with dam builder EVN in Vietnam, Probe International and International Rivers play 
a key role to advocate the World Bank at international level to put pressure on EVN to stop 
further dam building and appealed for finding solution. 
As we have seen from the above we can argue that the local communities are empowered through 
network relation with various actors at national and international levels. In this study I found that 
network relation between local communities and NGOs at national and international levels were 
strongly established. On the contrary the relation between NGOs and the governmental agencies 
at national level was not strongly created. This does not mean that the work of NGOs is poorly 
organized but rather the governmental agencies are reluctant to support NGOs because of the 
influence of interest of Cambodian government which favors the bilateral cooperation with 
Vietnam established since 1979 as well as its interest in building dam in its own stretch in Se San 
River. An example of this is that up to 2007, local communities had sent six petitions to 
Cambodian Prime Minister to help negotiating with Vietnam to stop further dam building and 
compensate losses but until now no action has been taken to respond to the communities’ request. 
The second case which I examined was the responses at national arena where national 
government plays a major role in finding solution particularly after the affected communities and 
NGOs appealed for actions. In this case I found that the Cambodia National Mekong Committee 
(CNMC) plays a major role. This is because of the relationship that CNMC has with other 
signatory states to the 1995 Mekong Agreement in which Vietnam is one of the members. The 
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analysis at this arena was therefore cross-cutting at the international arena where responses were 
done through the Mekong River Commission (MRC) Secretariat, whose role was to play as an 
intermediary to bring the Cambodia party to negotiate with Vietnam party. The finding of this 
study suggested that the MRC Secretariat has no power to impose measures or compensation on 
Vietnam and its responses can only be done if the two governments requested. This shows that 
the power of the MRC Secretariat is weak and therefore characterized by the influence of national 
interest of the member countries (see also Hirsch et al., 2006). As the MRC Secretariat has no 
power to act on its own stand, the negotiation between Cambodia and Vietnam took place 
bilaterally not under the influence of the MRC framework in which independent international 
mediator should be enrolled (see also Wyatt and Baird, 2007). 
In this study I claim that the involvement of the MRC Secretariat in Se San issue gained a short 
momentum after the February 2000 flood event, for instant conducting a field fact-finding 
mission to Ratanakiri province, establishing water level monitoring stations on Cambodia’s 
stretch of Se San River, and helping to establish the Cambodia-Vietnam Joint Committee for the 
Management of Se San River, all of which were done in 2000 and 2001. The momentum of the 
engagement of the MRC Secretariat became weaker and weaker shifting from a facilitator role in 
the first, second and third meetings of the Cambodia-Vietnam Joint Committee in 2001, 2002 and 
2003 respectively to an observer in the fourth committee’s meetings in 2008. This shows that 
conflict resolution mechanism for river basin management within the MRC framework is poorly 
structured. 
Although I claim that the MRC Secretariat was institutionally weak in response to the Yali-Falls 
dam, it is not necessary that the interaction between individuals working at the MRC Secretariat 
and the CNMC was also weak. As the case showed, the MRC Secretariat was supportive to 
CNMC during the negotiation for hydrodynamic modeling and impact studied in the second 
meeting of the Cambodia-Vietnam Joint Committee in 2002. This shows that the CNMC gained 
some powers from the MRC Secretariat to negotiate with Vietnam. The funding for EIA study 
committed by the MRC Secretariat during the second meeting is also another supportive example 
to the CNMC. Although much has been assisted by the MRC Secretariat, the Electricity of 
Vietnam (EVN) considered some of these assistances with caution. If the EIA were to be 
financed by the MRC Secretariat the EVN would not fully be able to control over the result of the 
study, the reason why the EVN decided to fund from its own source. 
Among the other things which were identified to mitigate downstream impact from Yali reservoir 
operation was the establishment of warning system from the dam site down to the local 
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communities in Cambodia. However, the implementation of this measure was not successful as 
the information did not reach the affected communities smoothly. In this regard, I argue that the 
warning system which was established by the Cambodia government agencies and the EVN of 
Vietnam is just a game in which EVN of Vietnam painted a picture to show something is being 
done to mitigate the impact. 
The third case which I examined is the international and global arenas where the issue on dam 
development was put into discussion in international and global agenda. In this study the role of 
distant actors was identified as important in supporting local communities to fight against dam 
building and to help advocate dam building supporters to press EVN of Vietnam to stop building 
dam and compensate losses resulting from hydropower dam operation. In this study I presented 
the interaction between Probe International/International Rivers and the World Bank. The debate 
between the two entities continued to hold different view in regard to the involvement of the 
Bank in supporting EVN to build transmission line connecting the Yali-Falls dam site to Ho Chi 
Minh City. This study found that although the Bank did not support dam building directly but the 
Bank played an indirect role behind the scene and thereby favoring EVN to build more dams 
rather than blocking to favor local communities in Cambodia. 
To move forward dam building as fast as possible EVN has shifted the issue which was raised at 
international and global levels to a bilateral level which is more favorable to take control over 
negotiation between Cambodia and Vietnam. This may be in part due the closeness of the current 
Cambodian regime to Vietnam and hence reluctance of the government to offend its stronger 
neighbor. Not only dam issue remains unsolved but the Cambodia government has asked 
Vietnam to build more dams on the Cambodia’s stretch of Se San River. This shows that 
hydropower dam development has become a strong interest of Cambodia government while the 
issue raised by local communities has been largely ignored. 
Overall, planning process in Se San river basin highly served the interest of dam builders as well 
as national development priority of individual country and failed to take into account the interest 
of local communities whose livelihoods depend on river system for living. To meet their interests 
and goals, powerful actors zigzagged their strategies to avoid claims made by affected 
communities and NGO sector. Therefore, future interventions should consider a clear role of river 
basin organization in possessing the mandate to enforce rule and regulation to support local 
communities to have a say in conflict resolution for river basin management. 
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Mekong River Commission Secretariat 
- Do Manh Hong, Director of Operation Division. Interview on 20 December 2007. Vientiane, 
Laos.  
- Keu Moua, Senior Program Officer, Environment Division. Interview on 10 December 2007. 
Vientiane, Laos.  
- Tatsuo Kunieda, Senior Advisor on River Management, Basin Development Plan, Planning 
Division. Interview on 12 December 2007. Vientiane, Laos.  
- Ton Lennaerts, Chief Technical Advisor, Basin Development Plan, Planning Division. 
Interview on 13 December 2007. Vientiane, Laos. 
- Worawan Sukraroek, Program Officer, Environment Division. Interview on 18 December 
2007. Vientiane, Laos. 
 
VIETNAM 
- Doan Ke Ruan, Senior hydrologist, Power Engineering Consulting Company 1, Electricity of 
Vietnam. Interview on 10 January 2008. Hanoi, Vietnam.  
- Hoang Dieu Hang, Program Officer, Development Cooperation, Embassy of Sweden, Hanoi. 
Interview on 7 January 2008. Hanoi, Vietnam.  
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- Kirsti Digerud, First Secretary, Development Cooperation, Royal Norwegian Embassy, 
Hanoi. Interview on 18 January 2008. Hanoi, Vietnam.  
- Le Duc Trung, Deputy Secretary General, Vietnam National Mekong Committee. Interview 
on 17 January 2008. Hanoi, Vietnam.  
- Le Hung Nam, Chief of Water Environment Planning Division and Water Environmental 
Laboratory. Institute of Water Resources Planning. Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development. Interview on 11 January 2008. Hanoi, Vietnam.  
- Le Thi Ngoc Quynh, Deputy Director, Department of Science, Technology and Environment, 
Electricity of Vietnam. Interview on 15 January 2008. Hanoi, Vietnam.  
- Nguyen Hong Toan, Secretary General, Vietnam National Mekong Committee. Interview on 
3 January 2008. Hanoi, Vietnam.  
- Nguyen Nhan Quang, Deputy Secretary General, Vietnam National Mekong Committee. 
Interview on 14 January 2008. Hanoi, Vietnam.  
- Nguyen Thi Ky Nam, Senior Program Officer, Vietnam National Mekong Committee. 
Interview on 4 January 2008. Hanoi, Vietnam.  
- Tran Duc Cuong, Deputy Secretary General, Vietnam National Mekong Committee. 
Interview on 9 January 2008.  
- Tran Trong Chinh, Advisor, Development Cooperation, Royal Norwegian Embassy, Hanoi. 
Interview on 18 January 2008. Hanoi, Vietnam.  
- Vu Minh Tien, Program Officer for Hydropower, Vietnam National Mekong Committee. 
Interview on 4 January 2008. Hanoi, Vietnam.  
- Vu Thi Tam Dan, Deputy Manager of Personnel and Administration, and Manager for 
National Hydropower Master Plan. Electricity of Vietnam. Interview on 16 January 2008. 
Hanoi, Vietnam.  
- Vu Van Tuan, Deputy director, Vietnam Institute of Meteorology, Hydrology and 
Environment, Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment. Interview on 8 January 2008. 
Hanoi, Vietnam. 
Ratanakiri Province (Province, district, commune and village) 
- Ab Deu, Acting Governor of Taveng district. Interview on 3 September 2007. Ratanakiri, 
Cambodia. 
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- Amy Trandem, Information Advisor, 3S Rivers Protection Network (3SPN). Interview on 20 
June 2007. Ratanakiri, Cambodia.  
- Chan Sopheak, Administrative and Finance Officer, 3S Rivers Protection Network (3SPN). 
Interview on 14 June 2007. Ratanakiri, Cambodia.  
- Che Kai, Fisherman in Lameuy village, Veun Sai district on 17 October 2007. Ratanakiri, 
Cambodia.  
- Chea Hor, Project Manager Assistant, Welt Hunger Hilfe (German Agro Action – GAA). 
Interview on 23 October 2007. Ratanakiri, Cambodia.  
- Cheang Lon, Vice-chief of Taveng Krom Commune, Taveng district. Interview 13 September 
2007. Ratanakiri, Cambodia.  
- Chenda Ravuth, Project Manager, Centre d’Etude et de Dévelopment Agricole Cambodgien 
(CEDAC). Interview on 24 October 2007. Ratanakiri, Cambodia.  
- Chi Krodan, Vice-chief of Taveng Krom Commune, Tanveng district. Interview on 13 
September 2007. Ratanakiri, Cambodia. 
- Chim Cheat, fisherman in Talim village, Veun Sai district. Interview on 16 October 2007. 
Ratanakiri, Cambodia.  
- Den In, Fisherman in Kachon Krom village, Veun Sai district on 12 October 2007. 
Ratanakiri, Cambodia.  
- Ev Phal, GIS Advisor, Ratanakiri Department of Land Use and Urban Planning. Interview on 
25 June 2007. Ratanakiri, Cambodia.  
- Heng Saveun, Deputy Governor of Veun Sain district. Interview on 8 October 2007. 
Ratanakiri, Cambodia.  
- Keo Paov, Vice-chief, Provincial Rural Development Committee, Ratanakiri. Interview on 4 
June 2007. Ratanakiri, Cambodia.  
- Kham Phun Kok, Chief of Tiem Leu village, Veun Sai district on 15 October 2007. 
Ratanakiri, Cambodia.  
- Khen Ling, Chief of Pakalan commune, Veun Sai district. Interview on 9 October 2007. 
Ratanakiri, Cambodia.  
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- Khim Sokhon, Chief of Meteorology Office, Ratanakiri Department of Water Resources and 
Meteorology. Interview on 12 June 2007. Ratanakiri, Cambodia.  
- Khlan Liam, Focal Person for Andong Meas district Se San Community Network. Interview 
on 30 July 2007. Ratanakiri, Cambodia.  
- Kim Sangha, Coordinator, 3S Rivers Protection Network (3SPN). First interview on 11 June 
2007, Ratanakiri, Cambodia. Second interview by phone on 30 September 2008. Ratanakiri, 
Cambodia.  
- Klan Thy, villager in Lom Leng village, Andong Meas district. Interview on 9 August 2007. 
Ratanakiri, Cambodia. 
- Lim Kham Moun, villager in Pankit village, Taveng district. Interview on 7 September 2007. 
Ratanakiri. Cambodia.  
- Lou Ven Khim, Chief of Kachon commune, Veun Sai district. Interview on 12 October 2007. 
Ratanakiri, Cambodia.  
- Markus Freund, Manager of VOR ORT, and member of Ratanakiri NGO Network. Interview 
on 16 August 2007. Ratanakiri, Cambodia.  
- Meach Mean, Acting Coordinator, 3S Rivers Protection Network (3SPN). First interview on 
21 June 2007, Ratanakiri, Cambodia. Second interview by phone on 03 October 2008, Bonn, 
Germany. 
- Meung Soun, Chief of Taveng Krom Commune, Taveng district. Interview 13 September 
2007. Ratanakiri, Cambodia.  
- Mon Se, Chief of Phayang Leu village. Taveng district. Interview on 17 September 2007. 
Ratanakiri, Cambodia  
- Nab Bun Heng, Chief, Ratanakiri Provincial Cabinet Office. Interview on 4 June 2007. 
Ratanakiri, Cambodia.  
- Neang Sam Ath, Local Administration Advisor, Project to Support Democratic Development 
through Decentralization and Deconcentration (PSDD), UNDP. Interview on 18 June 2007. 
Ratanakiri, Cambodia.  
- Ngoun Mom, Focal Person for Veun Sai district Se San Community Network. Interview on 
27 September 2007. Ratanakiri, Cambodia.  
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- Nou Teng, Chief of Kalan village, Veun Sai district. Interview on 11 October 2007. 
Ratanakiri, Cambodia.  
- Pau Bun Soum, Focal Person for Taveng district Se San Community Network. Interview on 
30 August 2007. Ratanakiri, Cambodia. 
- Pheu Tia, Chief of Ki Koung Krom village, Taveng district. Interview on 18 September 2007. 
Ratanakiri, Cambodia.  
- Romam Ponh, District governor, Andong Meas district. Interview on 8 August 2007. 
Ratanakiri, Cambodia.  
- Romam Vet, Village chief of Inn village, Andong Meas district. Interview on 23 August 
2007. Ratanakiri, Cambodia.  
- Romas Veun, Vice-chief of Se San Commune, Oyadao district. Interview on 17 July 2007. 
Ratanakiri, Cambodia.  
- Sai Bun Ma, Vice chief of Pakalan commune, Veun Sai district. Interview on 9 October 2007. 
Ratanakiri, Cambodia.  
- Sai Bunlam, Network Support Officer, 3S River Protection Network (3SPN). First interview 
on 27 June 2007. Ratanakiri, Cambodia. Second interview by phone on 16 February 2008.  
- Sat Ratana, Acting chief of Administration Office, Ratanakiri Department of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries. Interview on 5 June 2007. Ratanakiri, Cambodia.  
- Seng Kronh, Vice-chief, Agro-industry office, Ratanakiri Department of Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fisheries. Interview on 5 June 2007. Ratanakiri, Cambodia.  
- Sopha Sobin, Chief of Talao Commune, Andong Meas district. Interview on 21 August 2007. 
Ratanakiri, Cambodia.  
- Tha Bun Lot, Vice-chief of Talao Commune, Andong Meas district. Interview on 21 July 
2007. Ratanakiri, Cambodia.   
- Thoung Sam Ath, Deputy Director, Ratanakiri Department of Planning. Interview on 7 June 
2007. Ratanakiri, Cambodia.  
- Um Sovanna, Chief of Hydrology Office, Ratanakiri Department of Water Resources and 
Meteorology. Interview on 12 June 2007. Ratanakiri, Cambodia.  
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- Uy Nen, Fisherman in Pang village, Veun Sai district on 18 October 2007. Ratanakiri, 
Cambodia. 
- Veng Phany, Focal Person for Taveng district Se San Community Network. Interview on 30 
August 2007. Ratanakiri, Cambodia.  
- Yorn Chetana, Director, Ratanakiri Department of Water Resources and Meteorology. 
Interview on 13 June 2007. Ratanakiri, Cambodia. 
 
2. FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION BY DISTRICT 
Oyadao District 
- Focus group discussion with villagers in Phi village on 17 July 2007. 
- Focus group discussion with villagers in Katang village on 19 July 2007. 
- Focus group discussion with villagers in Padal village on 24 July 2007. 
Andong Meas District 
- Focus group discussion with villagers in Tangse village on 7 August 2007. 
- Focus group discussion with villagers in Dal village on 8 August 2007. 
- Focus group discussion with villagers in Kachout village on 9 August 2007. 
- Focus group discussion with villagers in Tanong village on 13 August 2007. 
- Focus group discussion with villagers in Kak village on 14 August 2007. 
- Focus group discussion with villagers in Kanat village on 21 August 2007. 
- Focus group discussion with villagers in Talao village on 22 August 2007. 
- Focus group discussion with villagers in Inn village on 23 August 2007. 
- Focus group discussion with villagers in Lom Leng village on 24 August 2007. 
Taveng District 
- Focus group discussion with villagers in Chan village on 4 September 2007. 
- Focus group discussion with villagers in Chouy village on 5 September 2007. 
- Focus group discussion with villagers of Ta Bok village on 6 September 2007. 
- Focus group discussion with villagers in Pangkit village on 7 September 2007. 
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- Focus Group discussion with villagers in Rieng Vinh village on 11 September 2007. 
- Focus group discussion with villagers in Kikoung Leu on 12 September 2007. 
- Focus group discussion with villagers in Sonh village on 12 September 2007. 
- Focus group discussion with villagers in Taveng village on 13 September 2007. 
- Focus group discussion with villagers in Phleu Thom village on 13 September 2007. 
- Focus group discussion with villagers in Ta Ngach village on 14 September 2007. 
- Focus group discussion with villagers in Phayang Leu village on 17 September 2007. 
- Focus group discussion with villagers in Kikoung Krom on 18 September 2007. 
- Focus group discussion with villagers in Sieng Sai village on 18 September 2007 
- Focus group discussion with villagers in Koh Pang village on 19 September 2007. 
- Focus group discussion with villagers in Tom Poun Reung Thom on 19 September 
- Focus group discussion with villagers in Tom Poun Reung Toch village on 20 September 
2007. 
- Focus group discussion with villagers in Phao village on 20 September 2007. 
- Focus group discussion with villagers in Vientiane village on 21 September 2007. 
Veun Sai District 
- Focus group discussion with villagers in Lumpoat village on 2 October 2007. 
- Focus group discussion with villagers in Veun Hoi village on 3 October 2007. 
- Focus group discussion with villagers in Hat Pok village on 4 October 2007. 
- Focus group discussion with villagers in Tiem Krom village on 5 October 2007. 
- Focus group discussion with villagers in Kampong Cham village on 9 October 2007. 
- Focus group discussion with villagers in Pakalan village on 9 October 2007. 
- Focus group discussion with villagers in Phnom Kok Lao village on 10 October 2007. 
- Focus group discussion with villagers in Kalan village on 11 October 2007 
- Focus group discussion with villagers in Kachon Krom village on 12 October 2007 
- Focus group discussion with villagers in Kachon Leu village on 12 October 2007. 
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- Focus group discussion with villagers in Tiem Leu village on 15 October 2007. 
- Focus group discussion with villagers in Talim village on 16 October 2007. 
- Focus group discussion with villagers in Lameuy village on 17 October 2007. 
- Focus group discussion with villagers in Pang village on 18 October 2007. 
- Focus group discussion with villagers in Veun Sai village on 19 October 2007. 
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